Aligning Incentives Information And Choice
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Aligning Incentives Information And Choice
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Author :
language : en
Publisher: Health as Human Capital Fou
Release Date :
Aligning Incentives Information And Choice written by and has been published by Health as Human Capital Fou this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with categories.
Aligning Incentives Information And Choice
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Author : Wendy D. Lynch
language : en
Publisher: Health as Human Capital Fou
Release Date : 2008
Aligning Incentives Information And Choice written by Wendy D. Lynch and has been published by Health as Human Capital Fou this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Business & Economics categories.
Why would someone intentionally gain forty pounds in four months? Why are over thirty percent of doctor visits for reasons that the American Medical Association recommends against? Why would the size of someone's bonus pay affect his or her interest in health? Incentives, that's why. Incentives are imbedded into the rules and structures of our social systems, businesses, communities, and healthcare programs. Similar to the force of gravity, incentives pull behaviors in a particular direction. Maybe you don't pay attention to incentives now-after reading this, we think you will.
Attention Information Processing And Choice In Incentive Aligned Choice Experiments
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Author : Cathy L. Yang
language : fr
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Attention Information Processing And Choice In Incentive Aligned Choice Experiments written by Cathy L. Yang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Incentive Regulation And The Regulation Of Incentives
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Author : Glenn Blackmon
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Incentive Regulation And The Regulation Of Incentives written by Glenn Blackmon and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
The class is theory of price regulation assumed that the regulator knows the fIrm's costs, the key piece of information that enables regulators to pressure fmns to choose appropriate behaviors. The "regulatory problem" was reduced to a mere pricing problem: the regulator's goal was to align price with marginal cost, subject to the constraint that revenues must cover costs. Elegant and important insights ensued. The most important was that regulation was inevitably a struggle to achieve second-best outcomes. (Ramsey pricing was a splendid example. ) Reality proved harsh to regulatory theory. The fmn's costs are by no means known to the regulator. At best, the regulator may know how much is currently spent to provide services, but hardly what costs would be if the fmn vigorously pursued effIciency. Even if the current cost curve were known to the regulator, technologies change so swiftly that today's costs are a very poor indicator of tomorrow's, and those are the costs that will determine the fIrm's future decisions. With the burgeoning attention to information considerations and game theory in economics, the regulator's problem of eliciting host information about cost has received considerable attention. In most cases, however, it has been in context that are both static and stylized; such analyses rarely capture many of the essential elements of real world regulatory issues. This volume represents a fresh approach. It reflects Glenn Blackmon's twin strengths, a keen analytic mind and important experience in the regulatory arena.
Aligning Ambition And Incentives
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Author : Alexander K. Koch
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Aligning Ambition And Incentives written by Alexander K. Koch and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational choice. The main insights stem from a trade-off between 'good monetary incentives' and 'good reputational incentives'. We show that the principal optimally designs contracts to create ambiguity about agents' abilities. This may make it optimal to contract on relative performance measures, even though the extant rationales for such schemes are absent. Finally, we link the structure of contracts to one aspect of organizational design: we show that it might be optimal for the principal to adopt an opaque organization where performance is not verifiable, despite the constraints that this imposes on contracts.
Rewarding Provider Performance
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Author : Institute of Medicine
language : en
Publisher: National Academies Press
Release Date : 2007-02-17
Rewarding Provider Performance written by Institute of Medicine and has been published by National Academies Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-02-17 with Medical categories.
The third installment in the Pathways to Quality Health Care series, Rewarding Provider Performance: Aligning Incentives in Medicare, continues to address the timely topic of the quality of health care in America. Each volume in the series effectively evaluates specific policy approaches within the context of improving the current operational framework of the health care system. The theme of this particular book is the staged introduction of pay for performance into Medicare. Pay for performance is a strategy that financially rewards health care providers for delivering high-quality care. Building on the findings and recommendations described in the two companion editions, Performance Measurement and Medicare's Quality Improvement Organization Program, this book offers options for implementing payment incentives to provide better value for America's health care investments. This book features conclusions and recommendations that will be useful to all stakeholders concerned with improving the quality and performance of the nation's health care system in both the public and private sectors.
Aligning Incentives With Equity
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Author : Matthew T. Bodie
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Aligning Incentives With Equity written by Matthew T. Bodie and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
When the Internet boom wa ...
Pay For Results
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Author : Mercer, LLC
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 2009-03-17
Pay For Results written by Mercer, LLC and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-03-17 with Business & Economics categories.
The numerous incentive approaches and combinations and their implications can be dizzying even to the compensation professional. Pay for Results provides a road map for developing and implementing executive incentives that drive business needs and strategy. It is filled with specific analytic tools, including tables, exhibits, forms, checklists. In addition, it uncovers myths in performance measurement strategy and design. Timely and thorough, this book expertly shows businesses how to drive their specific needs and strategy. Human resources and compensation officers will discover how to apply performance metrics that align with shareholder investment.
Incentives And Information In Multiagent Settings
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Author : Omar Ahmed Nayeem
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Incentives And Information In Multiagent Settings written by Omar Ahmed Nayeem and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
This dissertation comprises three papers, each of which analyzes a mechanism design issue that arises in a setting with multiple agents that need to either acquire or aggregate information for use in a decision. The decision affects all agents as well as a principal, who also plays the role of mechanism designer. The theoretical models that I develop in these papers can be applied to a wide range of diverse settings, but I emphasize applications in the areas of organizational economics and political economics. The first paper, titled ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses, '' presents a novel view of the role of middle managers in organizations. Conventional wisdom regarding middle management suggests that a principal that can administer her organization independently has no reason to hire a manager, and that a principal that can benefit from a manager's services should hire one with aligned interests. The paper highlights a channel through which virtually any principal can benefit from the services of a manager, particularly of one whose interests differ. Specifically, when a principal relies on a worker to acquire information for an organizational decision, she can strengthen the worker's incentives by delegating the decision to a ``biased'' manager. Although casual observation of the game suggests that the manager's position is redundant, delegation benefits the principal. Thus, the paper helps to reconcile the prevalence of middle management with its widespread lamentation. It also illustrates how discord between a manager and a worker can improve an organization's performance. The results are consistent with outcomes from various knowledge-based organizations. The second paper, titled ``Communication and Preference (Mis)alignment in Organizations, '' conveys insights that are similar to the ones from ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses.'' Like the previous paper, this one explains the benefits of biased agents (both workers and managers) in organizations. However, unlike the previous paper, this one assumes that an organization's principal--whose time, technical expertise, and attention are limited--relies upon division managers to produce reports, which summarize information acquired by workers, to inform her decisions. Given this assumption, a pressing question for the principal is not whether to appoint a manager, but rather which type of manager to appoint. Note that two types of agency problems can arise in the setting described above. First, workers that bear private costs for their information acquisition efforts may not exert as much effort as the principal would like. Second, managers that do not share the principal's preferences over decisions can produce false reports. The paper shows that, although preference alignment within the organization may be expected to minimize the principal's losses from agency, the principal may benefit from intraorganizational conflict. In particular, the principal can use a manager's bias to strengthen a worker's incentives to acquire information. Since a manager's incentive to mislead the principal vanishes if the acquired information is of sufficiently high quality, the principal realizes an unambiguous welfare gain by hiring a biased manager. The principal can further enhance her welfare by also hiring a biased worker, whose bias clashes with the manager's. The third paper, titled ``Efficient Electorates, '' analyzes a social choice setting with pure common values, private noisy information about an unobservable payoff-relevant state of the world, and costless voting. In such a setting, an economic argument in favor of direct democracy is essentially one about information aggregation: if all citizens vote according to their private information--which, on average, is correct--then, in large majority-rule elections, the probability that the welfare-maximizing outcome is implemented is close to one. This argument, formalized first by the Marquis de Condorcet in his celebrated ``jury theorem'' and later extended to cover more general environments, is an asymptotic result that requires voters' information to be sufficiently uncorrelated. The paper shows that, for a fixed number of sincere voters with shared information sources, direct democracy is often suboptimal. It then considers the problem of appointing an optimal electorate given the allocation of information. In special cases of this framework, the problem can be viewed as the choice of an electorate from a set of individuals that communicate with each other via a social network before the election. It provides a characterization of the optimal electorate for certain classes of networks. Because the optimal electorate is often a proper subset of the full set of agents, representative democracy--even in the absence of voting costs--is often more efficient than direct democracy. As the paper illustrates through various examples, though, the solution to the problem of optimal elector appointment is unstable, and so a general characterization of the optimal electorate is elusive.
Incentives
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Author : Donald E. Campbell
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2018-02-22
Incentives written by Donald E. Campbell and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-02-22 with Business & Economics categories.
When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.