Essays On Dynamic Game Theory

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Essays On Dynamic Game Theory And Policy Analysis

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Author : Robert F. Lyons
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999

Essays On Dynamic Game Theory And Policy Analysis written by Robert F. Lyons and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Economics, Mathematical categories.

Essays On Dynamic Game Theory

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Author : Gyu Ho Wang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1991

Essays On Dynamic Game Theory written by Gyu Ho Wang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1991 with categories.

Game Theory And Economic Behaviour

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Author : Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany)
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 1999-03-24

Game Theory And Economic Behaviour written by Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany) and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-03-24 with categories.

'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.

Games And Dynamics In Economics

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Author : Ferenc Szidarovszky
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2020-04-11

Games And Dynamics In Economics written by Ferenc Szidarovszky and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-04-11 with Mathematics categories.

This book focuses on the latest advances in nonlinear dynamic modeling in economics and finance, mainly—but not solely—based on the description of strategic interaction by using concepts and methods from dynamic and evolutionary game theory. The respective chapters cover a range of theoretical issues and examples concerning how the qualitative theory of dynamical systems is used to analyze the local and global bifurcations that characterize complex behaviors observed in social systems where heterogeneous and boundedly rational economic agents interact. Nonlinear dynamical systems, represented by difference and differential and functional equations, are extensively used to simulate the behavior of time-evolving economic systems, also in the presence of time lags, discontinuities, and hysteresis phenomena. In addition, some theoretical issues and particular applications are discussed, as well. The contributions gathered here offer an up-to-date review of the latest research in this rapidly developing research area.

Essay In Cooperative Games

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Author : Gianfranco Gambarelli
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-06-05

Essay In Cooperative Games written by Gianfranco Gambarelli and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-06-05 with Business & Economics categories.

Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed.

Four Essays On Dynamic Evolutionary Models In Economics And Game Theory

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Author : Pier Luigi Sacco
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993

Four Essays On Dynamic Evolutionary Models In Economics And Game Theory written by Pier Luigi Sacco and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Evolution categories.

Three Essays On Dynamic Games

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Author : Asaf Plan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

Three Essays On Dynamic Games written by Asaf Plan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.

Chapter 1: This chapter considers a new class of dynamic, two-player games, where a stage game is continuously repeated but each player can only move at random times that she privately observes. A player's move is an adjustment of her action in the stage game, for example, a duopolist's change of price. Each move is perfectly observed by both players, but a foregone opportunity to move, like a choice to leave one's price unchanged, would not be directly observed by the other player. Some adjustments may be constrained in equilibrium by moral hazard, no matter how patient the players are. For example, a duopolist would not jump up to the monopoly price absent costly incentives. These incentives are provided by strategies that condition on the random waiting times between moves; punishing a player for moving slowly, lest she silently choose not to move. In contrast, if the players are patient enough to maintain the status quo, perhaps the monopoly price, then doing so does not require costly incentives. Deviation from the status quo would be perfectly observed, so punishment need not occur on the equilibrium path. Similarly, moves like jointly optimal price reductions do not require costly incentives. Again, the tempting deviation, to a larger price reduction, would be perfectly observed. This chapter provides a recursive framework for analyzing these games following Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) and the continuous time adaptation of Sannikov (2007). For a class of stage games with monotone public spillovers, like differentiated-product duopoly, I prove that optimal equilibria have three features corresponding to the discussion above: beginning at a "low" position, optimal, upward moves are impeded by moral hazard; beginning at a "high" position, optimal, downward moves are unimpeded by moral hazard; beginning at an intermediate position, optimally maintaining the status quo is similarly unimpeded. Corresponding cooperative dynamics are suggested in the older, non-game-theoretic literature on tacit collusion. Chapter 2: This chapter shows that in finite-horizon games of a certain class, small perturbations of the overall payoff function may yield large changes to unique equilibrium payoffs in periods far from the last. Such perturbations may tie together cooperation across periods in equilibrium, allowing substantial cooperation to accumulate in periods far from the last. Chapter 3: A dynamic choice problem faced by a time-inconsistent individual is typically modeled as a game played by a sequence of her temporal selves, solved by SPNE. It is recognized that this approach yields troublesomely many solutions for infinite-horizon problems, which is often attributed to the existence of implausible equilibria based on self-reward and punishment. This chapter presents a refinement applicable within the special class of strategically constant (SC) problems, which are those where all continuation problems are isomorphic. The refinement requires that each self's strategy be invariant, here that implies history-independence under the isomorphism. I argue that within the class of SC problems, this refinement does little more than rule out self-reward and punishment. The refinement substantially narrows down the set of equilibria in SC problems, but in some cases allows plausible equilibria that are excluded by other refinement approaches. The SC class is limited, but broader than it might seem at first.

Optimization Dynamics And Economic Analysis

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Author : Engelbert J. Dockner
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06

Optimization Dynamics And Economic Analysis written by Engelbert J. Dockner and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.

This book includes a collection of articles that present recent developments in the fields of optimization and dynamic game theory, economic dynamics, dynamic theory of the firm, and population dynamics and non standard applications of optimal control theory. The authors of the articles are well respected authorities in their fields and are known for their high quality research in the fields of optimization and economic dynamics.

Essays In Dynamic General Equilibrium Theory

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Author : Alessandro Citanna
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2006-01-11

Essays In Dynamic General Equilibrium Theory written by Alessandro Citanna and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-01-11 with Business & Economics categories.

In the area of dynamic economics, David Cass’s work has spawned a number of important lines of research, including the study of dynamic general equilibrium theory, the concept of sunspot equilibria, and general equilibrium theory when markets are incomplete. Based on these contributions, this volume contains new developments in the field, written by Cass's students and co-authors.

Essays In Evolutionary Game Theory

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Author : Ratul Lahkar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007

Essays In Evolutionary Game Theory written by Ratul Lahkar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.