A Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation
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A Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation
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Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 1993
A Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Business & Economics categories.
Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.
Incentives In Procurement Contracting
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Author : Jim Leitzel
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2019-08-19
Incentives In Procurement Contracting written by Jim Leitzel and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-08-19 with Political Science categories.
This volume presents a nontechnical treatment of issues that arise in procurement contracting, with an emphasis on major weapons systems procurement. Employing the economic theory of agency as their analytical framework, contributors assess the incentives that arise, for both buyers and sellers, in different contractual settings. Procurement contra
The Theory Of Incentives
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Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2009-12-27
The Theory Of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-12-27 with Business & Economics categories.
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Incentive Regulation And The Regulation Of Incentives
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Author : Glenn Blackmon
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Incentive Regulation And The Regulation Of Incentives written by Glenn Blackmon and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.
Essays On The Theory Of Incentives
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Author : Shane B. Evans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays On The Theory Of Incentives written by Shane B. Evans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Franchises (Retail trade) categories.
This thesis explores models of procurement, franchising and innovation through the lens of the theory of incentives. Chapter 2 examines the influence of type-dependent reservation utility on the optimality of linear contracts in a Principal-Agent model of procurement. Type-dependency of reservation utility, combined with the requirements of individual rationality and incentive compatibility in the principal's contracts induces a countervailing incentive effect, the strength of which depends on an index of quality or degree of competition that the agent would face in a private market. The results show how the curvature of the reservation utility dictates whether the optimal contracts can be implemented with a menu of linear contracts, and how the magnitude of the private market index influences the net-transfer rule.
The Principal Agent Model
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Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2003
The Principal Agent Model written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Business & Economics categories.
The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. This anthology brings together every major paper in the field.
The Theory Of Incentives
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Author : David Martimort
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
The Theory Of Incentives written by David Martimort and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Economics categories.
Economics Has Much To Do With Incentives Not Least, Incentives To Work Hard, To Produce Quality Products, To Study, To Invest, And To Save. Although Adam Smith Amply Confirmed This More Than Two Hundred Years Ago In His Analysis Of Sharecropping Contracts, Only In Recent Decades Has A Theory Begun To Emerge To Place The Topic At The Heart Of Economic Thinking. In This Book, Jean-Jacques Laffont And David Martimort Present The Most Thorough Yet Accessible Introduction To Incentives Theory To Date. Central To This Theory Is A Simple Question As Pivotal To Modern-Day Management As It Is To Economics Research: What Makes People Act In A Particular Way In An Economic Or Business Situation? In Seeking An Answer, The Authors Provide The Methodological Tools To Design Institutions That Can Ensure Good Incentives For Economic Agents.This Book Focuses On The Principal-Agent Model, The Simple Situation Where A Principal, Or Company, Delegates A Task To A Single Agent Through A Contract The Essence Of Management And Contract Theory. How Does The Owner Or Manager Of A Firm Align The Objectives Of Its Various Members To Maximize Profits? Following A Brief Historical Overview Showing How The Problem Of Incentives Has Come To The Fore In The Past Two Centuries, The Authors Devote The Bulk Of Their Work To Exploring Principal-Agent Models And Various Extensions Thereof In Light Of Three Types Of Information Problems: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, And Non-Verifiability. Offering An Unprecedented Look At A Subject Vital To Industrial Organization, Labor Economics, And Behavioral Economics, This Book Is Set To Become The Definitive Resource For Students, Researchers, And Others Who Might Find Themselves Pondering What Contracts, And The Incentives They Embody, Are Really All About.This Special Low-Priced Edition Is For Sale In India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Myanmar, Pakistan And Sri Lanka Only.
Lectures On Antitrust Economics
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Author : Michael D. Whinston
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2008-01-25
Lectures On Antitrust Economics written by Michael D. Whinston and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-01-25 with Business & Economics categories.
Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Regulation And Development
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Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2005-03-10
Regulation And Development written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-03-10 with Business & Economics categories.
In Regulation and Development Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for developing countries. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of less developed countries (LDCs) and offers a positive theory of privatization that stresses the role of corruption. He develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDC's specificities. In the final chapter he proposes a theory of separation of powers which reveals one of the many vicious circles of underdevelopment made explicit by the economics of information. Based on organization theory and history, and using simple empirical tests wherever possible, Professor Laffont offers a comprehensive evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions and opens up a rich new research agenda for development studies.
Incentives Procurement And Regulation Of Work Integration Social Enterprises In France
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Author : Patrick Gianfaldoni
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Incentives Procurement And Regulation Of Work Integration Social Enterprises In France written by Patrick Gianfaldoni and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) in France become increasingly dependent on commercial resources through public and private markets. Following New Public Management reforms that try to modernize the sector via market oriented management, they have restructured and modified their practices. We compare the normative prescriptions of the theory of incentives in regulation to the actual practices. The trend toward competitive process is described and the form of incentives contract toward workfare is detailed. Are the main insights of this literature appealing for this kind of enterprises? Do the traditional incentives and contract theories ignore some very specific features of WISEs entities? We point out the drawbacks of potentially inaccurate forms of regulation contracts currently used.