Does Price Discrimination Intensify Competition
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Does Price Discrimination Intensify Competition
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Author : James C. Cooper
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Does Price Discrimination Intensify Competition written by James C. Cooper and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with Antitrust law categories.
Third Degree Price Discrimination In Oligopoly
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Author : Kenneth S. Corts
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998
Third Degree Price Discrimination In Oligopoly written by Kenneth S. Corts and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998 with categories.
Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers; the trade-off of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate--including the adoption of everyday low pricing or no-haggle policies--may raise firm profits by softening price competition.
Price Discrimination
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Author : Fouad Sabry
language : en
Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
Release Date : 2024-03-27
Price Discrimination written by Fouad Sabry and has been published by One Billion Knowledgeable this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2024-03-27 with Business & Economics categories.
What is Price Discrimination Price discrimination is a microeconomic pricing strategy where identical or largely similar goods or services are sold at different prices by the same provider in different market segments. Price discrimination is distinguished from product differentiation by the more substantial difference in production cost for the differently priced products involved in the latter strategy. Price differentiation essentially relies on the variation in the customers' willingness to pay and in the elasticity of their demand. For price discrimination to succeed, a firm must have market power, such as a dominant market share, product uniqueness, sole pricing power, etc. All prices under price discrimination are higher than the equilibrium price in a perfectly competitive market. However, some prices under price discrimination may be lower than the price charged by a single-price monopolist. Price discrimination is utilized by the monopolist to recapture some deadweight loss. This Pricing strategy enables firms to capture additional consumer surplus and maximize their profits while benefiting some consumers at lower prices. Price discrimination can take many forms and is prevalent in many industries, from education and telecommunications to healthcare. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Price discrimination Chapter 2: Monopoly Chapter 3: Monopolistic competition Chapter 4: Oligopoly Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Imperfect competition Chapter 7: Deadweight loss Chapter 8: Two-part tariff Chapter 9: Pricing Chapter 10: Barriers to entry Chapter 11: Yield management Chapter 12: Market power Chapter 13: Non-price competition Chapter 14: Market structure Chapter 15: Pricing strategies Chapter 16: Dynamic pricing Chapter 17: Revenue management Chapter 18: Value-based pricing Chapter 19: Rental value Chapter 20: Profit (economics) Chapter 21: Monopoly price (II) Answering the public top questions about price discrimination. (III) Real world examples for the usage of price discrimination in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Price Discrimination.
Commitments Not To Price Discriminate
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Author : Kenneth Stevens Corts
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Commitments Not To Price Discriminate written by Kenneth Stevens Corts and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms may intensify competition, leading to lower prices for all consumers; the trade-off of consumer groups' welfare that is characteristic of monopolistic discrimination need not arise. This escalation of competition may make firms worse off, and as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Under conditions similar to those in which unambiguous price and welfare effects may arise, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate - including the adoption of every day low-pricing or no-haggle policies - may raise firm profits by softening price competition.
The Economics Of Price Discrimination
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Author : George Norman
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 1999
The Economics Of Price Discrimination written by George Norman and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Business & Economics categories.
This volume brings together significant articles which have appeared between 1971 and 1997, analyzing the application and effects of price discrimination.
Does Banning Price Discrimination Promote Entry And Increase Welfare A Model Of Differentiated Product Duopoly With Asymmetric Markets
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Author : Silvia Jorge
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Does Banning Price Discrimination Promote Entry And Increase Welfare A Model Of Differentiated Product Duopoly With Asymmetric Markets written by Silvia Jorge and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
In this paper we investigate the impact of firms' pricing policies upon entry and welfare under duopoly price competition and product differentiation. We consider a model where an incumbent serves two distinct and independent geographical markets and an entrant may enter in one of the markets. Our results show that discriminatory pricing may be either more, less or equally favorable to entry than uniform pricing. The welfare effect of banning price discrimination is also ambiguous. However, the case for banning price discrimination is much weaker than under monopoly. Interestingly, discriminatory pricing may yield higher welfare even when entry occurs only under uniform pricing.
The Economics Of Price Discrimination
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Author : Louis Phlips
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 1983-06-30
The Economics Of Price Discrimination written by Louis Phlips and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1983-06-30 with Business & Economics categories.
A theoretical and unified explanation of how prices are determined in practice, written in a non-technical way.
Essays On The Relationship Of Competition And Firms Price Responses
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Author : Sungbok Lee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On The Relationship Of Competition And Firms Price Responses written by Sungbok Lee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
This dissertation investigates the relationship of competition and firms' price responses, by analyzing: i) whether new entry reduces price discrimination, ii) when incumbents reduce price discrimination preemptively in response to the threat of entry, and iii) how competition increases prices. The dissertation consists of three independent essays addressing each of the above questions. The first two essays present an empirical analysis of the airline industry and the third essay presents a theoretical analysis of the credit card industry. In the empirical study of the relationship between competition and firms' pricing in the airline industry, I emphasize the importance of distinguishing the equilibrium behaviors with respect to different market characteristics. Major airlines can price discriminate differently in a market where they compete with low-cost carriers comparing to in another market where they don't, and also they can respond dfferently to the threat of entry depending on whether they are certain about the rival's future entry. The study reveals that competition has a positive effect on price discrimination in the routes where major airlines compete against one anther. In these routes, competition reduces lower-end prices to a greater extent than upper-end prices. In contrast, an entry by low-cost carriers results in a significant negative relationship between competition and price discrimination. Thus, the opposite results in the literature are both evident in the airline industry, and it is very important to identify the different forces of competition on price discrimination. Firms can respond to potential competition as well as actual competition. So, I extend the study to the relationship of potential competition and price discrimination, specially in cases where major airlines compete against one another while facing Southwest's threat of entry. I also attempt to suggest major airlines' motives of reducing price discrimination preemptively. The results of the study suggest that incumbents reduce price dispersion when it is possible to deter the rival's entry and that the potential rival discourages incumbents from deterring entry by announcing before its beginning service. Finally, I examine when competition can increase prices in a market, by analyzing the issuing side of the credit card industry. This industry is characterized by a two-sided market with a platform. Under the no-surcharge rule that restricts merchants to set the same price for cash and card purchases, the equilibrium interchange fee increases with competition. This occurs because issuers can compensate losses from competing on the issuing side by collectively increasing the interchange fee. As a result, limiting competition may improve social welfare when the interchange fee is higher than the social optimal level. In contrast, in the absence of the no-surcharge rule, the analysis shows that competition always improves social welfare by lowering the price of the market.
Revisiting The Relationship Between Competition And Price Discrimination
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Author : Ambarish Chandra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Revisiting The Relationship Between Competition And Price Discrimination written by Ambarish Chandra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
We revisit the relationship between competition and price discrimination in the airline industry. Theoretically, we show that, if consumers differ in terms of both their underlying willingness-to-pay and their brand loyalty, competition may increase price differences between some consumers while decreasing them between others. Empirically, we find that competition has little impact on tickets at the top or the bottom of the fare distribution but a significant impact on tickets in the middle, thus increasing some fare differentials but decreasing others. Our findings highlight the importance of understanding the relevant sources of consumer heterogeneity and can reconcile earlier conflicting findings.
Can Price Discrimination Be Bad For Firms And Good For All Consumers A Theoretical Analysis Of Cross Market Price Constraints With Entry And Product Differentiation
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Author : Ofer H. Azar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Can Price Discrimination Be Bad For Firms And Good For All Consumers A Theoretical Analysis Of Cross Market Price Constraints With Entry And Product Differentiation written by Ofer H. Azar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
The article examines a differentiated-products duopoly model where the firms make entry decisions to two markets and then choose prices. The effects of product differentiation and entry costs are analyzed in two games: with and without price discrimination between the markets. Allowing price discrimination encourages more entry and tends to reduce prices and profits and to increase consumer welfare in both markets. The model suggests that firms might be better off if they agree not to price discriminate between different markets. It also suggests that when the market is not a natural monopoly, regulators should consider the effects of universal service requirements on entry before adopting them, because entry might be discouraged by such requirements, leading to less competitive markets.