Essays On Information Liquidity And Financial Frictions
DOWNLOAD
Download Essays On Information Liquidity And Financial Frictions PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Essays On Information Liquidity And Financial Frictions book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Essays On Information Liquidity And Financial Frictions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Wukuang Cun
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Information Liquidity And Financial Frictions written by Wukuang Cun and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Financial crises categories.
This dissertation seeks to understand how financial frictions arise and how they can affect the economy, and explores the implications of financial frictions for monetary policy during crises. Specifically, Chapter 2 and 3 study the endogenous nature of information asymmetry and explore its implications for financial markets and the macro economy. Chapter 4 studies the potential side effects of large scale asset purchase by central banks. In Chapter 2, I study a dynamic economy in which the information on asset quality is asymmetric and the degree of information asymmetry endogenously varies with the macro-economy, which amplifies the effects of shocks. In the model, firms hold assets of heterogeneous quality and borrow for operating expenses. Production is subject to idiosyncratic shocks, which may force the firms to liquidate their assets to pay off debts. Firms are initially uninformed of the qualities of their assets, but they can acquire private information on their own assets at a cost. Private information is individually beneficial, but it creates a lemons problem that lowers market liquidity and distorts economic decisions. Adverse shocks trigger private information acquisition, which exacerbates the lemons problem. As results, market liquidity drops and economic activity declines. The model can generate larger fluctuations in financial and macroeconomic variables than an otherwise the same model with the level of information asymmetry being fixed. In Chapter 3, I provide a possible explanation for the countercyclical movements in the measures of asset return volatility. In the model, external financing is costly due to the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. When the borrowers' financial conditions are worsened, the costs of external financing rise. Borrowers respond by increasing their transparency to outside investors to mitigate information asymmetry, which helps reduce the external financing cost. As a result, returns on external financing instruments disperse and fluctuate more as more information is disclosed, leading to increases in the cross sectional dispersion and the time series volatility of returns. This model can generate countercyclical dispersion, volatility in returns and external finance premium, with correlation coefficients between pairs of these measures quantitatively in line with the data. In Chapter 4, I explore the potential side effects of central bank asset purchase. In the model, commercial banks and shadow banks hold liquid assets as part of their operations. Asset purchases by the central bank decreases the supply of liquid assets that shadow banks can directly hold. When commercial banks do not face binding leverage constraints, shadow banks respond by increasing their deposits in or credit lines from commercial banks and central bank asset purchases are neutral. In the presence of a binding leverage constraint, however, asset purchases create distortions that decrease shadow banks' liquidity holdings and their lending. While conventional wisdom says that central bank asset purchases should be expansionary, I show that central bank asset purchases are necessarily contractionary when the level of bank reserves is high.
Essays On Liquidity And Information
DOWNLOAD
Author : Pablo Daniel Kurlat
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays On Liquidity And Information written by Pablo Daniel Kurlat and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
This dissertation studies the interaction of liquidity and incomplete or asymmetric information. In Chapter 1, I study a dynamic economy with illiquidity due to adverse selection in financial markets. Investment is undertaken by borrowing-constrained entrepreneurs. They sell their past projects to finance new ones, but asymmetric information about project quality creates a lemons problem. The magnitude of this friction responds to aggregate shocks, amplifying the responses of asset prices and investment. Indeed, negative shocks can lead to a complete shutdown in financial markets. I then introduce learning from past transactions. This makes the degree of informational asymmetry endogenous and makes the liquidity of assets depend on the experience of market participants. Market downturns lead to less learning, worsening the future adverse selection problem. As a result, transitory shocks can create highly persistent responses in investment and output. In Chapter 2, I study why firms can choose to be illiquid. Optimal incentive schemes for managers may involve liquidating a firm following bad news. Fragile financial structures, vulnerable to runs, have been proposed as a way to implement these schemes despite their ex-post inefficiency. I show that in general these arrangements result in multiple equilibria and, even allowing arbitrary equilibrium selection, they do not necessarily replicate optimal allocations. However, if output follows a continuous distribution and creditors receive sufficiently precise individual early signals, then there exists a fragile financial structure such that global games techniques select a unique equilibrium which reproduces the optimal allocation. In Chapter 3, I study speculative attacks against illiquid firms. When faced with a speculative attack, banks and governments often hesitate, attempting to withstand the attack but giving up after some time, suggesting they have some ex-ante uncertainty about the magnitude of the attack they will face. I model that uncertainty as arising from incomplete information about speculators' payoffs and find conditions such that unsuccessful partial defenses are possible equilibrium outcomes. There exist priors over the distribution of speculators' payoffs that can justify any possible partial defense strategy. With Normal uncertainty, partial resistance is more likely when there is more aggregate uncertainty regarding agents' payoffs and less heterogeneity among them.
Essays On Liquidity Monopolistic Competition And Search Frictions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Mario Rafael Silva
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays On Liquidity Monopolistic Competition And Search Frictions written by Mario Rafael Silva and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
I study the interactions between liquidity constraints, monopolistic competition, and search frictions for product markets, labor markets, and credit markets. Monopolistic competition is especially important for three different reasons. First, there is an externality that links the demand of firms to the state of the economy. Second, under free entry, the product space is influenced by policy and interacts with liquidity constraints. Third, monopolistic competition generates markups, which can augment other wedges and thereby interact with liquidity constraints.The first chapter considers the role played by endogenous variety and monopolistic competition in the long-run transmission of monetary policy. The combination of free entry and product variety gives rise to both an intensive margin (quantity of particular good) and extensive margin (extent of variety), and search frictions imply that firm entry involves a congestion externality. Inflation generally reduces variety. Under constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences, firms are inefficiently small, with the inefficiency increasing in product differentiation and the extent of search frictions. The Friedman rule, which involves contracting the money supply at the rate of time preference, is the best policy under CES preferences. In contrast, with variable elasticity of demand, inflation can increase firm size, reduce markups, and raise welfare, even though output is lower. Under CES preferences, the welfare cost of inflation is high; moreover, it increases monotonically with the markup and is higher with endogenous variety than with a fixed variety alternative.The second chapter departs from the dramatic growth of revolving credit since 1970 relative to both consumption and consumer credit. Importantly, revolving credit primarily determines short-run household liquidity and comoves positively with product variety. I augment the Mortensen-Pissarides model with an endogenous borrowing constraints and free entry of monopolistically competitive firms. Unemployment is amplified from a two-way feedback: higher debt limits encourage firm entry and raise product variety (the entry channel), and greater variety makes default more costly and thereby raises the equilibrium debt level (the consumption value channel). I compare the model to a counterfactual economy in which either channel is shut down and find that mean amplification exceeds 50%. Furthermore, only the model economy generates a procyclical response of the credit-to-consumption ratio, as observed in the data.The third chapter examines the role of corporate finance and imperfect competition in the pass through of monetary policy to the real lending rate and its transmission into investment. Monopolistically competitive entrepreneurs can finance investment opportunities using bank-issued credit or money. They seek loans in an over-the-counter market where the terms of the contract (loan size, interest rate, and down payment) are negotiated subject to pledgeability constraints. I investigate pass through of the policy rate to the real lending rate and its transmission to output and investment, taking into account the interplay of (1) heterogeneous financial frictions from limited enforcement and (2) aggregate demand externalities from monopolistic competition. Whereas returns to scale or product diversity are not important for the pass through, the former substantially affect the transmission of policy to investment and output. Furthermore, financial frictions interact positively with demand complementarities from monopolistic competition. Greater dispersion of financial frictions reduces investment and output and also increases transmission unevenly across the range of nominal policy rates, having a maximal effect at about a policy rate of 9%.
Essays On Liquidity Informational Frictions And Monetary Policy
DOWNLOAD
Author : Kee Youn Kang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays On Liquidity Informational Frictions And Monetary Policy written by Kee Youn Kang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with Electronic dissertations categories.
The dissertation, which consists of two chapters, is devoted to exploring the role of informational friction in monetary economics and finance.Chapter I: COUNTERFEITING, SCREENING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY.In this chapter, I construct a search theoretic model of money in which counterfeit money can be produced at a cost but agents can screen for fake money also at a cost. Counterfeiting can occur in equilibrium when both costs and the inflation rate are sufficiently low. Optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule. However, the rationale for the Friedman rule in an economy with the circulation of counterfeit money differs from the conventional mechanism that holds in the model when counterfeiting does not occur. I also study optimal anti-counterfeiting policy that determines the counterfeiting cost and the screening cost.Chapter II: CENTRAL BANK PURCHASES OF PRIVATE ASSETS: AN EVALUATIONIn this chapter, I develop a model of asset exchange and monetary policy, augmented to incorporate a housing market and a frictional financial market. Homeowners take out mortgages with banks using their residential properties as collateral to finance consumption. Banks use mortgages and government liabilities as collateral to secure deposit contracts, but they have an incentive to fake the quality of mortgages at a cost. Quantitative easing (QE) in the form of central bank purchases of mortgages from private banks has effects on the composition of assets in the economy, and on the incentive structure of the private sector. When the incentive problem is severe, the central bank can unambiguously improve welfare by purchasing mortgages. However, when it is not severe, the central bank's mortgage purchases cause a housing construction boom and sometimes can lower exchange in the economy, hence reducing welfare.
Essays In Financial Frictions Entrepreneurship And Economic Development
DOWNLOAD
Author : Rasim Burak Uras
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays In Financial Frictions Entrepreneurship And Economic Development written by Rasim Burak Uras and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Electronic dissertations categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the economic implications of financial frictions on entrepreneurial investment decision making and aggregate economic performance. The first essay studies investment horizon choice of a distribution of entrepreneurs when a fraction of the financiers within the economy consists of impatient type of lenders. The second essay studies the effects of financial contract enforcement in promoting productive entrepreneurship and economic development. The third essay studies the link between financial development and entrepreneurial capital-labor management. In the first essay, I study the effects of incomplete insurance in financial contracts on risk taking, investment horizon choice and productivity of a distribution of heterogeneous entrepreneurs. I develop a highly-stylized three-period OLG model in which young financiers are heterogeneous in terms of their liquidity needs. As a result, in the model only a fraction of financiers are patient enough to consider their long term lending opportunities. The lending options of financiers are short and long term and any combination of both which result in either short term or long term investment projects undertaken by entrepreneurs. In this setting, equilibrium investment composition (short term vs. long term) and productivity levels of entrepreneurs are determined by their intrinsic entrepreneurial ability distribution, as well as by the fraction of the patient type of financiers in the economy. When productivity improves, entrepreneurial firms increase their capital investment; however, whether they shift to long term oriented projects or not is strongly linked with the liquidity needs of the financiers. Cross-country data shows a positive correlation between a nation's contract enforcement level and its ability to adopt modern technologies. In the second essay of my dissertation, I study the role entrepreneurial incentives play in shaping this empirical observation. I develop and solve a life-cycle model with limited financial contract enforcement, entrepreneurial heterogeneity (ability and financial pledgeability) and technology choice. In the model production processes can be undertaken using either the Traditional or the Modern technology. Depending on the entrepreneurial ability, the modern technology can be more productive relative to the traditional technology, but the former requires a long-term investment making entrepreneur's pledgeability important in his choice. In equilibrium the level of contract enforcement and entrepreneurial characteristics endogenously determine (1) the investment size and (2) the technology choice. Key results of the paper indicate that when financial contract enforcement is weak, the investment size and the intensity of modern technology use of entrepreneurial firms are positively correlated with financial pledgeability. Collateral-building associated with short term investment is important for the results. I calibrate the model to study its quantitative properties. Quantitative experiments illustrate sizeable positive effects of financial contract enforcement on aggregate output and aggregate modern technology adoption for the U.S. economy. Furthermore, counterfactual analysis shows that if financial contract enforcement in Turkey (a low enforcement economy) improves to the U.S. level (a high enforcement economy), output rises by 13-15%; and one third of this change is due to the increase in the rate of modern technology adoption. The third essay in my dissertation provides a quantitative analysis on the effects of firm level financial characteristics in explaining the observed industry-wide productivity heterogeneity in U.S. firm level data. In the first part of the essay, I develop a model in which the interplay between capital and financial market frictions endogenously determine capital-labor ratio decisions of entrepreneurial firms. In this economy capital is costly to rent to some producers due to investment related moral hazard. Therefore, it is beneficial for such entrepreneurs to purchase the capital good instead of renting it. Entrepreneurs can internalize the cost of capital by borrowing in the financial market. However, the amount which can be borrowed is constrained by an entrepreneurs financial market reputation (pledgeability) and his financial asset liquidity (collateral). In equilibrium, firms with lower pledgeability and/or lower liquidity become more labor intensive relative to firms with higher pledgeability and/or liquidity. Distortions to capital rental rates augment the sensitivity of capital-labor choice with respect to firm level financial pledgeability and liquidity. In the second part of the essay, the analytical results are tested in a panel data analysis. Using proxies for "labor intensive production", "financial pledgeability", and "financial asset liquidity" for a large sample of U.S. firms from Compustat North America, I show that low pledgeability and low asset liquidity are associated with labor intensive production. The third part of the essay provides a quantitative analysis. I choose seven major industries in the U.S. economy. For these industries, I show that ability to borrow against financial pledgeability and asset liquidity mitigate the distortionary effects of non-uniform capital rental rates and decrease intra-industry productivity dispersion while increasing industry total factor productivity by quantitatively important proportions. However, there are differential effects of financial pledgeability and financial asset liquidity on aggregate industry performance. My results suggest that the way sectoral firms benefit from the presence of financial pledgeability and asset liquidity depend on sector specific characteristics.
Three Essays In Macroeconomics
DOWNLOAD
Author : Golam Ashique Habib
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Three Essays In Macroeconomics written by Golam Ashique Habib and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
This thesis collects three papers studying topics related to financial frictions and macroeconomics. In Chapter 1, I study how rating agencies affect liquidity and welfare in over-the-counter (OTC) asset markets. My main finding is that when assets are rated matters for welfare and liquidity: When sellers rate the asset prior to matching, then ratings can improve liquidity but their use is fragile. However, a better arrangement is to rate the asset after buyers and sellers meet. Although this arrangement eliminates liquidity distortions and improves welfare, it is difficult to sustain if buyers are not incentivized to follow through with rating the asset. Buyers can overcome this commitment problem by constructing a semi-pooling equilibrium. I use my framework to show that policies that support buyers purchasing ratings can substantially improve market liquidity. In Chapter 2, I propose that an important channel through which financial frictions adversely impact aggregate productivity is by hindering the discovery of productive entrepreneurs. I develop a model where households have imperfect information about the quality of their business idea and show how financial frictions arising from weak contract enforcement systematically reduce access to capital for poor households with good ideas, which undermines their incentive to learn. After calibrating the model to US data, I find that with imperfect information, total factor productivity (TFP) falls by 23% when contract enforcement is lowered to developing country levels, compared to 12% with perfect information. Half of the productivity loss in the economy with imperfect information is due to financial frictions hindering the discovery of good ideas by poor households. I find that these losses can be substantially mitigated by subsidizing young entrepreneurs. In Chapter 3, I present ongoing work with Chaoran Chen and Xiaodong Zhu examining the joint role of financial and managerial frictions in explaining factor misallocation and lower productivity in developing countries. We present a model where weak contract enforcement prevents productive firms from hiring outside managers and expanding production in developing countries, and show that its key features are consistent with cross-country evidence from the IPUMS-International dataset.
Essays On Financial Intermediation And Liquidity
DOWNLOAD
Author : Ye Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays On Financial Intermediation And Liquidity written by Ye Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
The complementarity between money and credit arises from financial frictions and amplifies economic fluctuations. In the third essay, my coauthors and I model the liquidity demand of banks. To buffer liquidity shocks, banks hold central bank reserves and can borrow reserves from each other. The propagation of liquidity shocks, depend on the topology of interbank credit network, but more importantly, on the type of equilibrium on the network (strategic complementarity vs. substitution). The model is estimated using data on reserves, interbank credit, bank balance sheets, and macroeconomic variables. We propose a method to identify banks that contribute the most to systemic risk, and offer policy guidance by comparing the decentralized outcome with the choice of a benevolent planner.
Essays In Macroeconomics And Financial Frictions
DOWNLOAD
Author : Christine N. Tewfik
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays In Macroeconomics And Financial Frictions written by Christine N. Tewfik and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
My dissertation is comprised of three papers on the causes and consequences of the U.S. Great Recession. The emphasis is on the role that financial frictions play in magnifying financial shocks, as well as in informing the effectiveness of potential policies. Chapter 1, "Financial Frictions, Investment Delay and Asset Market Interventions," co-authored with Shouyong Shi, studies the role of investment delay in propagating different types of financial shocks, and how this role impacts the effectiveness of asset market interventions. The topic is motivated by the observation that, during the Great Recession, governments conducted large-scale asset market interventions. The aim was to increase the level of liquidity in the asset market and make it easier for firms to obtain financing. However, firms were observed to have delayed investment by hoarding liquid funds, part of which were obtained through the interventions. We construct a dynamic macro model to incorporate financial frictions and investment delay. Investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs who face liquidity frictions in the equity market and a collateral constraint in the debt market. After calibrating the model to the U.S. data, we quantitatively examine how aggregate activity is affected by two types of financial shocks: (i) a shock to equity liquidity, and (ii) a shock to entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity. We then analyze the effectiveness of government interventions in the asset market after such financial shocks. In particular, we compare the effects of government purchases of private equity and of private debt in the open market. In addition, we examine how these effects of government interventions depend on the option to delay investment. In Chapter 2, "Housing Liquidity and Unemployment: The Role of Firm Financial Frictions," I build upon the role that firms' ability to obtain funding plays in the severity of the Great Recession. I focus specifically on how the housing crisis reduced the ability of firms to obtain funding, and the consequences for unemployment. An important feature I focus on is the role of housing liquidity, or how easy it is to sell or buy a house. I analyze how an initial fall in housing market liquidity, linked to rising foreclosure costs for banks, affects labor market outcomes, which can have further feedback effects. I focus on the role that firm financial frictions play in these feedback effects. To this end, I construct a dynamic macro model that incorporates frictional housing and labor markets, as well as firm financial frictions. Mortgages are obtained from banks that incur foreclosure costs in the event of default. Foreclosure costs also affect the ease with which firms can borrow, and this influences their hiring decisions. I calibrate the model to U.S. data, and find that a rise in foreclosure costs that generates a 10% fall in the firm loan-to-output ratio results in a 3 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate. The rise in unemployment makes it more difficult for indebted owners to avoid defaulting on their mortgage. This rise in default, on the order of 20 percent, creates further slack in the housing market by both increasing the number of houses on the market and reducing the amount of buyers. Consequently, there are large drops in housing prices and in the size of mortgage loans. Notably, when firm financial frictions are absent, I observe a counter-factual fall in the unemployment rate, which mitigates the effects on the housing market, and even results in a fall in the mortgage default rate. The results highlight the importance of the impact of the housing market crisis on a firm's willingness to hire, and how firms' limited access to credit magnifies the initial housing shock. In Chapter 3, "Housing Market Distress and Unemployment: A Dynamic Analysis," I add to the contributions of my second paper, and extend the analysis to determine the dynamic effects of the housing crisis on unemployment. In Chapter 2, I focused on comparing stationary equilibria when there is a rise in the foreclosure costs associated with mortgage default. However, a full analysis must also take into account the dynamic effects of the shock. In order to do the dynamic analysis, I modify the model in my job market paper to satisfy the conditions of block recursivity. I do this by incorporating Hedlund's (2016) technique of introducing real estate agents in the housing market that match separately with buyers and sellers. Doing this makes the model's endogenous variables independent of the distribution of households and firms. Rather, the impact of the distribution is summarized by the shadow value of housing. This greatly improves the tractability of the model, and allows me to compute the dynamic response to a fall in a bank's ability to sell a foreclosed house, thus raising the costs of mortgage default. I find that the results are largely dependent on the size and persistence of the shock, as well as the level of firm financial frictions that are present. When firm financial frictions are high, as represented by the presence of an interest rate premium charged to firms, and the initial shock is large, the shock is transferred to firms via an endogenous rise in the cost of renting capital. Firms scale back on production and reduce employment. The rise in unemployment increases the debt burden for households with large mortgages. They can try and sell, but find it difficult to do so because they must sell at a high price to be able to pay off their debt. If they fail, they are forced to default, thus further raising the mortgage costs of banks, further reducing resources to firms, and propagating the initial shock. However, the extent of the propagation is limited; once the shock wears off, the economy recovers to its pre-crisis levels within two quarters. I discuss the reasons why, and what elements would be needed for greater persistence.
Essays On Financial Markets Inequality And Economic Development
DOWNLOAD
Author : Joaquin Blaum
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Financial Markets Inequality And Economic Development written by Joaquin Blaum and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
In Chapter 1, I study the effects of wealth inequality on economies where financial markets are imperfect. I exploit the idea that inequality should have a different effect across sectors. Using a difference-in-difference strategy, I show that sectors that are more in need of external finance are relatively smaller in countries with higher income inequality. I then build a model in which sectors differ in their fixed cost requirement, agents face collateral constraints, and production is subject to decreasing returns. A calibrated version of the model is consistent with the documented facts on inequality and cross-sector outcomes. At the calibrated parameters, wealth inequality exacerbates the effect of financial frictions on the economy. Quantitatively, wealth inequality can generate losses of up to 46 percent of per capita income. In Chapter 2, co-authored with Claire Lelarge and Michael Peters, we explore the ingredients that a model of import behavior should have in order to be consistent with the firm level evidence. We build a model where firms are heterogeneous in their factor neutral productivity, and prices, fixed costs and input qualities are common across firms. Using a comprehensive dataset of French firms, we test the qualitative predictions of such model. The model fares well in describing firm's expenditure across imported varieties, but fails to account for the pattern of expenditure between domestic and foreign inputs. We conclude that a mechanism inducing firm-level heterogeneity in the relative price of domestic varieties is needed to model import demand. In Chapter 3, I study the effects of financial frictions on the pattern of cross-industry growth rates. I document two facts: (i) externally dependent sectors tend to grow faster along the economy's development path, and (ii) externally dependent sectors grow disproportionately faster in countries with better financial institutions. I argue that financial frictions can account for these facts. I build a dynamic two-sector model in which sectors differ in their liquidity requirement and agents face collateral constraints. Financial frictions generate faster growth in the sector with higher liquidity requirement. I identify conditions under which financial development leads to higher excess growth in the externally dependent sector.
Essays On Information And Frictions In Financial Markets
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yueyang Han
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On Information And Frictions In Financial Markets written by Yueyang Han and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.