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Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers


Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers
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Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers


Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers
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Author : Philippe Jehiel
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998

Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers written by Philippe Jehiel and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with Auctions categories.




Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers


Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers
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Author : Benny Moldovanu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001

Auctions With Downstream Interaction Among Buyers written by Benny Moldovanu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with categories.


We study an auction whose outcome influences the future interaction among agents. The impact of that interaction on agent i is assumed to be a function of all agents' types (which are private information at the time of the auction). Explicit illustrations treat auctions of patents and takeover contests. We derive equilibria for second-price, sealed-bid auctions in which the seller sometimes keeps the object, and we point out the various effects caused by positive and negative impacts. We also study the effect of reserve prices and entry fees on the seller's revenue and on welfare.



Auctions Of Digital Goods With Externalities


Auctions Of Digital Goods With Externalities
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Author : Maryann Z. Rui
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020

Auctions Of Digital Goods With Externalities written by Maryann Z. Rui and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.


Data is increasingly important for firms, regulators, and researchers to develop accurate models for decision-making. Since data sets often need to be externally acquired, a systematic way to value and trade data is necessary. Moreover, buyers of data often interact with each other downstream, such as firms competing in a market. In this setting, an allocation of data may not only benefit the buying firm, but also impose negative externalities on the firm’s competitors. The way data is allocated and sold should thus depend on the particulars of its downstream usage and the interaction between data buyers. We capture the problem of valuing and selling data sets to buyers who interact downstream within the general framework of auctions of digital, or freely replicable, goods. We study the resulting single-item and multi-item mechanism design problems in the presence of additively separable, negative allocative externalities among bidders. Two settings of bidders’ private types are considered, in which bidders either know the externalities that others exert on them or know the externalities that they exert on others. We obtain forms of the welfare-maximizing (efficient) and revenue-maximizing (optimal) auctions of single digital goods in both settings and highlight how the information structure affects the resulting mechanisms. We find that in all cases, the resulting allocation rules are deterministic single thresholding functions for each bidder. For auctions of multiple digital goods, we assume that bidders have independent, additive valuations over items and study the first setting of privately known incoming externalities. We show that the welfare-maximizing mechanism decomposes into multiple efficient single-item auctions using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. Under revenue-maximization, we show that selling items separately via optimal single-item auctions yields a guaranteed fraction of the optimal multi-item auction revenue. This allows us to construct approximately revenue-maximizing multi-item mechanisms using the aforementioned optimal single-item mechanisms.



The Scope Of Auctions In The Presence Of Downstream Interactions And Information Externalities


The Scope Of Auctions In The Presence Of Downstream Interactions And Information Externalities
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Author : Onur A. Koska
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

The Scope Of Auctions In The Presence Of Downstream Interactions And Information Externalities written by Onur A. Koska and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.




Understanding Auctions


Understanding Auctions
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Author : Asunción Mochón
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2014-09-15

Understanding Auctions written by Asunción Mochón and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-09-15 with Business & Economics categories.


In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.



Understanding Auctions


Understanding Auctions
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Author : Srobonti Chattopadhyay
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2019-07-03

Understanding Auctions written by Srobonti Chattopadhyay and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-07-03 with Business & Economics categories.


The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.



The Double Auction Market


The Double Auction Market
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Author : Daniel Friedman
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2018-05-04

The Double Auction Market written by Daniel Friedman and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-05-04 with Social Science categories.


This book focuses on markets organized as double auctions in which both buyers and sellers can submit bids and asks for standardized units of well-defined commodities and securities. It examines evidence from the laboratory and computer simulations.



The Case For Tradable Remedies In Wto Dispute Settlement


The Case For Tradable Remedies In Wto Dispute Settlement
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Author : Kyle Bagwell
language : en
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Release Date : 2004

The Case For Tradable Remedies In Wto Dispute Settlement written by Kyle Bagwell and has been published by World Bank Publications this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.




Auctioning Public Assets


Auctioning Public Assets
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Author : Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004

Auctioning Public Assets written by Maarten Christiaan Wilhelmus Janssen and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Business & Economics categories.


In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.



Spectrum Auctions And Competition In Telecommunications


Spectrum Auctions And Competition In Telecommunications
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Author : Gerhard Illing
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2003-12-23

Spectrum Auctions And Competition In Telecommunications written by Gerhard Illing and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003-12-23 with Business & Economics categories.


Leading experts in industrial organization and auction theory examine the recent European telecommunication license auction experience. In 2000 and 2001, several European countries carried out auctions for third generation technologies or universal mobile telephone services (UMTS) communication licenses. These "spectrum auctions" inaugurated yet another era in an industry that has already been transformed by a combination of staggering technological innovation and substantial regulatory change. Because of their spectacular but often puzzling outcomes, these spectrum auctions attracted enormous attention and invited new research on the interplay of auctions, industry dynamics, and regulation. This book collects essays on this topic by leading analysts of telecommunications and the European auction experience, all but one presented at a November 2001 CESifo conference; comments and responses are included as well, to preserve some of the controversy and atmosphere of give-and-take at the conference.The essays show the interconnectedness of two important and productive areas of modern economics, auction theory and industrial organization. Because spectrum auctions are embedded in a dynamic interaction of consumers, firms, legislation, and regulation, a multidimensional approach yields important insights. The first essays discuss strategies of stimulating new competition and the complex interplay of the political process, regulation, and competition. The later essays focus on specific spectrum auctions. Combining the empirical data these auctions provide with recent advances in microeconomic theory, they examine questions of auction design and efficiency and convincingly explain the enormous variation of revenues in different auctions.