Essays In Behavioral Industrial Organization And Mechanism Design
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Essays In Behavioral Industrial Organization And Mechanism Design
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Author : Johannes Johnen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays In Behavioral Industrial Organization And Mechanism Design written by Johannes Johnen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
Essays On Behavioral Industrial Organization
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Author : Karen Khachatryan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Essays On Behavioral Industrial Organization written by Karen Khachatryan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
Handbook Of Behavioral Industrial Organization
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Author : Victor J. Tremblay
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2018
Handbook Of Behavioral Industrial Organization written by Victor J. Tremblay and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
The Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization integrates behavioral economics into industrial organization. Chapters cover concepts such as relative thinking, salience, shrouded attributes, cognitive dissonance, motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, overconfidence, status quo bias, social cooperation and identity. Additional chapters consider industry issues, such as sports and gambling industries, neuroeconomic studies of brands and advertising, and behavioral antitrust law. The Handbook features a wide array of methods (literature surveys, experimental and econometric research, and theoretical modelling), facilitating accessibility to a wide audience.
Essays On Mechanism And Market Design
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Author : Aaron Luke Bodoh-Creed
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays On Mechanism And Market Design written by Aaron Luke Bodoh-Creed and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
The focus of this dissertation is the role of information in the determination of market outcomes. The first essay provides a novel framework for studying large market mechanisms with an application to the information aggregation properties of uniform price auctions. The second essay analyzes a model of mood and associative memory and shows that this bias could explain anomalous results in the behavioral finance and organizational behavior literatures. The third and final essay analyzes ambiguity aversion and how it affects outcomes in general mechanisms. The first essay, "Mean Field Approximation of Large Games, " provides a general framework for approximating the equilibria of games with many participants using analytically tractable nonatomic limit games. We prove that if the game is continuous, then the set of equilibria is upper hemicontinuous in the number of agents. This implies that we can use equilibrium strategies of the limit game as an approximation of the equilibrium actions of the agents in the large finite game. We argue that this continuity property implies that generic large, continuous markets are almost competitive in the limit. We use our framework to analyze multi-unit demand uniform price auctions with both a common value component and bidders who value successive units as complements. We show that these auctions fully reveal the state of the world asymptotically and result in ex post efficient allocations with arbitrarily high probability in the asymptotic limit. As a second application, we provide a framework for approximating large stochastic games using dynamic competitive equilibria with applications to macroeconomics, industrial organization, engineering and computer science. The second essay, "Mood and Associative Memory, " examines the biases in memory caused by an agent's affective state. Within the psychology literature, it is a well established fact that decision makers in a positive emotional state are optimistic about the odds of positive random events and agents in a negative emotional state are pessimistic. By building a mathematical model firmly grounded on psychological primitives, we develop a behavioral decision theory framework that can be utilized in a wide range of microeconomic models. We apply our model to study employee morale and clarify a severely conflicted literature on morale within the Organizational Behavior literature. We also show that biases in memory are a potential explanation for a wide range of asset pricing anomalies such as excess volatility, short run underreaction and long run overreaction to news, and the influence of non-fundamental events. Our model provides a tool for policy makers to analyze the effects of biases in memory on the response of agents to firms, markets, and government policies and can be used to identify situations in which either public or private intervention may be required to ameliorate the effects of the agents' errors in judgment. The third and final essay, "Ambiguous Beliefs and Mechanism Design, " explores the effects of ambiguity aversion, also known as Knightian Uncertainty, on mechanism design theory. Knightian uncertainty refers to risk within the economy that is not characterized by a stochastic process commonly known to the agents. Compelling psychological data, such as the classical Ellsberg Paradox, have shown that agents reveal a strong aversion to Knightian Uncertainty above and beyond the risk aversion considered in neoclassical microeconomic theory. Policy makers ought to be especially concerned about the effects of ambiguity aversion, neglected in traditional studies of mechanism and market design, in situations where the agents are unfamiliar with the mechanism and the economic environment the mechanism creates. We unify the Multiple Prior Expected Utility (MEU) model of ambiguity aversion with the tools of contract theory to provide a general framework to analyze the effects of ambiguity aversion in market settings and use these tools to assess the effect of ambiguity aversion on auctions and bargaining problems. We show that the first and second price auction cannot be ranked when the agents are ambiguity averse, derive the optimal auction format, and study the effects of ambiguity on auction entry. We also prove that ambiguity aversion can be efficiency enhancing in ex ante budget balanced mechanisms and revenue enhancing in ex post efficient bargaining mechanisms.
Behavioral Industrial Organization
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Author : Paul Heidhues
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Behavioral Industrial Organization written by Paul Heidhues and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with Consumer behavior categories.
This discussion paper is a preliminary version of a survey written for the Handbook of Behavioral Economics.
New Perspectives On Industrial Organization
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Author : Victor J. Tremblay
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2012-07-20
New Perspectives On Industrial Organization written by Victor J. Tremblay and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-07-20 with Business & Economics categories.
This book covers the main topics that students need to learn in a course on Industrial Organization. It reviews the classic models and important empirical evidence related to the field. However, it will differ from prior textbooks in two ways. First, this book incorporates contributions from behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, providing the reader with a richer understanding of consumer preferences and the motivation for many of the business practices we see today. The book discusses how firms exploit consumers who are prone to making mistakes and who suffer from cognitive dissonance, attention lapses, and bounded rationality, for example and will help explain why firms invest in persuasive advertising, offer 30-day free trials, offer money-back guarantees, and engage in other observed phenomena that cannot be explained by the traditional approaches to industrial organization. A second difference is that this book achieves a balance between textbooks that emphasize formal modeling and those that emphasize the history of the field, empirical evidence, case studies, and policy analysis. This text puts more emphasis on the micro-foundations (i.e., consumer and producer theory), classic game theoretic models, and recent contributions from behavioral economics that are pertinent to industrial organization. Each topic will begin with a discussion of relevant theory and models and will also include a discussion of concrete examples, empirical evidence, and evidence from case studies. This will provide students with a deeper understanding of firm and consumer behavior, of the factors that influence market structure and economic performance, and of policy issues involving imperfectly competitive markets. The book is intended to be a textbook for graduate students, MBAs and upper-level undergraduates and will use examples, graphical analysis, algebra, and simple calculus to explain important ideas and theories in industrial organization.
Essays In Public Finance And Industrial Organization
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Author : Neale Ashok Mahoney
language : en
Publisher: Stanford University
Release Date : 2011
Essays In Public Finance And Industrial Organization written by Neale Ashok Mahoney and has been published by Stanford University this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
This dissertation has four chapters. The first three chapters examine health insurance markets in the U.S., focusing in particular on contexts where there are important interactions between health insurance plans. The fourth chapter is on the U.S. budget, examining the implications of annual budget cycles on the quantity and quality of end-of-year spending. Chapter 1, entitled "Bankruptcy as Implicit Health Insurance" examines the interaction between health insurance and the implicit insurance that people have because they can file (or threaten to file) for bankruptcy. With a simple model that captures key institutional features, I demonstrate that the financial risk from medical shocks is capped by the assets that could be seized in bankruptcy. For households with modest seizable assets, this implicit "bankruptcy insurance" can crowd out conventional health insurance. I test these predictions using variation in the state laws that specify the type and level of assets that can be seized in bankruptcy. Because of the differing laws, people who have the same assets and receive the same medical care face different losses in bankruptcy. Exploiting the variation in seizable assets that is orthogonal to wealth and other household characteristics, I show that households with fewer seizable assets are more likely to be uninsured. This finding is consistent with another: uninsured households with fewer seizable assets end up making lower out-of-pocket medical payments. The estimates suggest that if the laws of the least debtor-friendly state of Delaware were applied nationally, 16.3 percent of the uninsured would buy health insurance. Achieving the same increase in coverage would require a premium subsidy of approximately 44.0 percent. To shed light on puzzles in the literature and examine policy counterfactuals, I calibrate a utility-based, micro-simulation model of insurance choice. Among other things, simulations show that "bankruptcy insurance" explains the low take-up of high-deductible health insurance. Chapter 2, entitled "Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice", is coauthored with M. Kate Bundorf and Jonathan Levin. The starting point for the paper is the simple observation that when insurance premiums do not reflect individual differences in expected costs, consumers may choose plans inefficiently. We study this problem in health insurance markets, a setting in which prices often do not incorporate observable differences in expected costs. We develop a simple model and estimate it using data on small employers. In this setting, the welfare loss compared to the feasible risk-rated benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, the benefits from plan choice relative to each of the single-plan options are substantial. Chapter 3, entitled "The Private Coverage and Public Costs: Identifying the Effect of Private Supplemental Insurance on Medicare Spending, " is coauthored with Marika Cabral. While most elderly Americans have health insurance coverage through Medicare, traditional Medicare policies leave individuals exposed to significant financial risk. Private supplemental insurance to "fill the gaps" of Medicare, known as Medigap, is very popular. In this Chapter, we estimate the impact of this supplemental insurance on total medical spending using an instrumental variables strategy that leverages discontinuities in Medigap premiums at state boundaries. Our estimates suggest that Medigap increases medical spending by 57 percent--or about 40 percent more than previous estimates. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that a 20 percent tax on premiums would generate combined revenue and savings of 6.2 percent of baseline costs; a Pigovian tax that fully accounts for the fiscal externality would yield savings of 18.1 percent. Chapter 4, entitled "Do Expiring Budgets Lead to Wasteful Year-End Spending? Evidence from Federal Procurement, " is coauthored with Jeffrey Liebman. Many organizations fund their spending out of a fixed budget that expires at year's end. Faced with uncertainty over future spending demands, these organizations have an incentive to build a buffer stock of funds over the front end of the budget cycle. When demand does not materialize, they then rush to spend these funds on lower quality projects at the end of the year. We test these predictions using data on procurement spending by the U.S. federal government. Using data on all federal contracts from 2004 through 2009, we document that spending spikes in all major federal agencies during the 52nd week of the year as the agencies rush to exhaust expiring budget authority. Spending in the last week of the year is 4.9 times higher than the rest-of-the-year weekly average. We examine the relative quality of year-end spending using a newly available dataset that tracks the quality of $130 billion in information technology (I.T.) projects made by federal agencies. Consistent with the model, average project quality falls at the end of the year. Quality scores in the last week of the year are 2.2 to 5.6 times more likely to be below the central value. To explore the impact of allowing agencies to roll unused spending over into subsequent fiscal years, we study the I.T. contracts of an agency with special authority to roll over unused funding. We show that there is only a small end-of-year I.T. spending spike in this agency and that the one major I.T. contract this agency issued in the 52nd week of the year has a quality rating that is well above average.
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization
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Author : David B. Audretsch
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization written by David B. Audretsch and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization brings together leading scholars who present state-of-the-art research in the spirit of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm embodied in the work of Leonard W. Weiss. The individual chapters are generally empirically or public policy oriented. A number of them introduce new sources of data that, combined with the application of appropriate econometric techniques, enable new breakthroughs and insights on issues hotly debated in the industrial organization literature. For example, five of the chapters are devoted towards uncovering the link between market concentration and pricing behavior. While theoretical models have produced ambiguous predictions concerning the relationship between concentration and price these chapters, which span a number of different markets and situations, provide unequivocal evidence that a high level of market concentration tends to result in a higher level of prices. Three of the chapters explore the impact of market structure on production efficiency, and three other chapters focus on the role of industrial organization on public policy. Contributors include David B. Audretsch, Richard E. Caves, Mark J. Roberts, F.M. Scherer, John J. Siegfried and Hideki Yamawaki.
Journal Of Economic Literature
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Journal Of Economic Literature written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Economics categories.
Management Control Theory
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Author : A.J. Berry
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2019-05-23
Management Control Theory written by A.J. Berry and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-05-23 with Business & Economics categories.
First published in 1998, this volume of readings provides an overview of the development of the study of Management Control theory over the past 35 years. The period encompasses the publication of a major and seminal text by Anthony and Dearden in 1965, which acted as a touchstone in defining the range and scope of management control systems. This laid management control’s foundations in accounting-based mechanisms of control, an element which has been seen as both a strength and a constraint. A good deal of work has followed, providing both a development of the tradition as well as a critique. In this volume we attempt to provide a range of readings which will illustrate the variety of possibilities that are available to researchers, scholars and practitioners in the area. The readings illustrate the view that sees control as goal directed and integrative. They go on to explore the idea of control as adaption, consider its relationship with social structure and survey the effects of the interplay between the organisation and the environment. The essays included are not intended to lead the reader through a well-ordered argument which concludes with a well reasoned view of how management control should be. Instead it seeks to illustrate the many questions which have been posed but not answered and to open up agendas for future research.