Essays On Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation
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Essays In Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation
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Author : Fang Lin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays In Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation written by Fang Lin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.
Essays On Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation
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Author : Patrick Bernard Washington
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays On Corporate Governance And Executive Compensation written by Patrick Bernard Washington and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Electronic dissertations categories.
This dissertation is composed of three essays that study the interconnections between blockholders and CEO power, and the link between deferred compensation (inside debt) and financial performance/firm behavior. In the first chapter, I consider agency theory's prediction that a large shareholder, "blockholder," can serve as an effective governance mechanism when monitoring man- agers by reducing CEO dominance. However, not all blockholders are created equally. Inside blockholders with large equity stakes may be subject to CEO influence. Outside blockholders may not fear the same career concerns. Using a novel approach, I sepa- rate blockholders into insiders (officers & directors) and outsiders when considering their relationship to CEO power, which is proxied by the CEO Pay Slice (CPS). However, separating blockholders into outside and officer specifications reveals that director block- holders reduce CEO power. Economic theory suggests that firms with multiple classes of shares have weak governance structures. A significant difference in CEO dominance inside dual class share firms versus single class share firms has been documented. This paper expounds on previous research and shed's light on the effect of insiders' differential shareholder rights in dual class share firms. Evidence is provided that shows as insiders' percentage of voting rights increase then CEO power (CPS) decreases. Also, the results reveal that as insiders' percentage of cash flow rights increase then CEO power (CPS) increases. In the second chapter, I study recent literature's documentation that inside debt is widely used in executive compensation contracts. Prior research has only focused on the CEO's level of inside debt. However, the inner workings of the top executive team, and their importance for firm performance are difficult to observe and measure. In this essay, I aim to contribute to the subject by introducing new measures pertaining to the rela- tionship between the CEO and the other members of the top executive team, as well as studying the relation between these measures and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. My novel measure is the Slice of CEO Inside Debt (SCID) -- the frac- tion of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO. The effects of total deferred compensation account balances, firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID. This research provides evidence of increased CEO tenure (entrenchment) in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, reduced spending on research and development in relation to the earnings measure of SCID, increased spend- ing on capital expenditures in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID, and a lower probability of bankruptcy in relation to the executive contributions measure of SCID. Also, this paper shows that as the CEO's slice of deferred compensation from firm contributions and executive contributions increases then firm liquidity, i.e. working capital, decreases. In the final chapter, I consider prior research that has shown firms with CEOs who have less power take less risk. Thus, theory suggests that reducing CEO power through the use of deferred compensation, "inside debt," should motivate executives to become more risk averse. This essay investigates the relationship between the Slice of CEO Inside- Debt (SCID) — the fraction of the aggregate deferred compensation (inside debt) of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO — and CEO power (CPS--CEO Pay Slice) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The effects of firm contributions, executive contributions, and earnings on deferred compensation accounts are examined with respect to SCID in relation to CPS and CSR. This research provides evidence of increased CEO power by showing that firms with CEOs who contribute more money to their deferred compensation accounts relative to the total amount deferred by the top five executives, including the CEO, have CEOs with greater power in the following year. Additionally, this essay studies firms use of inside debt and its effect on corporate social responsibility. Empirical evidence is provided that firms with CEOs who experience increased earnings on their deferred compensation accounts relative to the account earnings of top five executives are positively correlated with being more socially responsible.
Three Essays In Executive Compensation And Corporate Governance
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Author : Swarnodeep Homroy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Three Essays In Executive Compensation And Corporate Governance written by Swarnodeep Homroy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Comparative Corporate Governance
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Author : Klaus J. Hopt
language : en
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
Release Date : 2015-02-06
Comparative Corporate Governance written by Klaus J. Hopt and has been published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-02-06 with Law categories.
Corporate governance has become an important issue in all industrial economies. This text has grown out of a conference entitled Comparative Corporate Governance, An International Conference, United States - Japan - Western Europe which considered the subject.
Three Essays On Corporate Restructurings Executive Compensation And Corporate Governance Mechanisms
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Author : Juan M. Sanchez
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Three Essays On Corporate Restructurings Executive Compensation And Corporate Governance Mechanisms written by Juan M. Sanchez and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Compensation management categories.
Two Essays On Corporate Governance
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Author : Minhua Yang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Two Essays On Corporate Governance written by Minhua Yang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with Corporate governance categories.
This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore the changes in corporate governance around the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 2002. In the first essay, I examine the relation between board structure and compensation as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO. Bargaining game theories describe an endogenous process of determining the structure of director and CEO compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered the equilibrium of power between the board and CEO by changing the monitoring role of the board. SOX essentially provides a natural experiment to test how a shock to the bargaining game alters the balance of power between directors and the CEO. Using the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation to proxy for bargaining power, I find a significant increase following the passage of SOX, consistent with directors gaining bargaining advantage. Moreover, firms with strong shareholder rights exhibit even greater evidence of power shifting to the directors. Overall, the results suggest that directors gain more power relative to the CEO in determining compensation plans and strong shareholder rights help firms to align directors' incentives with those of shareholders. In the second essay, I examine the relation between CEO compensation structure and acquirer returns. In the literature, researchers find that executive compensation structures influence corporate acquisition decisions. Equity-based executive compensation should reduce the non-value-maximizing behavior of acquiring managers. A series of corporate reforms such as SOX and the FASB expensing rule affected the structure of CEO equity-based compensation. I find a significant increase in CEO restricted stock compensation and a significant decrease in CEO option-based compensation following these reforms. I also find that CEOs with strong managerial power are more likely to receive more restricted stock in their compensation package after the 2002 reforms. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between the restricted stock compensation of acquiring firm CEOs and abnormal stock returns after 2002. This provides empirical support on the effectiveness of the shift away from options towards restricted stock in executive compensation packages. Restricted stock is associated with better merger decisions.
Three Essays On Corporate Governance And Control
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Author : Susan Christine Sassalos
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Three Essays On Corporate Governance And Control written by Susan Christine Sassalos and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with categories.
Essays On Corporate Governance And The Labor Market For Corporate Directors
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Author : Egor V. Matveyev
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Corporate Governance And The Labor Market For Corporate Directors written by Egor V. Matveyev and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Corporate governance categories.
"This thesis consists of two essays that examine issues related to the labor market for corporate directors and executive compensation. The first chapter develops and estimates an equilibrium model that identifies the key factors explaining the allocation of directors across firms. The approach is based on a two-sided matching model that allows an identification of director and appointing firm preferences. The findings indicate that directors choices are driven by their desire to expand their social network. Likewise, firms choose directors that increase the connectedness of their boards the most. The model is used to estimate the compensating differentials needed to attract directors with more attractive skill levels and higher quality connections. The evidence also suggests that CEO directors have lower propensity to expand their network, and choose firms with better records of recent performance. The performance of a CEO's firm does not affect his future prospects in the labor market for directorships. Second chapter examines the relation between executive and director compensation at the firm level. After controlling for monitoring proxies and manager-specific heterogeneity, there is no evidence of significant correlation between the excess compensation of directors and executives, contrary to previous research. The observed high levels of correlation between executive and director compensation are driven by underlying positive assortative matching between executive and director talent. Top-quality managers retain exceptional directors, and better directors choose to work for executives with excellent track records. This is consistent with a theory that assumes complementarity in production between director and executive skills"--Page iv-v.
Three Essays On Corporate Governance Of Family Firms
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Author : Tarek El Masri
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Three Essays On Corporate Governance Of Family Firms written by Tarek El Masri and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
This dissertation is comprised of three essays on issues related to the corporate governance of family firms. The first essay explores how owners-managers of family firms conceptualize and define their firms. Understanding the essence of a family firm helps us better understand their governance and behaviour. This essay contributes to the family business literature by presenting the seven most important criteria in identifying a family business (Handler 1989; Shanker & Astrachan 1996), namely: family ownership, control, involvement, succession, long-term vision, founders' legacy, and extended family of employees. The essay also contributes a familiness measurement tool that can be used in future research aiming at better understanding the family firm. The second essay investigates how management control technologies are calibrated in accordance with the sometimes conflicting economic and noneconomic goals resulting from the dual identities of family firms. The results show that family firms calibrate pervasive management control technologies, such as calculative, family-centric or procedural controls to strengthen the business identity and reduce the family identity of their family business. In comparison, the minimal use, or perceived absence, of management control technologies suggest that it accentuates and fosters family identity. Hence, reverting to management control technologies becomes related in a unilateral way to the business identity of the firm, despite the dual control ambition of family firms. The third essay analyzes CEO and TMT compensation practices to identify patterns that can explain the gap between family firms and the pool of external highly qualified executives. The data analysis highlights a connection between the degree of family ownership, the composition of the BOD, and the identity of the CEO. The results also show that family firms rely more heavily on cash-based awards than on equity-based awards as a form of CEO and TMT compensation. Family firms are reluctant to use option-based rewards and the use of share-based awards is also kept at a minimum. Other evidence point towards a role that institutional ownership plays in restructuring the compensation packages of the TMTs at family firms. Keywords: Family Firms, Definition of Family Firms, Family Firm Identity, Management Control Technologies, Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation.
Research Handbook On Executive Pay
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Author : John S. Beasley
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2012-01-01
Research Handbook On Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-01-01 with Business & Economics categories.
Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.