An Evolutionary Approach To Finding Bidding Strategies In A Combinatorial Auction
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An Evolutionary Approach To Finding Bidding Strategies In A Combinatorial Auction
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
An Evolutionary Approach To Finding Bidding Strategies In A Combinatorial Auction written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
Auctions involve trading of variety of different items. Auctions that allow agents to bid for combinations of items are called Combinatorial Auctions (CAs). The Ascending k-Bundle Auction(AkBA) is a combinatorial auction founded on a notion of bundle price equilibrium. The purpose of this research is to explore the strategy space and help agents evolve strategies for a Proxy version of A1BA(P-AkBA). We use a Genetic algorithm to search the space of strategies. Several experiments were performed for different categories of problems and the resultsshow that the approach yields good solutions. We compare the outcomes of the evolved solutions with the outcomes that result from truthful bidding, and compare prices against those generated in the sealed-bid version of k-bundle auction and the standard GVA payments. We also make several observations about the effect of genetic parameters on the performance of search.
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language : en
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written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with categories.
Evolutionary Winner Determination In Advanced Combinatorial Reverse Auctions
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Author : Shubhashis Kumar Shil
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Evolutionary Winner Determination In Advanced Combinatorial Reverse Auctions written by Shubhashis Kumar Shil and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
Traditional Combinatorial Reverse Auctions (CRAs) are already very hard problems to solve. By considering the multiplicity of units, attributes and objectives of items; the complexity of CRAs increases. Winner Determination (WD) is one of the main challenges of CRAs, and which has been shown to be NP-complete. Researchers limit the auction features because of the issue of time efficiency. We address several types of advanced CRAs by varying the auction parameters. We tackle the combinatorial procurement problem instances using Genetic Algorithms (GAs). In the first instance, we consider multiple units, single attribute and objective. To this end, we propose a modified crossover operator and two routines. Our proposed WD method is capable of finding the winner(s) with a minimum procurement cost and an efficient processing time. To validate our GA-based method, we conduct several experiments and the results clearly demonstrate the good-time performance and the high quality of the solution. In the second problem, we tackle CRAs with two attributes, single objective and multiple units and rounds. We make this problem more interesting by considering all-units discounts and the availability of sellers' stock. To evaluate our proposed method, we conduct several experiments. In the next problem instance, we include additional constraints, such as seller stocks and discount rate. In this part, we perform a comparative study of several exact and evolutionary techniques addressing different types of CRAs. In particular, we show that our technique based on GAs outperforms some other methods in terms of time efficiency. Lastly, we address CRAs with multiple units, attributes, objectives and rounds. We define optimization approach based on GAs that we integrate with our own variants of diversity and elitism strategies to greatly improve the solution quality. We conduct a case study as well as simulated testing to illustrate the importance of the diversity and elitism schemes. We also validate the proposed WD method through simulated experiments by generating large instances of our CRA problem. Moreover, we apply our WD approach to a real-life electricity application based on renewable energy sources. The option for public utilities to organize electricity CRAs to purchase the needed electricity from other power suppliers is a new concept. For this purpose, we develop a constrained CRA to procure power from diverse sources including residents and plants. In our CRA, subject to various trading constraints, an item denotes a time slot that has two conflicting attributes, energy volume and price. To secure electricity, we design our auction with two bidding rounds: the first one is for variable energy suppliers and the second one for other sources, like controllable load and other renewable technologies. Our CRA leads to a complex WD problem. We view this problem as a resource allocation optimization that we solve with multi-objective GAs in order to find the best trade-off solution that lowers the price and increases the energy. This solution consists of multiple winning suppliers, their prices, power volumes and schedules. We validate our WD approach based on simulated data by generating large instances of our multi-objective constrained auction problem. The goal of the experiments is to assess the time-efficiency of our WD method and its significant superiority to well-known heuristic and exact WD techniques. Furthermore, we implement two exact algorithms to solve our complex procurement problem in order to evaluate the accuracy of our WD method i.e. how near to optimal is the solution.
Bidding Strategies In Agent Based Continuous Double Auctions
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Author : Huiye Ma
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2008-09-15
Bidding Strategies In Agent Based Continuous Double Auctions written by Huiye Ma and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-09-15 with Computers categories.
This book provides a new bidding strategy for agents to adopt in continuous double auctions (CDAs) and proposes some generally used tools to enhance the performance of existing bidding strategies in CDAs. It is the first book to focus on CDAs where a limited amount of seller agents and buyer agents trade what they want. The superior performance of the new bidding strategy and the tools proposed by this book are illustrated through extensive experiments.
Auction Theory
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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher: Academic Press
Release Date : 2009-09-28
Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by Academic Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Techniques For Finding Nash Equilibria In Combinatorial Auctions
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Techniques For Finding Nash Equilibria In Combinatorial Auctions written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
Auctions that allow participants to bid on a combination of items rather than just the individual items are called combinatorial auctions. For items that exhibit complementarity and substitutability, combinatorial auctions can be used to reach economically efficient allocations of goods and services. There has been a surge of recent research on combinatorial auctions because of the wide variety of practical situations to which they can be applied. There are several instances in which combinatorial auctions have already been applied to allocate scares resources, but there are still some challenging issues that need to be addressed before combinatorial auctions can be much more widely used in practice. Many different combinatorial auctions designs have been proposed by researchers and recently there has been a lot of work on studying the computational and strategic aspects of these auction designs. In this thesis, I analyze combinatorial auctions from a game theoretic perspective and propose techniques for determining pure strategy Nash equilibrium of combinatorial auctions. For a variety of reasons, combinatorial auctions pose serious computational challenges to compute Nash equilibria using current techniques. One problem is that the size of the strategy space in combinatorial auctions is very large and grows exponentially with the number of bidders and items. Another computational issue is that for combinatorial auctions it is computationally expensive to compute the payoffs of the players as a result of the joint actions. This makes it computationally expensive to determine the complete payoff matrix upfront and then determine Nash equilibrium. In this dissertation, we present techniques to overcome these problems. We present algorithms based on meta-heuristic search techniques, best response dynamics and linear programming to tackle these problems. We present empirical and theoretical results to support our claim that the algorithms perform well.
An Introduction To Auction Theory
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Author : Flavio M. Menezes
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Release Date : 2005
An Introduction To Auction Theory written by Flavio M. Menezes and has been published by Oxford University Press, USA this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of auction theory and aims to provide an introductory treatment to allow students to work through all the basic results. The techniques and insights gained provide a useful starting point for those wanting to venture into information economics, mechanism design and regulatory economics.
Putting Auction Theory To Work
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Author : Paul Milgrom
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004-01-12
Putting Auction Theory To Work written by Paul Milgrom and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-01-12 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Pricing And Bidding Strategies In Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Alexander Pikovsky
language : en
Publisher: VDM Publishing
Release Date : 2008
Pricing And Bidding Strategies In Iterative Combinatorial Auctions written by Alexander Pikovsky and has been published by VDM Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Mathematics categories.
Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs) are IT-based economic mechanisms in which bidders submit bundle bids iteratively and the auctioneer computes allocations and ask prices in each auction round. In addition to strategic problems, the design of such auction formats exhibits hard computational problems. More recently, researchers have focused on the pricing and information feedback in ICAs. This book presents the results of 5 years research in this field, whereas the emphasis was put on the practical applicability of considered auction designs and pricing mechanisms in these auctions. The main topic of this book is a comprehensive comparison of the most important auction designs proposed in the literature by means of computational and laboratory experiments. Additionally, the book presents a new auction design ALPS, which has been shown very efficient and robust in many settings. In laboratory experiments all considered auction designs were tested for practical applicability and robustness against diverse bidding strategies.
Bidding Behavior Evolution In Sequential Auctions
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Author : Paulo Goes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Bidding Behavior Evolution In Sequential Auctions written by Paulo Goes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
Retailers are increasingly exploiting sequential online auctions as an effective and low cost distribution channel for disposing large quantities of inventory. In such auction environments, bidders have the opportunity of participating in many auctions to learn and choose the bidding strategy that best fits their preferences. Previous studies have mostly focused on identifying bidding strategies in single, isolated online auctions. Using a large data set collected from sequential online auctions, we first characterize bidding strategies in this interesting online environment and then develop an empirical model to explain bidders' adoption of different strategies. We also examine how bidders change their strategies over time. Our findings challenge the general belief that bidders employ their strategies regardless of experience or their specific demand. We find that bidders' demand, participation experience, and auction design parameters affect their choice of bidding strategies. Bidders with unit demand are likely to choose early bidding strategies, while those with multiple unit demand adopt late bidding strategies. Auction design parameters that affect bidders' perception of demand and supply trends affect bidders' choice of bidding strategies. As bidders gain experience within a sequence of auctions, they start choosing late bidding strategies. Our findings help auctioneers to design auction sequences that maximize their objectives. Full paper available at https://doi.org/10.2307/41703496.