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Efficient Rent Seeking In Experiment


Efficient Rent Seeking In Experiment
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Efficient Rent Seeking In Experiment


Efficient Rent Seeking In Experiment
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Author : Carsten Vogt
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997

Efficient Rent Seeking In Experiment written by Carsten Vogt and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with categories.




The Rent Seeking Society


The Rent Seeking Society
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Author : Gordon Tullock
language : en
Publisher: Selected Works of Gordon Tullo
Release Date : 2005

The Rent Seeking Society written by Gordon Tullock and has been published by Selected Works of Gordon Tullo this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Business & Economics categories.


The fifth volume in The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock consists of six parts, each part expounding on a separate component of the field. Part 1, "Rent Seeking: An Overview," brings together two papers that focus on problems of defining rent-seeking behavior and outline the nature of the ongoing research program in a historical perspective. Part 2, "More on Efficient Rent Seeking," contains four contributions in which Tullock elaborates on his 1980 article on efficient rent seeking. Part 3, "The Environments of Rent Seeking," consists of eight papers that collectively display the breadth of the rent-seeking concept. Part 4, "The Cost of Rent Seeking," comprises seven papers that address several important issues about the cost of rent seeking to society as a whole. Part 5 is Tullock's short monograph Exchanges and Contracts, in which he develops a systematic theory of exchange in political markets. In Part 6, "Future Directions for Rent-Seeking Research," Tullock focuses on the importance of information in the political marketplace. This work has been carefully constructed to build on the inaugural volume in this collection and to ease students through the field in a clear and concise manner. Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and University Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became Public Choice and remained its editor until 1990. Charles K. Rowley was Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University and a Senior Fellow of the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy at George Mason University. He was also General Director of the Locke Institute.



Efficiency In A Sequential Rent Seeking Experiment


Efficiency In A Sequential Rent Seeking Experiment
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Author : Carsten Vogt
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995

Efficiency In A Sequential Rent Seeking Experiment written by Carsten Vogt and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with categories.




Efficient Rent Seeking


Efficient Rent Seeking
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Author : Alan Lockard
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2001-01-31

Efficient Rent Seeking written by Alan Lockard and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001-01-31 with Business & Economics categories.


Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk `Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economy could not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrong even if the referee couldn't put his finger on it. There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, in which various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to the paradox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions. In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like the referee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly, at least very well. Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted. It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did show exactly that paradox. Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matter and the discussion sort of wound down, although it could not be said that it was either solved or even abated. It also began to appear that it had a much larger scope than just competitive rent seeking. Any contest for wealth, privilege, or prestige in which the chances of winning were affected by the investment of the contestants would appear to be subject to the same problem. The sum of the investments in equilibrium might be much less than the prize or much more. It depended on the structure of the contest, but the range of structures seemed to include almost all economic competition. Clearly, from the standpoint of economics, this was a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the whole vast structure of economic analysis rested on faulty foundations. Speaking frankly, neither of the editors thinks the situation is that desperate. We feel that there is a logical solution, even if we do not know what it is. The purpose of this volume is to attempt to get economists to turn to the problem and, hopefully, solve the paradox. We present here a substantial portion of the literature on the matter. We hope that the readers will be stimulated to think about the problem and, even more, we hope they will be able to solve it.



Efficient Rent Seeking


Efficient Rent Seeking
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Author : Alan Lockard
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-03-14

Efficient Rent Seeking written by Alan Lockard and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-03-14 with Business & Economics categories.


Some time ago one of the editors (Gordon Tullock) stumbled on a paradox in the competition for rents. He asked a previous research assistant (William Hunter) to work out some examples and gave a seminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) he titled his talk `Efficient Rent Seeking'. As Editor of Public Choice he was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal of Political Economy had turned it down on the grounds that the economy could not be that chaotic, and hence there must be something wrong even if the referee couldn't put his finger on it. There followed a long series of articles, mainly in Public Choice, in which various distinguished scholars proposed solutions to the paradox. The editor responded by finding fault with these solutions. In this case the editor was arguing against interest. He, like the referee for the JPE, believed that the market works, if not perfectly, at least very well. Nevertheless, the paradox resisted and persisted. It was like the paradox of the liar, and indeed in some cases did show exactly that paradox. Eventually everyone, including the editor, grew tired of the matter and the discussion sort of wound down, although it could not be said that it was either solved or even abated. It also began to appear that it had a much larger scope than just competitive rent seeking. Any contest for wealth, privilege, or prestige in which the chances of winning were affected by the investment of the contestants would appear to be subject to the same problem. The sum of the investments in equilibrium might be much less than the prize or much more. It depended on the structure of the contest, but the range of structures seemed to include almost all economic competition. Clearly, from the standpoint of economics, this was a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the whole vast structure of economic analysis rested on faulty foundations. Speaking frankly, neither of the editors thinks the situation is that desperate. We feel that there is a logical solution, even if we do not know what it is. The purpose of this volume is to attempt to get economists to turn to the problem and, hopefully, solve the paradox. We present here a substantial portion of the literature on the matter. We hope that the readers will be stimulated to think about the problem and, even more, we hope they will be able to solve it.



40 Years Of Research On Rent Seeking 1


40 Years Of Research On Rent Seeking 1
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Author : Roger D. Congleton
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2008-08-01

40 Years Of Research On Rent Seeking 1 written by Roger D. Congleton and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-08-01 with Business & Economics categories.


The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appHcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously pubHshed research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.



Efficient Rent Seeking


Efficient Rent Seeking
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Author : Alan Lockard
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014-09-01

Efficient Rent Seeking written by Alan Lockard and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-09-01 with categories.




40 Years Of Research On Rent Seeking 2


40 Years Of Research On Rent Seeking 2
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Author : Roger D. Congleton
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2008-08-01

40 Years Of Research On Rent Seeking 2 written by Roger D. Congleton and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-08-01 with Business & Economics categories.


The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appUcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earUer surveys. Volume I contains previously pubhshed research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously published research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.



An Experiment On Sequential Rent Seeking


An Experiment On Sequential Rent Seeking
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Author : Joachim Weimann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001

An Experiment On Sequential Rent Seeking written by Joachim Weimann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with categories.


In an experiment on sequential rent seeking, we find that the theoretically predicted first-mover advantage does not exist empirically. Rather, a second-mover advantage can be observed. Though the subgame perfect equilibrium can not prevail in experiment, individual behavior is highly reasonable nevertheless, such that subjects appear to play a reduced form of the original game. We also observe that the efficient fair outcome can not be achieved because of the exploitation opportunity for the second mover. The observed behavior is quite different from that in ultimatum and trust game experiments. Keyword(s): Rent-seeking, Experiment, Reciprocity, Fairness, Exploitation.



The Political Economy Of Rent Seeking


The Political Economy Of Rent Seeking
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Author : Charles Rowley
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 1988-01-31

The Political Economy Of Rent Seeking written by Charles Rowley and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1988-01-31 with Business & Economics categories.


It is now twenty years since the concept of rent-seeking was first devised by Gordon Tullock, though he was not responsible for coining the phrase itself. His initial insight has burgeoned over two decades into a major research program which has had an impact not only on public choice, but also on the related disciplines of economics, political science, and law and economics. The reach of the insight has proved to be universal, with relevance not just for the democracies, but also, and arguably more important, for all forms of autocracy, irrespective of ideological com plexion. It is not surprising, therefore, that this volume is the third edited publication dedicated specifically to scholarship into rent-seeking behavior. The theory of rent-seeking bridges normative and positive analyses of state action. In its normative dimension, rent-seeking scholarship has expanded, enlivened, in some respects turned on its head, the traditional welfare analyses of such features of modern economics as monopoly, externalities, public goods, and trade protection devices. In its positive dimension, rent-seeking contributions have provided an important analy tical perspective from which to understand and to predict the behavior of politicians, interest groups and bureaucrats, the media and the academy within the political market place. This bridge between normative and positive elements of analysis is invaluable in facilitating an understanding of and evaluating the costs of state activity within a consistent paradigm.