Price Variations In Online Auctions Evidence From A Thick Market
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Price Variations In Online Auctions Evidence From A Thick Market
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Author : Jianwei Hou
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Price Variations In Online Auctions Evidence From A Thick Market written by Jianwei Hou and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
This dissertation makes following contributions to the auction literature: First, this study develops a classification scheme of online auctions based on two dimensions---market structure (thick vs. thin) and quality uncertainty (high vs. low). Second, the integration of quality uncertainty into online auction studies is new to the literature. By using a certification/brand-related measure, this study provides a natural and direct measure of quality uncertainty. This dissertation investigates how quality uncertainty may moderate the effect of seller expertise, selling strategy, bidder expertise, and bidding strategy on the auction price. Empirical results show that most effects except for the effect of selling strategy on price are stronger when the level of quality uncertainty is high. Third, this study finds that sellers with different levels of expertise approach their selling strategies differently, while bidder expertise influences how bidders respond to the third-party certification. In addition, late bidding has also been shown to increase the auction price. Finally, the effect of different grading services on auction outcomes deserves attention from both auctioneers and coin dealers because such finding helps them balance among grading services, grading costs, and market acceptance.
Price Variation In Internet Auction Markets For Homogenous Goods
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Author : R. Aleksandar Kirov
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Price Variation In Internet Auction Markets For Homogenous Goods written by R. Aleksandar Kirov and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Internet auctions categories.
The Determinants Of Price In Online Auctions
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Author : Chia-Hung Sun
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
The Determinants Of Price In Online Auctions written by Chia-Hung Sun and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This study explores how seller reputations affect auction prices and concludes that earlier findings may be biased due to the misspecification of seller reputation. This paper contributes to the literature by offering significant empirical evidence using Taiwanese internet auction data. Our study reveals that the influence of seller reputations on auction prices is significant, irrespective of the assumptions of linear or non-linear relationships with price. However, failure to consider the non-linear setting of seller reputation leads us to underestimate the impact of reputation when the seller's reputation score is low, but overestimates it when the seller's reputation becomes high. Using quantile regression, this study finds evidence of considerable differences in their impact on auction prices that are dependent on the distribution of price levels.
An Empirical Analysis Of Price Formation In Double Auction Markets
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Author : Timothy N. Cason
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990
An Empirical Analysis Of Price Formation In Double Auction Markets written by Timothy N. Cason and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with Auctions categories.
Reserve Prices In Online Auctions
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Author : Kong-Pin Chen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Reserve Prices In Online Auctions written by Kong-Pin Chen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
The paper proposes a simple model of auctions with an impatient seller who chooses the reserve price and the buy-it-now (BIN) price to maximize revenue. The three main sales channels in the online auction (the pure auction, the BIN auction, and the fixed-price sale) are each shown to be an optimal solution for the sellers with certain degrees of time-preference. The theory also predicts that the optimal posted price for the fixed-price listing is greater than the optimal reserve price for the BIN auction, which in turn is greater than that for the pure auction. This prediction is confirmed by data from eBay's auction of iPods. Using the seller's inventory as a proxy for his degree of time-preference, the data also confirm the theoretical prediction that there is an inverse relationship between the optimal reserve price and the seller's time-discount factor.
Mathematics Of The Internet
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Author : Brenda Dietrich
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2010-11-16
Mathematics Of The Internet written by Brenda Dietrich and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-11-16 with Business & Economics categories.
The use of the internet for commerce has spawned a variety of auctions, marketplaces, and exchanges for trading everything from bandwidth to books. Mechanisms for bidding agents, dynamic pricing, and combinatorial bids are being implemented in support of internet-based auctions, giving rise to new versions of optimization and resource allocation models. This volume, a collection of papers from an IMA "Hot Topics" workshop in internet auctions, includes descriptions of real and proposed auctions, complete with mathematical model formulations, theoretical results, solution approaches, and computational studies. This volume also provides a mathematical programming perspective on open questions in auction theory, and provides a glimpse of the growing area of dynamic pricing.
The Double Auction Market
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Author : Daniel Friedman
language : en
Publisher: Westview Press
Release Date : 1993-03-21
The Double Auction Market written by Daniel Friedman and has been published by Westview Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993-03-21 with Science categories.
This collection of papers focuses on markets organized as double auctions (DA). In a double auction, both buyers and sellers can actively present bids (offers to buy) and asks (offers to sell) for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. A classic example of a DA market (known by practitioners as an open outcry market) is the commodity trading pit at the Chicago Board of Trade. A related process is a call market, which is used to determine opening prices on the New York Stock Exchange. Already the predominant trading institution for financial and commodities markets, the double auction has many variants and is evolving rapidly in the present era of advancing computer technology and regulatory reform. DA markets are of theoretical as well as practical interest in view of the central role these institutions play in allocating resources. Although the DA has been studied intensively in the laboratory, and practitioners have considerable experience in the field, only recently have tools started to become available to provide the underpinning of a behavioral theory of DA markets.
Putting Auction Theory To Work
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Author : Paul Milgrom
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004-01-12
Putting Auction Theory To Work written by Paul Milgrom and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-01-12 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Last Minute Bidding And The Rules For Ending Second Price Auctions
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Author : Alvin E. Roth
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
Last Minute Bidding And The Rules For Ending Second Price Auctions written by Alvin E. Roth and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Auctions categories.
There is a great deal of late bidding on internet second price auctions. We show that this need not result from either common value properties of the objects being sold, or irrational behavior: late bidding can occur at equilibrium even in private value auctions. The reason is that very late bids have a positive probability of not being successfully submitted, and this opens a way for bidders to implicitly collude, and avoid bidding wars, in auctions such as those run by eBay, which have a fixed end time. A natural experiment is available because the auctions on Amazon, while operating under otherwise similar rules, do not have a fixed end time, but continue if necessary past the scheduled end time until ten minutes have passed without a bid. The strategic differences in the auction rules are reflected in the auction data by significantly more late bidding on eBay than on Amazon. Futhermore, more experienced bidders on eBay submit late bids more often than do less experienced bidders, while the effect of experience on Amazon goes in the opposite direction. On eBay, there is also more late bidding for antiques than for computers. We also find scale independence in the distribution over time of bidders' last bids, of a form strikingly similar to the deadline effect' noted in bargaining: last bids are distributed according to a power law. The evidence suggests that multiple causes contribute to late bidding, with strategic issues related to the rules about ending the auction playing an important role
Auction Strategies For Real World Markets
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Author : Joseph Uri Podwol
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Auction Strategies For Real World Markets written by Joseph Uri Podwol and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
The theoretical and empirical study of auctions is of importance to economists as it provides unique insights into the behaviors and decision-making processes involved in the setting of prices that are otherwise unobserved in traditional fixed price sales. The papers in this dissertation look at observed outcomes from real world auctions and draw inferences as to the underlying economic behavior. The first paper examines the practice of auctioneers "fishing" for an opening bid by calling out lower and lower amounts until an opening bid is eventually proffered. I incorporate such a tactic into an auctioneer's strategy set within a game-theoretic model in which an indivisible good is sold via English ascending-price auction by a seller or auctioneer that cannot commit to a predetermined sequence of starting prices in advance. The analysis departs from previous literature by showing that the English auction is not strategically equivalent to the second-price auction within the dynamic setting. This difference has implications for the optimal starting price path, giving rise to an initial starting price consistent with the Coase conjecture. Additional price dynamics resembling "auction fever" are rationalized within this rational framework. In the second paper, I, along with a co-author, investigate theories of non-standard preferences and irrational bidding that have been used to explain the behavior of bidders in auctions online. We test these theories using data from a field experiment that we ran on eBay and supplemented with an observational dataset we collected from eBay. We find little evidence that several of these behavioral mechanisms are important in the field, and instead find behavior consistent with a standard rational model. The third paper examines the practice of shill bidding, whereby a seller in an online auction bids on his own item. To incorporate shill bidding into a seller's strategy set, I model the sale of a common value item via auction where some proportion of potential buyers have superior information and some proportion of potential sellers participate in the market only for the purpose of fraudulent selling. The model establishes the conditions under which shill bidding is supported in equilibrium.