Effects Of Executive Compensation Complexity On Investor Behavior In An Experimental Stock Market
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Effects Of Executive Compensation Complexity On Investor Behavior In An Experimental Stock Market
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Author : Robert M. Gillenkirch
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Effects Of Executive Compensation Complexity On Investor Behavior In An Experimental Stock Market written by Robert M. Gillenkirch and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
This study experimentally investigates whether shareholders correctly anticipate the incentive effects of increasingly complex compensation packages given to managers, and whether potential biases in individual shareholder beliefs carry over to price and volume effects in a stock market. In the experiment, a manager makes a decision about the stochastic dividend process generating the firm's fundamental value, and shareholders make estimations about fundamental value and trade shares in a stock market. The manager's action is either known or hidden and, nested in the hidden action condition, compensation is either simple or complex.We hypothesize that hidden action gives rise to perceived behavioral uncertainty, and that this uncertainty has valuation relevance in that it affects both individual estimations of fundamental firm value and stock prices. Furthermore, we hypothesize that perceived behavioral uncertainty increases with the complexity of compensation, and that compensation complexity also affects trading volume.We find supporting evidence for our conjectures. Both estimations and market prices are biased when the manager's action is hidden, and biases are stronger when compensation is complex. We further find that trading volume decreases when compensation is complex, even though the heterogeneity of investors' individual beliefs increases.
Inducements In Organizations
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Author : Nicolas Tichy
language : en
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
Release Date : 2023-03-14
Inducements In Organizations written by Nicolas Tichy and has been published by BoD – Books on Demand this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023-03-14 with Business & Economics categories.
Executive compensation has inspired controversial debate in both academia and the general public, and many voices criticize that executive compensation designs fail to deliver desired outcomes. Although much research has been devoted to understanding the antecedents and consequences of executive compensation design, important questions remain unanswered. This dissertation contributes to the field by exploring a previously neglected aspect: executive compensation complexity. Given the absence of an established measure of executive compensation complexity, there is an incomplete understanding of how complexity enters executive compensation contracts and what the consequences are for managers and corporations. The essays of this dissertation aim to narrow this gap. The first study presents a novel measure of executive compensation complexity, which is validated and utilized to examine the antecedents of executive compensation complexity. The second study explores the consequences of executive compensation complexity and finds that complexity impairs firm performance, regardless of the performance metric chosen (accounting-based, market-based, or ESG-based performance metrics). The third study explores the link between compensation design dispersion and executive turnover and reveals that executives with riskier compensation packages and fewer performance goals are more likely to move. The fourth study provides experimental evidence on the effect of CSR Fit dimensions and organizational reputation. Taken together, the essays of this dissertation make a significant and valuable contribution to the scholarly discourse on executive compensation. By shedding light on the complex nature of executive compensation and its implications for managers and corporations, this dissertation advances the current understanding of executive compensation and provides insights for policymakers, managers, and investors.
The Effect Of Executive Compensation Discretion On Investor Judgments
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
The Effect Of Executive Compensation Discretion On Investor Judgments written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation develops two chapters related to experimental examinations of investor perceptions. This is motivated by the need to understand the underlying causes of investment decisions, as investment decisions have large implications for firms and management decision-making. Chapter two synthesizes existing experimental research in the area of investor perceptions. Within it, I develop three main categories to group the research: investor perceptions of information formats, investor characteristics, and investor perceptions of disclosure credibility. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further research on investor expectations, perceptions of governance, and how investment position changes investor perceptions. Chapter three examines investor perceptions related to how the Board of Directors determines executive compensation. A large body of research documents the effect of firm and manager characteristics on executive compensation design and the effect of compensation on manager actions. This chapter focuses specifically on how investors view the compensation choices firms have made. I find that investors view investing in firms more negatively after reading the compensation disclosure, especially if the Board uses discretion, rather than a target-based formula, to determine executive pay. Investors have specific concerns regarding management behavior due to the information asymmetry inherent in the separation of ownership and management. Their concerns lead them to judge the financial statements as less reliable and less relevant, which lowers their likelihood to invest in the firm and their ratings of investment attraction. Hiring a compensation consultant or following the industry norm lessens investors' negative reactions to the compensation design.
The Handbook Of The Economics Of Corporate Governance
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Author : Benjamin Hermalin
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2017-09-18
The Handbook Of The Economics Of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-09-18 with Business & Economics categories.
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Pay Without Performance
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Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
language : en
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date : 2004
Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and has been published by Harvard University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Business & Economics categories.
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Efficiency And Anomalies In Stock Markets
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Author : Wing-Keung Wong
language : en
Publisher: Mdpi AG
Release Date : 2022-02-17
Efficiency And Anomalies In Stock Markets written by Wing-Keung Wong and has been published by Mdpi AG this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022-02-17 with Business & Economics categories.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis believes that it is impossible for an investor to outperform the market because all available information is already built into stock prices. However, some anomalies could persist in stock markets while some other anomalies could appear, disappear and re-appear again without any warning. A Special Issue on "Efficiency and Anomalies in Stock Markets" will be devoted to advancements in the theoretical development of market efficiency and anomaly in the Stock Market, as well as applications in Stock Market efficiency and anomalies.
Behavioral Corporate Finance
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Author : Hersh Shefrin
language : en
Publisher: College Ie Overruns
Release Date : 2017-04-16
Behavioral Corporate Finance written by Hersh Shefrin and has been published by College Ie Overruns this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-04-16 with Corporations categories.
The Lessons Of Mumbai
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Author : Angel Rabasa
language : en
Publisher: Rand Corporation
Release Date : 2009-01-29
The Lessons Of Mumbai written by Angel Rabasa and has been published by Rand Corporation this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-01-29 with Political Science categories.
This study of the Mumbai, India, terrorist attack of November 2008 identifies the operational and tactical capabilities displayed by the terrorists and evaluates the response of the Indian security forces, with the goal of helping counterterrorism authorities in India and elsewhere to prepare for or counter future terrorist attacks on urban centers.
Executive Compensation And Shareholder Value
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Author : Jennifer Carpenter
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-04-17
Executive Compensation And Shareholder Value written by Jennifer Carpenter and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-04-17 with Business & Economics categories.
Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.
Searching For A Corporate Savior
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Author : Rakesh Khurana
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2011-09-19
Searching For A Corporate Savior written by Rakesh Khurana and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-09-19 with Business & Economics categories.
Corporate CEOs are headline news. Stock prices rise and fall at word of their hiring and firing. Business media debate their merits and defects as if individual leaders determined the health of the economy. Yet we know surprisingly little about how CEOs are selected and dismissed or about their true power. This is the first book to take us into the often secretive world of the CEO selection process. Rakesh Khurana's findings are surprising and disturbing. In recent years, he shows, corporations have increasingly sought CEOs who are above all else charismatic, whose fame and force of personality impress analysts and the business media, but whose experience and abilities are not necessarily right for companies' specific needs. The labor market for CEOs, Khurana concludes, is far less rational than we might think. Khurana's findings are based on a study of the hiring and firing of CEOs at over 850 of America's largest companies and on extensive interviews with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms. Written with exceptional clarity and verve, the book explains the basic mechanics of the selection process and how hiring priorities have changed with the rise of shareholder activism. Khurana argues that the market for CEOs, which we often assume runs on cool calculation and the impersonal forces of supply and demand, is culturally determined and too frequently inefficient. Its emphasis on charisma artificially limits the number of candidates considered, giving them extraordinary leverage to demand high salaries and power. It also raises expectations and increases the chance that a CEO will be fired for failing to meet shareholders' hopes. The result is corporate instability and too little attention to long-term strategy. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of corporate culture and the nature of markets and leadership in general.