Essays In Corporate Governance
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Essays On Corporate Governance
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Author : Radhakrishnan Gopalan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Essays On Corporate Governance written by Radhakrishnan Gopalan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Essays In Corporate Governance
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Author : Jared Ian Wilson
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays In Corporate Governance written by Jared Ian Wilson and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Boards of directors categories.
Corporate governance examines the mechanisms through which managers and directors are incentivized to act in the best interests of shareholders. The three essays of this dissertation focus on internal and external control mechanisms in the CEO and director labor markets and their effectiveness in aligning the interests of mangers, directors and shareholders. The first essay examines the influence of industry shocks and peer firms on board monitoring decisions. Recent evidence documents that industry factors influence CEO turnover decisions, despite agency theory's proposition that boards should filter out industry shocks when evaluating CEO performance. Consistent with industry dynamics affecting board monitoring decisions, I document that industries exhibit CEO turnover waves. During these periods of abnormally high turnover, executives face a heightened threat of discipline as boards increase turnover-performance sensitivity. This increased scrutiny inside waves represents a meaningful managerial incentive that curbs value-destroying behavior of CEOs. Overall, this essay documents the existence of CEO turnover waves, which motivate boards to monitor management differently and have real effects on CEO behavior and shareholder wealth. The second essay examines the shareholder wealth effects associated with a required venue for shareholder litigation. In response to the increased threat of shareholder litigation filed in multiple states, firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to a single venue of the board's choice. It is unclear whether these provisions impose increased costs on shareholders' ability to discipline managers and directors or provide benefits to shareholders by eliminating multi-forum and duplicative lawsuits. I use the Delaware Chancery Court's announcement upholding the adoption of these provisions as a natural experiment to evaluate their wealth implications. Overall, this essay suggests that exclusive forum provisions create value for shareholders by specifying a required venue for corporate litigation. The final essay, with David Becher and Ralph Walkling, examines the stability and composition of acquirer boards around mergers and the director characteristics associated with selection for the post-merger board. Our results indicate that the post-merger board changes substantially and variation is significantly different from both non-merger years and non-merging firms. Adjustments reflect firms upgrading skills associated with executive and merger experience and bargaining between targets and acquirers, rather than agency motives. Conversely, director selection at non-merging firms is driven by general skills and diversity. Our analyses provide insight into the dynamic nature of board structure and characteristics valued in the director labor market.
Three Essays In Corporate Governance
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Author : Valentina Giulia Bruno
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Three Essays In Corporate Governance written by Valentina Giulia Bruno and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Essays In Corporate Governance
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Author : Chenyang Wei
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays In Corporate Governance written by Chenyang Wei and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Impact of various equity governance mechanisms and the central debt governance mechanism - covenants, on bondholders are investigated in this dissertation. First, the impact of shareholder control (proxied by the existence of institutional blockholders) on credit risk depends on takeover vulnerability. Shareholder control is associated with higher (lower) yields if the firm is exposed to (protected from) takeovers. However, event risk covenants reduce the credit risk associated with strong shareholder governance. Second, we construct a Covenant Protection Index for a large sample of public bonds in U.S. and investigate: (1) the impact of covenant protection on the credit spread dynamics; (2) the role of covenant protection in mitigating managerial risk-shifting. We first document that, ex ante, credit spreads are decreasing in the strength of covenant protection. Furthermore, ex post, an investment strategy of buying bonds with strong protection and shorting bonds with weak protection generates an abnormal return of 2.71% per year which is statistically significant. We conduct novel analysis including a matching technique and other tests to address the issue of endogeneity. To further show the pricing impact is justified, we study the ex post effectiveness of covenant protection during industry-level and economy-wide negative shocks. Under the exogenous shocks, bonds with strong protection experience significantly less or no value loss. Finally, we document that higher CEO risk-taking incentive (measured by Vega) is associated with higher credit spreads for bonds with weak protection. For bonds with strong protection, higher Vega is associated with lower credit spreads.
Comparative Corporate Governance
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Author : Klaus J. Hopt
language : en
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
Release Date : 2015-02-06
Comparative Corporate Governance written by Klaus J. Hopt and has been published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-02-06 with Law categories.
Corporate governance has become an important issue in all industrial economies. This text has grown out of a conference entitled Comparative Corporate Governance, An International Conference, United States - Japan - Western Europe which considered the subject.
Essays In Corporate Governance
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Author : Ofer Eldar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays In Corporate Governance written by Ofer Eldar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
Essays On Corporate Governance In Emerging Markets
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Author : Sudarat Bo Ananchotikul
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Corporate Governance In Emerging Markets written by Sudarat Bo Ananchotikul and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Essays In Corporate Governance
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Author : Ms. Nadya Malenko
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays In Corporate Governance written by Ms. Nadya Malenko and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
This dissertation provides a theoretical analysis of several corporate governance mechanisms in the presence of information asymmetries and agency conflicts between shareholders, managers, and directors. The first essay of the dissertation analyzes decision-making in corporate boards and studies how board characteristics and the design of board meetings affect board decisions. Two other essays are on shareholder activism. The second essay focuses on voting for non-binding shareholder proposals and examines its effectiveness in conveying shareholder views to the management. The third essay considers another common form of shareholder activism, private negotiations with the management, and studies the activist's choice between private negotiations and public confrontation. The first essay, "Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards, " develops a theory of communication and collective decision-making in a board of directors whose members have private information about the issue under discussion. The key element of the model is that the quality of board communication is endogenous, because it depends on the time and effort directors are willing to put into communicating their information to others. Directors may have biases regarding the decision and may be reluctant to disagree with the prevailing opinion in the boardroom. I show that when effective communication is personally costly for directors, both stronger preferences for conformity and stronger biases may improve the board's decisions because directors will have stronger incentives to convince others of their position. These results have implications for the design of board policies, including the use of open vs. secret ballot voting, the establishment and composition of committees, and the frequency of executive sessions of outside directors. The second essay, "Non-Binding Voting for Shareholder Proposals, " which is co-authored with Doron Levit and is forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, considers another setting where information relevant for the firm's decisions is dispersed among many agents, namely, the firm's large shareholders. Our main question is whether voting for non-binding shareholder proposals fulfills its intended role of conveying shareholders' expectations to the management. We show that when the interests of the manager and shareholders are not aligned, non-binding voting generally fails to convey shareholder views to the manager. This distinguishes voting for non-binding proposals from standard voting for binding proposals, where some information is always conveyed. In practice, the effectiveness of shareholder proposals may be affected by external governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control in the form of activist investors. Our analysis demonstrates that the presence of an activist investor can enhance the advisory role of non-binding voting only if there is substantial conflict of interest between the activist and shareholders. Although shareholder proposals have become increasingly common in recent years, submitting a proposal to a shareholder vote is often viewed by activist investors as a tactic of last resort. According to survey evidence, activists generally try to achieve their objectives through private negotiations with the management and use confrontational tactics only if these negotiations are not successful. The third essay, "Behind-the-Scene Negotiations in Shareholder Activism, " examines under which circumstances negotiations between the activist and the management fail. I study these negotiations in a bargaining framework where the manager is privately informed about his private benefits. The model provides implications for the likelihood of proposal withdrawals and announcement effects of proposal submissions. It demonstrates, in particular, that the announcement of an activist's intervention may have a negative price effect even if the intervention is known to be beneficial to the company.
Essays On Corporate Governance
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Author : 丁文治
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023
Essays On Corporate Governance written by 丁文治 and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with Corporate governance categories.
Three Essays On Corporate Governance Of Family Firms
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Author : Tarek El Masri
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Three Essays On Corporate Governance Of Family Firms written by Tarek El Masri and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
This dissertation is comprised of three essays on issues related to the corporate governance of family firms. The first essay explores how owners-managers of family firms conceptualize and define their firms. Understanding the essence of a family firm helps us better understand their governance and behaviour. This essay contributes to the family business literature by presenting the seven most important criteria in identifying a family business (Handler 1989; Shanker & Astrachan 1996), namely: family ownership, control, involvement, succession, long-term vision, founders' legacy, and extended family of employees. The essay also contributes a familiness measurement tool that can be used in future research aiming at better understanding the family firm. The second essay investigates how management control technologies are calibrated in accordance with the sometimes conflicting economic and noneconomic goals resulting from the dual identities of family firms. The results show that family firms calibrate pervasive management control technologies, such as calculative, family-centric or procedural controls to strengthen the business identity and reduce the family identity of their family business. In comparison, the minimal use, or perceived absence, of management control technologies suggest that it accentuates and fosters family identity. Hence, reverting to management control technologies becomes related in a unilateral way to the business identity of the firm, despite the dual control ambition of family firms. The third essay analyzes CEO and TMT compensation practices to identify patterns that can explain the gap between family firms and the pool of external highly qualified executives. The data analysis highlights a connection between the degree of family ownership, the composition of the BOD, and the identity of the CEO. The results also show that family firms rely more heavily on cash-based awards than on equity-based awards as a form of CEO and TMT compensation. Family firms are reluctant to use option-based rewards and the use of share-based awards is also kept at a minimum. Other evidence point towards a role that institutional ownership plays in restructuring the compensation packages of the TMTs at family firms. Keywords: Family Firms, Definition of Family Firms, Family Firm Identity, Management Control Technologies, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation.