Equilibrium Analysis Of Procurement Auctions

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Equilibrium Analysis Of Procurement Auctions

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Author : Serkan Ozkan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Equilibrium Analysis Of Procurement Auctions written by Serkan Ozkan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Auctions categories.

The ultimate benefit of our research is to offer a concise analytical tool that models multi-attribute auctions, where the generalized valuation function captures trade-offs between the primary attribute (price) and the secondary attributes such as quality, delivery performance and service level.

Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions

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Author : Maria Monica Wihardja
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions written by Maria Monica Wihardja and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.

We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders are unobservable and non-contractible ex-post. We show examples of equilibrium bids and bribes of N two-dimensional-type bidders in an incomplete information game where the type space is discrete and strategy space is infinite. The equilibrium bid and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly chosen, constraining efficiency. In fact, no mechanism can be efficient in this auction. The empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders increases the percentage cost efficiency at a decreasing rate and it starts to decrease the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.

Comparing Public Procurement Auctions

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Author : Francesco Decarolis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020

Comparing Public Procurement Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.

This article contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions (ABAs), in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the ABA is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for the subsample of first price auctions and used to quantify the efficiency loss under counterfactual ABAs.

Procurement Auctions With Entry And Uncertain Number Of Actual Bidders

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Author : Xiaoyong Zheng
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Procurement Auctions With Entry And Uncertain Number Of Actual Bidders written by Xiaoyong Zheng and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.

Competition In Procurement Auctions With Corruption

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Author : Daniel Z. Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

Competition In Procurement Auctions With Corruption written by Daniel Z. Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.

We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a first-price public procurement auction. In our model, firms are invited into the auction at positive costs, and a bureaucrat runs the auction on behalf of a government, who may request a bribe from the winning firm afterward. We first show that, in the absence of corruption, the bureaucrat will invite more than socially optimal number of firms into the auction. Secondly, the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare vary across different forms of bribery. In the case of fixed bribe, corruption has no effect on equilibrium competition, yet does induce social welfare loss due to the distortion cost of increased public spending. In the case of proportional bribe, the bureaucrat may invite fewer or more firms into the auction, depending on how much the bureaucrat weights on his personal interest. Thirdly, we show that information disclosure may result in more dispersed distribution of firms' cost estimates, and induce more firms to be invited, no matter there is corruption or not. Finally, we also provide some discussions on the policy implications of our model.

First Price Equilibrium And Revenue Equivalence In A Sequential Procurement Auction Model

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Author : J. Philipp Reiss
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007

First Price Equilibrium And Revenue Equivalence In A Sequential Procurement Auction Model written by J. Philipp Reiss and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.

Auctions Under Increasing Costs

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Author : Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission
language : en
Publisher: CreateSpace
Release Date : 2015-06-06

Auctions Under Increasing Costs written by Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission and has been published by CreateSpace this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-06-06 with categories.

This book models procurement auctions when suppliers face increasing costs. It is shown than an asymmetric equilibrium exists whereby one bidder bids different prices on each project in a series of simultaneous auctions, while its competitor bids the same price on each project. This existence of such an equilibrium may provide an explanation for observed bidding behavior in industries plausibly - characterized by increasing costs. Further, it is shown that the price paid in simultaneously-held auctions will be less than the prices paid in sequentially-held auctions. Hence, the existence of an asymmetric equilibria may explain the prominence of simultaneous auctions for certain products.

Cartelization In The Automotive Industry And Bid Rigging In Procurement Auctions

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Author : Johannes Gerhardt
language : en
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Release Date : 2017-04-04

Cartelization In The Automotive Industry And Bid Rigging In Procurement Auctions written by Johannes Gerhardt and has been published by GRIN Verlag this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-04-04 with Business & Economics categories.

Master's Thesis from the year 2016 in the subject Economics - Industrial Economics, grade: 1,3, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen, language: English, abstract: Due to the high importance of the automotive industry for the EU and the growing number of discovered automotive supplier cartels in this economic area, the purpose of the master thesis at hand is to analyze and display why cartelization – especially among automotive suppliers in the EU – is observed so frequently. Particularly, it investigates factors that facilitate collusion of car part manufacturers. Furthermore, it focuses on cartelization in procurement auctions as the touch point of automotive manufacturers and suppliers where collusive activities are executed. Hence, it examines the current state of theoretical research on collusive mechanism in auctions and provides implications for further research. Finally, it analyzes approaches to prevent collusion and assesses whether such measures are applicable to the automotive industry. The thesis is structured as follows: After this introduction, chapter two defines the scope of the industry for this paper and provides a broad overview of its different sectors and significant players. In addition, due to their overall importance for the following analysis, procurement and bidding processes in the automotive industry are exhibited upfront. To emphasize the industry’s importance for the EU, an outline of the state of this industry sector in the EEA is given. Building on that, chapter three presents a general introduction to cartelization in the automotive industry, followed by a presentation of three representative recent cartel cases in the EU: Car Glass, Automotive Bearings and Parking Heaters. This sets ground for a detailed analysis of the prevailing environment in the automotive industry. First, the analysis examines the manufacturer side including degrees of concentration, dominant strategies and effects of the automotive manufacturers’ market power. This is followed by an analysis of the supplier side regarding concentration and barriers to entry. Contingent on the analysis, factors that facilitate collusion in the automotive industry are summarized To introduce collusion in auctions, chapter four starts with an outline of the theoretical foundation of auction theory. Based on this, auction formats that foster collusion and stability of cartels are discussed. Furthermore, the most relevant incentive compatible mechanisms are introduced distinguishing between one-shot and repeated auction games.

Auctions Under Increasing Costs

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Author : Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission
language : en
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
Release Date : 2016-01-17

Auctions Under Increasing Costs written by Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission and has been published by Createspace Independent Publishing Platform this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016-01-17 with categories.

This book models procurement auctions when suppliers face increasing costs. It is shown than an asymmetric equilibrium exists whereby one bidder bids different prices on each project in a series of simultaneous auctions, while its competitor bids the same price on each project. This existence of such an equilibrium may provide an explanation for observed bidding behavior in industries plausibly - characterized by increasing costs. Further, it is shown that the price paid in simultaneously-held auctions will be less than the prices paid in sequentially-held auctions. Hence, the existence of an asymmetric equilibria may explain the prominence of simultaneous auctions for certain products.

Three Essays On Auction Markets

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Author : Nicholas James Shunda
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Three Essays On Auction Markets written by Nicholas James Shunda and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.