Essays On Empirical Auctions And Related Econometrics
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Essays On Empirical Auctions And Related Econometrics
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Empirical Auctions And Related Econometrics written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
The first chapter studies identification and estimation of first-price auctions if the bidders face ambiguity about the distribution of valuations. Ambiguity is modeled using Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) Maxmin Expected Utility preferences. We exploit variation in the number of bidders to identify the essential primitives of the model. The identification result yields a closed form for the inverse bid function, which suggests a two-step estimation procedure. We study asymptotic and finite sample properties of the estimators. We find evidence of ambiguity in USFS timber auctions which leads to aggressive bidding for bidders with high valuations and has important implications for auction design. The second chapter proposes a procedure to test restrictions on infinite-dimensional parameters (partially) identified by unconditional or conditional moment equalities. Our new method allows us to test restrictions involving a continuum of inequalities. Examples of such restrictions include weakly increasing, concavity and first-order stochastic dominance. We show that our testing procedure controls size uniformly and has power approaching 1 against fixed alternatives. We conduct Monte Carlo Experiments to study the finite sample properties of our procedure. The third chapter studies the inference problem of bidders' risk attitudes in Independent Private Value (IPV) first-price auctions with multiplicative auction-level unobserved heterogeneity. Bidders are assumed to have Constant Relative Risk Aversion. Under the exclusion restriction that bidders randomly select themselves into auctions given the auction-level unobserved heterogeneity, bidders' CRRA coefficient is point-identified from bid data of auctions with at least two different number of active bidders. Our exclusion restriction is consistent with a variety of models with endogenous entry. Empirical application to USFS timber auctions shows that we will conclude that timber firms are risk averse if we ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity. But once we take the unobserved heterogeneity into account, risk neutrality is consistent with the data.
Essays On The Empirical Analysis Of Auctions
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Author : Bjarne Brendstrup
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Essays On The Empirical Analysis Of Auctions written by Bjarne Brendstrup and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
Essays In The Empirical Analysis Of Auction Markets
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Author : Ali Hortaçsu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001
Essays In The Empirical Analysis Of Auction Markets written by Ali Hortaçsu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with categories.
Three Essays In Empirical Auctions
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Author : Sudip Gupta
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Three Essays In Empirical Auctions written by Sudip Gupta and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
Essays In Empirical Industrial Organization And Auctions
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Author : Shumpei Goke
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Essays In Empirical Industrial Organization And Auctions written by Shumpei Goke and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
In this dissertation, I investigate various aspects of auction design problems. In Chapter 1, I study secret reserve prices in auctions that are partially binding in the sense that the sellers can accept bids below them. Such a reserve price has a bite only when the winning bid exceeds it, in which case the winning bid is accepted without seller's action. This work investigates the motivation for this puzzling practice that many real-world auctions take, such as wholesale used-car auctions. I estimate a structural model of ascending auctions using the auction data in the wholesale used-car market. To microfound seller's decision of the secret reserve price, I posit that the seller has uncertainty as to the value of the item when she sets the reserve price and that this uncertainty is resolved after she observes the auction price. I compare the status quo with two counterfactual auction formats: (i) no reserve prices and the seller gets to accept or reject every winning bid, and (ii) the seller commits to the secret reserve price. I observe very little difference among them in terms of probability of trade, seller's payoff and revenue. I discuss how the current format may be rationalized as reducing transaction costs for asking sellers' confirmation of all winning bids and avoiding sellers' cognitive cost of committing to a reserve price. The work in Chapter 2 is a joint work with Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ralph A. Mastromonaco, and Samuel S. Seljan. Weintraub and I formulated the research questions and laid out steps for the research project in close collaboration, and I performed all the data analysis with the advice from Weintraub. Mastromonaco and Seljan provided Weintraub and me with the dataset and the necessary domain knowledge. In this work, we study actual bidding behavior when a new auction format gets introduced into the marketplace. More specifically, we investigate this question using a novel dataset on internet display advertising auctions and exploiting a staggered adoption by different publishers (sellers) of first-price auctions (FPAs), instead of the traditional second-price auctions (SPAs). Event study regression estimates indicate that, immediately after the auction format change, the revenue per sold impression (price) jumped considerably for the treated publishers relative to the control publishers, ranging from 35% to 75% of the pre-treatment price level of the treatment group. Further, we observe that in later auction format changes the increase in the price levels under FPAs relative to price levels under SPAs dissipates over time, reminiscent of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem. We take this as evidence of initially insufficient bid shading after the format change rather than an immediate shift to a new Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Prices then went down as bidders learned to shade their bids. We also show that bidders' sophistication impacted their response to the auction format change. Our work constitutes one of the first field studies on bidders' responses to auction format changes, providing an important complement to theoretical model predictions. As such, it provides valuable information to auction designers when considering the implementation of different formats. In Chapter 3, I study the efficient design of mortgage foreclosure auctions. Lenders with delinquent mortgages recover their lending by foreclosure, which is a legal process to sell the mortgage property via public auction. In the U.S., mortgage lenders are allowed to bid in such foreclosure auctions, and they win in such auctions very frequently. I study the question of why mortgage lenders win in most of those auctions. I develop a theoretical model of ascending auctions with private values. I find that the lender's optimal bidding strategy is the same as the optimal reserve price of an auction seller, if it is below the debt balance. In other words, the lender exercises monopoly power as would an auction seller, up to the remaining debt. This increases the probability that the lender wins the auction, as third-party bidders' optimal strategy is to drop out of the auction when the price reaches their respective valuations of the mortgage property. The monopoly power that the mortgage confers to the lender also implies that the resulting allocation of the mortgage property may be inefficient. To resolve such inefficiency, I derive a mechanism that achieves efficient allocation of the foreclosed property.
Essays In Honor Of Cheng Hsiao
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Author : Dek Terrell
language : en
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
Release Date : 2020-04-15
Essays In Honor Of Cheng Hsiao written by Dek Terrell and has been published by Emerald Group Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-04-15 with Business & Economics categories.
Including contributions spanning a variety of theoretical and applied topics in econometrics, this volume of Advances in Econometrics is published in honour of Cheng Hsiao.
An Introduction To The Structural Econometrics Of Auction Data
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Author : Harry J. Paarsch
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2006
An Introduction To The Structural Econometrics Of Auction Data written by Harry J. Paarsch and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Business & Economics categories.
Accompanying CD-ROM contains data and sample computer code for empirical problems.
Three Essays On Multi Round Procurement Auctions
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Author : Lu Ji
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Three Essays On Multi Round Procurement Auctions written by Lu Ji and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Auctions categories.
My dissertation contributes to auction studies. It analyzes the bidding behavior in multi-round auctions. It is motivated by an interesting multi-round feature observed in the procurement auctions held by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT hereafter), which adopts secret reserve prices. Prior research has indicated that auctions with reserve prices usually lead to no trade. However, prior research has not paid much attention to the possibility that the seller can auction unsold objects from previous rounds and a trade is therefore still likely to occur. My dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical analyses of auctions with multiple rounds. It first develops a game-theoretic bidding model for the multi-round auctions with non-forward looking bidders. It then establishes a structural econometric model in order to conduct a structural analysis of the INDOT data. Lastly it introduces dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking and uses a dynamic control approach to analyze the bidding behavior and policy issues. The main findings are: (1) rational bidders reduce their markup across periods in multi-round auctions; (2) simulations show that using secret reserve price is sometimes better than public reserve price for the procurement auctioneer; (3) counterfactual analyses indicate that on one hand, when bidders are not forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price; on the other hand, when bidders are forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price when the discount factor is low and to use a public reserve price when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Essays On Nonparametric Identification And Estimation Of All Pay Auctions And Contests
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Author : Ksenia Shakhgildyan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On Nonparametric Identification And Estimation Of All Pay Auctions And Contests written by Ksenia Shakhgildyan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
My dissertation contributes to the structural nonparametric econometrics of auctions and contests with incomplete information. It consists of three chapters. The first chapter investigates the identification and estimation of an all-pay auction where the object is allocated to the player with the highest bid, and every bidder pays his bid regardless of whether he wins or not. As a baseline model, I consider the setting, where one object is allocated among several risk-neutral participants with independent private values (IPV); however, I also show how the model can be extended to the multiunit case. Moreover, the model is not confined to the IPV paradigm, and I further consider the case where the bidders' private values are affiliated (APV). In both IPV and APV settings, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimators of the distribution of the bidders' valuations using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000). Finally, I consider the model with risk-averse bidders. I prove that in general the model in this set-up is not identified even in the semi-parametric case where the utility function of the bidders is restricted to belong to the class of functions with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The second chapter proves the identification and derives the asymptotically normal estimator of a nonparametric contest of incomplete information with uncertainty. By uncertainty, I mean that the contest success function is not only determined by the bids of the players, but also by the variable, which I call uncertainty, with a nonparametric distribution, unknown to the researcher, but known to the bidders. This work is the first to consider the incomplete information contest with a nonparametric contest success function. The limiting case of the model when there is no uncertainty is an all-pay auction considered in the first chapter. The model with two asymmetric players is examined. First, I recover the distribution of uncertainty using the information on win outcomes and bids. Next, I adopt the structural approach of Guerre et al. (2000) to obtain the distribution of the bidders' valuations (or types). As an empirical application, I study the U.S. House of Representatives elections. The model provides a method to disentangle two sources of incumbency advantage: a better reputation, and better campaign financing. The former is characterized by the distribution of uncertainty and the latter by the difference in the distributions of candidates' types. Besides, two counterfactual analyses are performed: I show that the limiting expenditure dominates public campaign financing in terms of lowering total campaign spending as well as the incumbent's winning probability. The third chapter is a semiparametric version of the second chapter. In the case when the data is sparse, some restrictions on the nonparametric structure need to be put. In this work, I prove the identification and derive the consistent estimator of a contest of incomplete information, in which an object is allocated according to the serial contest success function. As in previous chapters, I recover the distribution of the bidders' valuations from the data on observed bids using a structural approach similar to that of Guerre et al. (2000) and He and Huang (2018). As a baseline model, I consider the symmetric contest. Further, the model is extended to account for the bidders' asymmetry.
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization
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Author : David B. Audretsch
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
Empirical Studies In Industrial Organization written by David B. Audretsch and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization brings together leading scholars who present state-of-the-art research in the spirit of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm embodied in the work of Leonard W. Weiss. The individual chapters are generally empirically or public policy oriented. A number of them introduce new sources of data that, combined with the application of appropriate econometric techniques, enable new breakthroughs and insights on issues hotly debated in the industrial organization literature. For example, five of the chapters are devoted towards uncovering the link between market concentration and pricing behavior. While theoretical models have produced ambiguous predictions concerning the relationship between concentration and price these chapters, which span a number of different markets and situations, provide unequivocal evidence that a high level of market concentration tends to result in a higher level of prices. Three of the chapters explore the impact of market structure on production efficiency, and three other chapters focus on the role of industrial organization on public policy. Contributors include David B. Audretsch, Richard E. Caves, Mark J. Roberts, F.M. Scherer, John J. Siegfried and Hideki Yamawaki.