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Essays In Industrial Organization Intermediation Marketing And Strategic Pricing


Essays In Industrial Organization Intermediation Marketing And Strategic Pricing
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Essays In Industrial Organization Intermediation Marketing And Strategic Pricing


Essays In Industrial Organization Intermediation Marketing And Strategic Pricing
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Author : Sebastian Wismer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Essays In Industrial Organization Intermediation Marketing And Strategic Pricing written by Sebastian Wismer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.




Intermediated Matching


Intermediated Matching
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Author : Vinay Ramani
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009

Intermediated Matching written by Vinay Ramani and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.


This dissertation consists of two essays on two-sided matching. In chapter 2, we consider a model of intermediation wherein an incumbent matchmaker faces the threat of entry from a potential entrant. We model this competition as an entry game where the incumbent moves first and offers a contract to a subset of men and women. The entrant observes the actions of the incumbent and then decides to enter or stay out. If there is entry, then the entrant offers a contract targeted to a subset of men and women. When thepayoff from matching is complementary in the types of the agents, we prove that there exists a weak sequential equilibrium either withentry and market segmentation or with entry deterrence. Our model explains the strategic market differentiation by the firms as thecreation of a niche market for themselves. The data on the presence of niche dating websites confirms this result.^An important findingof our model is that at an equilibrium, each firm offers a different contract to the men and women that they match. In sharp contrast toexisting models in the Industrial Organization literature on entry deterrence, we find that accommodating the entrant is anoptimal strategy for the incumbent, not entry deterrence. We then compare the duopoly market with a two-price monopoly market and findthat the duopoly market has greater coverage than a two-price monopoly market. The model is then extended to allow for sequentialentry. When intermediation is costless, allowing for sequential entry yields the socially efficient outcome as the number of entrants tends to infinity. Introducing intermediation costs leadsto a welfare loss and a finite number of intermediaries entering. In chapter 3, we extend the model developed in chapter 2 by introducing search in a model of intermediation.^It is common thatmen and women also search by themselves for a suitable partner in addition to using the services of the intermediaries. The entry gameis modified by allowing for the possibility that the men and women can search in the decentralized market. The men and women comparethe expected value of accepting the match offered by the intermediaries to the expected value of search in the decentralizedmarket. We prove that there exists a weak sequential equilibrium where the incumbent offers a contract to a subset consisting of thehighest types of men and women, the entrant enters and offers a contract to a subset of the highest types remaining in the residualmarket and the men and women not offered any contract by either the incumbent or the entrant search in the decentralized market using areservation value strategy.^Thus in addition to incorporating search in a model of intermediation, our model proves that marketsegmentation arises due to competition between the intermediaries to create a niche market for themselves. An interesting finding is thatthe higher types of agents prefer using the services of intermediaries while the lower types search by themselves. We thendiscuss the issues of entry accommodation and entry deterrence and find that strategic entry accommodation is the optimal strategy for the entrant, not entry deterrence. Thereafter we compare the duopoly model with a two-price monopoly market to ascertain whether the duopoly market has a greater coverage than a two-price monopoly market. Unlike in chapter 2, wedo not get a direct answer. Coverage could be higher in either of the two markets. However, as the value of search in the decentralized market decreases (and in the limit reaches zero), theduopoly market has greater coverage than a two-price monopoly market.^Finally we extend the model to allow for sequential entry. When intermediation is costless we find that the number of entrants tends to infinity and that matching is socially efficient. Howeverintroducing intermediation costs distorts this efficiency result and only a finite number of intermediaries enter the market.



Industrial Organization


Industrial Organization
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Author : Jeffrey R. Church
language : en
Publisher: Irwin/McGraw-Hill
Release Date : 2000

Industrial Organization written by Jeffrey R. Church and has been published by Irwin/McGraw-Hill this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Business & Economics categories.


Through an effective blend of analysis and examples this text integrates the game theory revolution with the traditional understanding of imperfectly competitive markets. The book's focus is on strategic competition and how firms can shelter their market power and economic profits from competitors. This focus establishes the intellectual foundation for determining business practices that warrant antitrust examination and prohibition and underlines recent activist antitrust policy. The author's stress an integrated understanding of industrial organization and the development of students' analytical abilities.



An Economic Theory Of Business Strategy


An Economic Theory Of Business Strategy
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Author : Scott J. Moss
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 1981

An Economic Theory Of Business Strategy written by Scott J. Moss and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1981 with Business & Economics categories.




The New Industrial Organization


The New Industrial Organization
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Author : Alex Jacquemin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1987

The New Industrial Organization written by Alex Jacquemin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1987 with Barriers to entry (Industrial organization) categories.




Industrial Pricing


Industrial Pricing
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Author : Frederic M. Scherer
language : en
Publisher: Chicago : Rand McNally College Publishing Company
Release Date : 1970

Industrial Pricing written by Frederic M. Scherer and has been published by Chicago : Rand McNally College Publishing Company this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1970 with Business & Economics categories.




Market Microstructure


Market Microstructure
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Author : Daniel F. Spulber
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 1999-04-13

Market Microstructure written by Daniel F. Spulber and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-04-13 with Business & Economics categories.


This book presents a theory of the firm based on its economic role as an intermediary between customers and suppliers. Professor Spulber demonstrates how the intermediation theory of the firm explains firm formation by showing how they arise in a market equilibrium. In addition, the theory helps explain how markets work by showing how firms select market-clearing prices. Models of intermediation and market microstructure from microeconomics and finance shed considerable light on the formation and market making activities of firms. The intermediation theory of the firm is compared to existing economic theories of the firm including the neoclassical, industrial organization, transaction cost, and principal-agent models.



Essays In Industrial Organization


Essays In Industrial Organization
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Author : Samuel Isaac Grondahl
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020

Essays In Industrial Organization written by Samuel Isaac Grondahl and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.


This thesis is a collection of three chapters that investigate burgeoning empirical issues in industrial organization. In the first chapter, I study platform fee policy with a specific focus on two-sided online marketplaces. The main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, I study a setting with coordinated price experimentation along the three different fee dimensions that are common to such marketplaces. Second, I describe the empirical impact of incomplete fee salience on equilibrium outcomes. Finally, I quantify the network externalities that must be present in order for observed fees to constitute an equilibrium. In the paper, I begin by developing a tractable model of the platform’s problem that generates testable predictions and yields equilibrium conditions in terms of estimable quantities. Then, using estimates from experimental data obtained from a large online marketplace, I quantify the salience and network effects. To conclude, I consider the counterfactual level and composition of equilibrium platform fees under when these effects are muted or absent. In the second chapter, using data from the same source as in chapter one, I study small sellers competing on the supply side of online marketplaces. As these platforms grow and markets become increasingly disintermediated, an important concern is whether small sellers, who may have limited experience or attention, can individually compete effectively with larger, often professional sellers operating on the same marketplaces. To answer this question, I develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates essential features of the empirical setting, including large and rapidly changing choice sets and buyer heterogeneity. Using the estimated model, I compute optimal pricing policies under various informational and computational restrictions. I find that small sellers adhering to a simple strategy can obtain nearly optimal expected revenue and that this strategy’s information requirements are easily satisfied in the online setting. Additionally, I present suggestive evidence that sellers learn to approximate such a strategy through repeated market interactions. In the third and final chapter, I investigate the industrial impacts of firm control rights, which confer discretion over firm policy and are usually shared between debt and equity holders. Control rights operate along a continuum and are difficult to measure. As a proxy, I consider the discontinuous shift in control from equity holders to creditors due to loan covenant violations, a common form of technical default. This paper contributes to the growing covenants literature in two ways. First, I consider the impact of and response to covenant violations at the industry level, inclusive of firms never in technical default. Second, I empirically document the effects of violations on contemporary product markets. I find that control rights transfers to creditors make firms tough in product markets, consistent with the predictions of a stylized model, and that markups decline at the industry level, though the declines are sharpest for firms directly affected.



Industrial Organization


Industrial Organization
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Author : Oz Shy
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 1996-01-17

Industrial Organization written by Oz Shy and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996-01-17 with Business & Economics categories.


This upper-level undergraduate text provides an introduction to industrial organization theory along with applications and nontechnical analyses of the legal system and antitrust laws. Using the modern approach but without emphasizing the mathematical generality inherent in many of the arguments, it bridges the gap between existing nontheoretical texts written for undergraduates and highly technical texts written for graduate students. The book can also be used in masters' programs, and advanced graduate students will find it a convenient guide to modern industrial organization.The treatment is rigorous and comprehensive. A wide range of models of all widely used market structures, strategic marketing devices, compatibility and standards, advertising, R&D, as well as more traditional topics are considered in versions much simplified from the originals but that retain the basic intuition. Shy first defines the issues that industrial organization addresses and then develops the tools needed to attack the basic questions. He begins with perfect competition and then considers imperfectly competitive market structures including a wide variety of monopolies, and all forms of quantity and price competitions. The last chapter provides a helpful feature for students by showing how various theories may be related to particular industries but not to others. Topics include: the basics needed to understand modern industrial organization; market structure (monopoly, homogenous products, differentiated products); mergers and entry; research and development; economics of compatibility and standards; advertising; quality and durability; pricing tactics; marketing tactics; management, compensation, and information; price dispersion and search theory; and special industries.



Industrial Market Structure And Economic Performance


Industrial Market Structure And Economic Performance
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Author : Frederic M. Scherer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1980

Industrial Market Structure And Economic Performance written by Frederic M. Scherer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1980 with Business & Economics categories.