Competitive Price Matching Guarantees
DOWNLOAD
Download Competitive Price Matching Guarantees PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Competitive Price Matching Guarantees book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees
DOWNLOAD
Author : Arcan Nalca
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees written by Arcan Nalca and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees Contingent On Product Availability
DOWNLOAD
Author : Arcan Nalca
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees Contingent On Product Availability written by Arcan Nalca and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Price-matching guarantees (PMGs) involve a retailer matching the lower price of a competitor for an identical product. In practice, retailers often make such guarantees contingent on verification of product availability at the competitor location and decline the price-match request if the product is not available there. In this paper, we model a multi-stage duopoly game where the stochastic customer demand is sensitive to both price and product availability. The objective is to understand why and when retailers should verify availability as a price-match prerequisite, and how it affects the intensity of price and inventory competition. Our results establish that the verification of availability may have pro-competitive or anti-competitive effects depending on how cognizant customers are to the implications of demand uncertainty. We first analyze a model where customers are mindful of the fact that retailers will decline their price-match requests based on the unavailability of the product at the competing retailer while making store choice decisions, and show that verification of availability is not the equilibrium strategy since it (weakly) increases the intensity of price and inventory competition between the retailers, increases consumers' surplus, and decreases retail profits. We show that one possible reason for retailers to offer availability contingent PMG is that customers concentrate on price and discount the effects of product availability while making store decisions. In fact, if customers ignore product availability issues while making store choices, then verification of availability is indeed the equilibrium strategy for retailers since it increases prices and order quantities, allows them to price discriminate against customers, decreases consumers' surplus, and increases retail profits. Finally, we show that the above results are valid irrespective of whether customers are homogenous or heterogenous in terms of the price information they have prior to their store visits.
Hassle Costs Price Matching Guarantees And Price Competition
DOWNLOAD
Author : Subhasish Dugar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Hassle Costs Price Matching Guarantees And Price Competition written by Subhasish Dugar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
In this study, we experimentally investigate whether the collusion-facilitating nature of price-matching guarantees survives the reasonable modification of hassle costs incurred by buyers to enact these guarantees. Hviid and Shaffer [1999] (HS) argue that the presence of an arbitrarily small number of positive hassle costs buyers undermines incentives for collusion in symmetric markets. To evaluate the impact of hassle costs, we develop four stylized one-shot price competition models that have sharp testable predictions. While the first model directly captures the implications of HS, the last three models deal with the theoretical analysis of hassle costs in symmetric markets by introducing varying proportions of positive and zero hassle costs buyers, previously unexplored in the literature. Although theory predicts that the competitive price should emerge in equilibrium in all four models, we find significant price differences in the experiment.
Price Matching Guarantees As Signals Of Low Prices
DOWNLOAD
Author : Joydeep Srivastava
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Price Matching Guarantees As Signals Of Low Prices written by Joydeep Srivastava and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Many retailers offer a price-matching guarantee that promises to pay consumers the difference if they find a lower price elsewhere. This article proposes that the effectiveness of a price-matching guarantee as a signal of low store prices depends on individuals' beliefs about the degree to which other consumers in the market engage in price search, enforce price-matching guarantees, or both. Consistent with signaling theory, results of a survey and two experimental studies demonstrate that market level factors affect consumer beliefs about the extent to which others engage in price search and thereby the effectiveness of price-matching guarantees in lowering perceptions of store prices. The implications of the findings for retail strategy are discussed along with directions for future research.
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees In An Uncertain Demand Environment
DOWNLOAD
Author : Arcan Nalca
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees In An Uncertain Demand Environment written by Arcan Nalca and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Price Matching Guarantees
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yuansheng Wei
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Price Matching Guarantees written by Yuansheng Wei and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
Traditionally, competing retailers offer price-matching guarantees (PMGs) whereby they promise their consumers that any lower price offered elsewhere within a specific period will be matched. Recently, a growing number of suppliers have opened their direct sales channel and started to match downstream retailers' prices. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of PMGs on channel coordination and competition in the dual-channel setting. We find that the interaction of the relative channel power and channel substitutability moderates the effectiveness of PMGs by supply chain entities. More specifically, when the relative channel power of the retail channel over the direct channel is small, unilateral PMGs by the supplier decreases both supply chain entities' profits; when the relative channel power of the retail channel over the direct channel is medium and channel substitutability is not high, unilateral PMGs by the supplier benefits both supply chain entities. The intuition behind these results hinges on the trade-off between price competition and revenue allocation. In addition, we investigate the Nash equilibrium outcome when both the supplier and the retailer have the option to offer PMGs. We show that, the retailer weakly prefers not to offer PMGs, the supplier weakly prefers to (not to) offer PMGs when the relative channel power of the retail channel over the direct channel is high (low). Our findings not only complement the PMGs literature, but also provide a new channel coordinating mechanism concerning the channel members' pricing strategies.
The Effects Of Price Matching Guarantees On Prices
DOWNLOAD
Author : Subhasish Dugar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
The Effects Of Price Matching Guarantees On Prices written by Subhasish Dugar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
This study reports experiments on two competing theories of price-matching guarantees (PMGs). The dominant view (Salop [1986]) in the literature suggests that PMGs can alter pricing incentives of firms and sustain anti-competitive outcome in the market. However, a recent theoretical extension (Hviid and Shaffer [1999]) argues that this anti-competitive outcome can be undermined if buyers incur costs in invoking these guarantees. Therefore, it is natural to wonder how these conclusions stand up empirically. In order to provide empirical evidence on the impact of PMGs on prices, we study a variety of stylized market models that capture the essence of the two theories, obtain testable predictions and lay out the design of the controlled experiment. Results indicate that in the absence of any hassle costs, PMGs can sustain the predicted collusive outcome. On the other hand, the presence of buyers who incur positive hassle costs significantly mitigates, though not fully as theory predicts, the price-facilitating power of PMGs. Our findings indicate that policy makers should heed the potentially anti-competitive effects of PMG related advertisements on prices.
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees In A Decentralized Channel
DOWNLOAD
Author : Arcan Nalca
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Competitive Price Matching Guarantees In A Decentralized Channel written by Arcan Nalca and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
An Experimental Examination Of Competitor Based Price Matching Guarantees
DOWNLOAD
Author : Shakun D. Mago
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
An Experimental Examination Of Competitor Based Price Matching Guarantees written by Shakun D. Mago and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overall ability of price guarantees to act as a collusion facilitating device becomes contingent on the relative cost difference. Lesser use of guarantees, combined with lower average prices and slower convergence to the collusive level, suggest that the mere presence of cost asymmetries may curtail collusive behavior.
Are Low Prices Compromises Collusion Guarantees An Experimental Analysis Of Price Matching Policies
DOWNLOAD
Author : Enrique Fatas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Are Low Prices Compromises Collusion Guarantees An Experimental Analysis Of Price Matching Policies written by Enrique Fatas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
In this paper we experimentally test the ability of Price-Matching Guarantees (PMG) to rise prices above the competitive level. We implement three different treatments of symmetric duopolies to check the effect of PMG both as a market institution and as a business strategy. In the absence of any low-price guarantee, prices get close to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium although in the 50 rounds of the experiment no full convergence is obtained. The existence of PMG as an institution in a market where firms decide only about prices results in a clear collusive outcome as all markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction. If we allow subjects to decide whether they adopt price matching or not we observe that almost all subjects decide to adopt PMG; prices significantly increases over the first treatment observed prices and are very close to the collusive ones.