Effort And Selection Effects Of Incentive Contracts
DOWNLOAD
Download Effort And Selection Effects Of Incentive Contracts PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Effort And Selection Effects Of Incentive Contracts book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Effort And Selection Effects Of Incentive Contracts
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jan Bouwens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Effort And Selection Effects Of Incentive Contracts written by Jan Bouwens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Effort And Selection Effects Of Incentive Contracts
DOWNLOAD
Author : J. L. Bouwens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Effort And Selection Effects Of Incentive Contracts written by J. L. Bouwens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Performance Measure Properties And The Effect Of Incentive Contracts
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jan Bouwens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Performance Measure Properties And The Effect Of Incentive Contracts written by Jan Bouwens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Using data from a third-party survey on compensation practices at 151 Dutch firms, we show that less noisy or distorted performance measures and higher cash bonuses are associated with better-directed effort and improved employee selection. Specifically, 1) an increase in the cash bonus increases the selection effects of incentive contracts, but does not independently affect the effort that employees deliver, and 2) performance measure properties directly impact both effort and the selection functioning of incentive contracts. These results hold after controlling for an array of incentive contract design characteristics and for differences in organizational context. Our estimation procedures address several known problems with using secondary datasets.
Decision Aids And The Design Of Incentive Compensation Contracts
DOWNLOAD
Author : Elaine G. Mauldin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Decision Aids And The Design Of Incentive Compensation Contracts written by Elaine G. Mauldin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with categories.
Distinguishing Incentive From Selection Effects In Auction Determined Contracts
DOWNLOAD
Author : Laurent Lamy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Distinguishing Incentive From Selection Effects In Auction Determined Contracts written by Laurent Lamy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
Ambiguity In Performance Pay
DOWNLOAD
Author : David J. Cooper
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Ambiguity In Performance Pay written by David J. Cooper and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
Many incentive contracts are inherently ambiguous, lacking an explicit mapping between performance and pay. Using an online labor market, Amazon Mechanical Turk, we study the effect of ambiguous incentives on willingness to accept contracts to do a real-effort task, the probability of completing the task, and performance at the task. Even modest levels of ambiguity about the relationship between performance and pay are sufficient to eliminate the positive selection effect associated with piece rates, as high ability individuals are no more likely than low ability individuals to accept a contract. Piece rate contracts significantly improve performance relative to fixed wages, primarily due to selection, but this positive effect is not present with ambiguous incentive contracts. Modest levels of ambiguity reduce the probability that subjects accept an incentive contract and all types of ambiguous incentive contracts increase the probability of quitting after having accepted an incentive contract. Information about individual ability at the task reduces the probability that subjects choose and complete the task.
An Introduction To The Economics Of Information
DOWNLOAD
Author : Inés Macho-Stadler
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 1996-10-03
An Introduction To The Economics Of Information written by Inés Macho-Stadler and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996-10-03 with Business & Economics categories.
In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.
Effects Of Incentive Contracts In Research And Development
DOWNLOAD
Author : Edward B. Roberts
language : en
Publisher: Forgotten Books
Release Date : 2018-02-23
Effects Of Incentive Contracts In Research And Development written by Edward B. Roberts and has been published by Forgotten Books this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-02-23 with Reference categories.
Excerpt from Effects of Incentive Contracts in Research and Development: A Preliminary Research Report In the past several years an effort has originated in the Defense Department (and followed by other government agencies) to discourage the use of cost-p1us=fixed fee (cpff) contracts and substitute contractual incentive arrangements. This effort supposedly relies upon the profit motive to reduce requirements for direct government control and to stim ulate better contractor performance and cost estimating. Incentive type contracts are not new in government contracting. Production contracts have been awarded on a fixed price basis for many years. The fixed price contract provides maximum correlation of contract profits with contract cost, and in theory might offer maximum cost incentive. How ever the use of incentive arrangements on r&d contracts is the novel feature of the dod (and nasa) programs of the past several years. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Equilibrium Incentive Contracts
DOWNLOAD
Author : Espen R. Moen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Equilibrium Incentive Contracts written by Espen R. Moen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Incentives in industry categories.
The Application Of The Controllability Principle And Managers Responses
DOWNLOAD
Author : Franz Michael Fischer
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2010-07-24
The Application Of The Controllability Principle And Managers Responses written by Franz Michael Fischer and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-07-24 with Business & Economics categories.
Franz Michael Fischer investigates the relationships between the application of the controllability principle and managers’ cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses. The author further explores the impact of several important contextual factors on the basic relationships and, thus, develops moderated mediation models. He reveals that the application of the controllability principle has a significant effect on role stress and role orientation which, in turn, are related to managerial performance and affective constructs.