Essays On Financial Intermediation
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Essays On Financial Intermediation And Monetary Policy
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Author : Abolfazl Setayesh Valipour
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Essays On Financial Intermediation And Monetary Policy written by Abolfazl Setayesh Valipour and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with Intermediation (Finance) categories.
My research revolves around financial institutions. In this essay, I aim to further our understandings of the internal workings of financial intermediaries, how they interact in financial networks, and how they affect monetary policy and the macroeconomy. In the first chapter, James Peck and I study a bank run model where the depositors can choose how much to deposit. In the many years and many published articles following the bank runs paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), only a few papers have modeled the decision of whether to deposit, much less the decision of how much to deposit. The questions we address here are, how does the opportunity for consumers to invest outside the banking system- in investments that do not provide liquidity insurance- (1) affect the nature of the final allocation, (2) affect the nature of the optimal deposit contract, and (3) affect the fragility of the banking system? We extend the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model so to incorporate sequential service constraint and the opportunity of outside investments and show that under certain conditions the equilibrium entails partial deposits, thus arguing for the optimality of limited banking. One might think that when depositors are allowed to invest a fraction of their endowments outside the banking system, they would be hedging against the risk of a run occurring, but losing out on some of the services provided by banks. Thus, one might think that this would improve the stability of the financial system at the expense of lost efficiency. However, we show that the opposite could be true, with reduced stability (runs more likely) but higher efficiency! In the second chapter, I study the strategic behavior of heterogeneous banks in a network and its implications on the stability of the financial system. I construct a model alas Allen and Gale (2000) wherein banks differ in whether they are hit by an uninsurable excess liquidity demand. I show that in such a framework banks that are already facing a high liquidity demand are more likely to incur the burden of excess liquidity shocks even when that shock has not directly hit them, i.e. relatively healthier banks strategically pass liquidation costs to relatively less healthy banks. I also show that private bailouts arise endogenously in this framework. If the strategic behavior of a bank results in the other bank's failure, the first bank may choose to incur the burden of the liquidity shock by itself to let the other bank survive and, thus, to control the indirect costs of failure feeding back to its portfolio. I also show that for some economies the financial network becomes more stable as the level of cross-deposits is increased from the minimum level that fully insures banks against liquidity demand uncertainty up to a threshold level. In the third chapter, I study the role of financial intermediaries in the transmission of monetary policy in low interest rate environments. The global financial crisis not only proved our understanding of intermediaries were inaccurate and in many ways misleading but also provided an unprecedented opportunity to investigate the questions in ways that were not possible before. Among those, was the behavior of economic players in ultra-low and even negative market rates. I study the internal workings of intermediaries by exploiting geographical variation in market concentration and provide the first explanation for the gradual deterioration of monetary policy power in low market rates that does not rely on bank-specific characteristics and similarly applies to non-bank intermediaries. I show that- in stark contrast to the textbook view but consistent with my mechanism- in low market rates more concentrated banks respond to market rate falls by reducing their deposit supply as well as their loan supply by more than those of less concentrated banks. I argue this behavior is the response of banks to loan and deposit demand becoming less elastic to market rate changes in low market rates which itself is due to the shift of household assets from the ones that are fully responsive to market rate changes (e.g. money market funds) to those less responsive (e.g. deposits) or irresponsive (e.g. cash) in low market rates. As the market rate falls, The downward pressure of the increased market power and the upward pressure of the traditional channels, cause the non-monotonic response of banks to market rate changes. The results help explain the puzzling slow recovery of the economy as well as stable inflation after the global financial crisis. I also show that local house prices become less responsive to market rate changes in low market rates in the counties that are exposed to high-market-power banks.
Essays On Financial Intermediation In A Dynamic Setting
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Author : Ronaldo Carpio
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Financial Intermediation In A Dynamic Setting written by Ronaldo Carpio and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 demonstrated that financial intermediaries play a critical, if not yet well-understood, role in the economy. However, our theoretical understanding of what intermediaries do is currently incomplete. The papers in this dissertation seek to improve our theoretical knowledge by introducing models that explicitly capture the activities of a financial intermediary in a dynamic setting. The first paper tackles two fundamental theoretical questions about banks. The first question seems simple but is still unresolved: how should we model a banking firm? We develop a dynamic model of a banking firm based on the notion of banking as the inventory management of cash. A bank that makes loans and takes deposits is a dynamic, stochastic inventory management problem. The second question is an old issue that has again become relevant in the wake of the financial crisis: why do banks engage in maturity mismatch, the process of "borrowing short and lending long". We show how profit-maximizing behavior in an inventory management model can result in maturity mismatch. We present the dynamic model, solve it numerically, and use simulation to predict the bank's behavior in different environments. A limitation of this model is that interest rates and the supply of deposits are taken as exogenous. The second paper endogenizes these quantities for a simple model of an inventory-theoretic financial firm, a Ponzi scheme. As with an ordinary monopolistic firm, the "bank" faces a demand schedule and chooses the price it offers; here, the price is the interest rate, and demand is generated by an OLG population that chooses to borrow or lend using standard models of savings and portfolio choice. In this way we seek to endogenize interest rates, quantities of credit, and financial risk. An issue that arises in dynamic optimization models such as the ones above is that analytic solutions are rare and we must resort to numerical computation, Standard methods of solving dynamic programming problems are computationally expensive; the third paper presents two promising approaches that can potentially provide dramatic speedups in speed. The first method is based on pre-computing the inverse gradient and Lagrange multipliers of a known utility function; subsequent calls can simply look up the pre-computed maximizers, instead of having to call a numeric root-finding routine each time. The second method exploits the duality between concave functions and their Legendre-Fenchel transforms. The Bellman operator in primal space is isomorphic to a tractable scaling and addition operation in dual space. In special cases, we can obtain the value function of the solution in closed form; even when we cannot obtain a closed form solution, we can gain theoretical insight into the properties of the solution.
Four Essays On Financial Intermediation
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Author : Stephen Donald Williamson
language : en
Publisher: Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International
Release Date : 1984
Four Essays On Financial Intermediation written by Stephen Donald Williamson and has been published by Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1984 with Financial institutions categories.
Essays On Financial Intermediation
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Author : Igor Salitskiy
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Financial Intermediation written by Igor Salitskiy and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three studies. In the first study I This paper extends the costly state verification model from Townsend (1979) to a dynamic and hierarchical setting with an investor, a financial intermediary, and an entrepreneur. Such a hierarchy is natural in a setting where the intermediary has special monitoring skills. This setting yields a theory of seniority and dynamic control: it explains why investors are usually given the highest priority on projects' assets, financial intermediaries have middle priority and entrepreneurs have the lowest priority; it also explains why more cash flow and control rights are allocated to financial intermediaries if a project's performance is bad and to entrepreneurs if it is good. I show that the optimal contracts can be replicated with debt and equity. If the project requires a series of investments until it can be sold to outsiders, the entrepreneur sells preferred stock (a combination of debt and equity) each time additional financing is needed. If the project generates a series of positive payoffs, the entrepreneur sells a combination of short-term and long-term debt. In the second study I I study optimal government interventions during asset fire sales by banks. Fire sales happen when a large portion of banks receive liquidity shocks. This depletes bank balance sheets directly and indirectly because these assets are used as collateral. The government can respond by buying distressed assets or buying stock from banks. Stock purchases do not deprive banks of collateral, but may have a lower effect on asset prices. The optimal policy depends on the elasticity of asset prices to asset supply and the amount of assets held by banks. Calibration to the recent financial crisis is provided. In the third study conducted with Attila Ambrus and Eric Chaney we use ransom prices and time to ransom for over 10,000 captives rescued from two Barbary strongholds to investigate the empirical relevance of dynamic bargaining models with one-sided asymmetric information in ransoming settings. We observe both multiple negotiations that were ex ante similar from the uninformed party's (seller's) point of view, and information that only the buyer knew. Through reduced-form analysis, we test some common qualitative predictions of dynamic bargaining models. We also structurally estimate the model in Cramton (1991) to compare negotiations in different Barbary strongholds. Our estimates suggest that the historical bargaining institutions were remarkably efficient, despite the presence of substantial asymmetric information.
Essays On Financial Intermediation And Corporate Efficiency
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Author : Miguel Cantillo Simon
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995
Essays On Financial Intermediation And Corporate Efficiency written by Miguel Cantillo Simon and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with categories.
Essays On Financial Intermediation And Deposit Insurance
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Author : George W. Fenn
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1988
Essays On Financial Intermediation And Deposit Insurance written by George W. Fenn and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1988 with Banks and banking categories.
Essays On Financial Intermediation
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Author : Michael Gábor Köllő
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Financial Intermediation written by Michael Gábor Köllő and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
The Theory Of Financial Intermediation
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Author : Bert Scholtens
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
The Theory Of Financial Intermediation written by Bert Scholtens and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Finance categories.
Essays On Financial Intermediation
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Author : Javed Ahmed
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Financial Intermediation written by Javed Ahmed and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
In this dissertation, I analyze behavior of two types of financial intermediaries that play critical roles in capital allocation: ratings agencies and merger advisors. Each type of intermediary survives due to (assumed) informational advantages relative to firms and investors. In the following chapters, I analyze how differences in information between market participants and intermediaries lead to signaling behavior related to privately-observed quality. My results explain some seemingly-anomalous aspects of financial markets, and provide a framework for assessing the impact intermediaries can have on efficient capital allocation. In the first chapter, I examine whether rating agencies strategically manipulate the informativeness of bond ratings in response to competition from private lenders. I model a monopolistic rating agency that caters to a low-quality marginal customer with uninformative ratings. High-quality customers prefer informative ratings but are captive customers of the rating agency in the absence of competition from private lenders. With competition from private lenders, the rating agency uses informative ratings to keep high-quality customers in public markets. The model also suggests that the ratings sector dampens the impact of capital supply shocks, and offers a strategic pricing rationale for the controversial practice of issuing unsolicited credit ratings. In the second chapter, I test predictions of the model using a measure of informativeness based on the impact of unexpected ratings on a debt issuer's borrowing cost. I analyze two events that increased the relative supply of private vs.\ public lending: the temporary shutdown of the high-yield market in 1989 and legislation in 1994 that reduced barriers to interstate bank lending. After each event, I find that the informativeness of ratings increased for issuers whose relative supply of private vs.\ public capital increased most. In the third chapter, I analyze how acquiring firms select and pay advisors. I present a model in which an advisor with privately known quality screens targets (due diligence) and improves negotiation outcomes (bidding). When a transaction involves only bidding, advisors pool by offering fees contingent on a completed transaction. By contrast, a transaction involving due diligence can lead to a separating equilibrium and fixed fees. The model predicts that acquirers use advisor market share instead of stock return-based measures to select advisors when synergies are not observable, and that acquirers with better information about advisor quality pay higher fees. I argue that investors in leveraged buyouts are skilled in acquisitions, and find that they pay higher fees for both mergers and tender offers, controlling for assignment and deal characteristics. They are also less likely to include contingent fees than other acquirers. Results suggest skilled investors use private information about advisor ability to hire advisors, and do so primarily to screen targets rather than to improve negotiation outcomes.
Essays In Financial Intermediation
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Author : Ping He
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Essays In Financial Intermediation written by Ping He and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.