Common Ownership Competition And Top Management Incentives
DOWNLOAD
Download Common Ownership Competition And Top Management Incentives PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Common Ownership Competition And Top Management Incentives book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Common Ownership Competition And Top Management Incentives
DOWNLOAD
Author : Miguel Anton
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Common Ownership Competition And Top Management Incentives written by Miguel Anton and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership causes variation in managerial incentives and productivity across firms, which leads to intra-industry and intra-firm cross-market variation in prices, output, markups, and market shares that is consistent with empirical evidence. The organizational structure of multiproduct firms and the passivity of common owners determine whether higher prices under common ownership result from higher costs or from higher markups. Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design we document that managerial incentives are less performance-sensitive in firms with more common ownership.
Who S Paying Attention
DOWNLOAD
Author : Erik P. Gilje
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Who S Paying Attention written by Erik P. Gilje and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with Corporate governance categories.
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager's actions benefit the investor's overall portfolio. Empirically, we show that potential drivers of ownership overlap, including mergers in the asset management industry and the growth of indexing, could in fact diminish managerial motives. Our findings illustrate the importance of accounting for investor inattention and cast doubt on the possibility that the growth of common ownership has had a significant impact on managerial incentives.
Who S Paying Attention
DOWNLOAD
Author : Erik P. Gilje
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Who S Paying Attention written by Erik P. Gilje and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to internalize externalities. A key feature of the measure is that it allows for the possibility that not all investors are attentive to whether a manager's actions benefit the investor's overall portfolio. Empirically, we show that potential drivers of ownership overlap, including mergers in the asset management industry and the growth of indexing, could in fact diminish managerial motives. Our findings illustrate the importance of accounting for investor inattention and cast doubt on the possibility that the growth of common ownership has had a significant impact on managerial incentives.
Common Ownership And Competition
DOWNLOAD
Author : Martin C. Schmalz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Common Ownership And Competition written by Martin C. Schmalz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
Competition requires that firms have incentives to compete. Common ownership reduces these incentives. There is no known reason or mechanism by which firms are supposed to compete in the absence of incentives to do so. All arguments in the defense of the asset management industry amount to a distraction from this key point, the absence of evidence to the contrary, as well as from the existing empirical evidence that current levels of common ownership are very likely to reduce competition. This note exposes the alternative talking points the industry and its defendants have brought forward, and contrasts them with empirical facts.
Market Structure Common Ownership And Coordinated Manager Compensation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Werner Neus
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Market Structure Common Ownership And Coordinated Manager Compensation written by Werner Neus and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms' quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80 % of the firms are commonly owned - an astonishing resemblance to the merger literature.
Pay Without Performance
DOWNLOAD
Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
language : en
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date : 2004
Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and has been published by Harvard University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Business & Economics categories.
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Ownership Diversification And Product Market Pricing Incentives
DOWNLOAD
Author : Albert Banal-Estañol
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Ownership Diversification And Product Market Pricing Incentives written by Albert Banal-Estañol and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with Competition categories.
We link investor ownership to profit loads on rival firms by the managers of a firm. We propose a theory model in which we distinguish between passive and active investors’ holdings, where passive investors are relatively more diversified. We find that if passive investors become relatively bigger, then common ownership incentives increase. We show that these higher incentives, in turn, are linked to higher firm markups. We empirically confirm these relationships for public US firms in the years 2004-2012, where the financial crisis coincides with passive investors’ rise. The found effects are small but non-negligible.
Common Ownership Competition And Corporate Governance
DOWNLOAD
Author : Vincenzo Denicolo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023
Common Ownership Competition And Corporate Governance written by Vincenzo Denicolo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with Antitrust law categories.
This paper presents a theoretical framework for determining the ownership stakes held by financial investors in companies competing in the same product market, or, in other words, the level of common ownership. In our model, the primary motivation for these investors is the anticipation of capital gains resulting from the impact of common ownership on product market competition, which leads to increased profitability for the firms involved. On the other hand, common ownership undermines effective corporate governance by reducing monitoring, increasing extraction of private benefits by the manager, and inhibiting investments that contribute to firm value. These negative effects on corporate governance act as limiting factors, ultimately determining the equilibrium level of common ownership.
Common Ownership Institutional Investors And Antitrust
DOWNLOAD
Author : Menesh S. Patel
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Common Ownership Institutional Investors And Antitrust written by Menesh S. Patel and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
Recent empirical studies demonstrate the significant extent to which a small number of well-known institutional investors have taken on large ownership interests in the majority of large U.S. public companies, including large ownership interests in horizontal competitors. The response to these studies has been dramatic, with calls for significant overhauls of antitrust policy and institutional shareholding due to common ownership's potential anticompetitive effects. Yet, this article argues, it is important to first appreciate a number of consequential complexities before any such changes occur. The article shows that while common ownership can harm competition as a theoretical matter, whether and the extent to which common ownership will actually generate competitive harm in a given market depends on numerous factors, such as the nature and extent of common ownership in the relevant market, the structure of the market, shareholder incentives, and managerial objectives. For that reason, the mere fact that institutional investors' significant equity holdings generate high levels of common ownership by itself is insufficient to conclude that this common ownership results in substantial competitive harm in a given market. The article's second contribution is a set of modest, but important, policy proposals that flow directly from the paper's core finding that there is no unequivocal answer to whether common ownership in a particular market will generate substantial competitive harm. Most important, rather than restrictions on common ownership or widespread antitrust investigation, or safe harbors or presumptions of legality, common ownership should continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
The Handbook Of The Economics Of Corporate Governance
DOWNLOAD
Author : Benjamin Hermalin
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2017-09-18
The Handbook Of The Economics Of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-09-18 with Business & Economics categories.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward