Essays On Market Structure And Competition
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Essays On Market Structure And Competition
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Author : Michalis Zaouras
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Market Structure And Competition written by Michalis Zaouras and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
Market Structure Organization And Performance
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Author : Almarin Phillips
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1962
Market Structure Organization And Performance written by Almarin Phillips and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1962 with Business & Economics categories.
No detailed description available for "Market Structure, Organization, and Performance".
Essays On Market Structure
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Author : Feng Ruan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On Market Structure written by Feng Ruan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
Economic Essays
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Author : Roy Harrod
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 1972-06-18
Economic Essays written by Roy Harrod and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1972-06-18 with Business & Economics categories.
Monopolistic Competition Theory
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Author : Robert E. Kuenne
language : en
Publisher: New York : Wiley
Release Date : 1967
Monopolistic Competition Theory written by Robert E. Kuenne and has been published by New York : Wiley this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1967 with CHAMBERLIN, EDWARD,1899- . THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION categories.
Essays On Competition Market Structures And Public Goods
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Author : Kimon Theofanis Doulis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Competition Market Structures And Public Goods written by Kimon Theofanis Doulis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Essays On Competitive Analysis
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Author : Eric Jahn
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Competitive Analysis written by Eric Jahn and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Essays On Corporate Finance And Product Market Competition
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Author : Bomi Lee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Corporate Finance And Product Market Competition written by Bomi Lee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This dissertation contains two essays on the aggressive behavior of corporations in product market competition. In the first essay, I investigate how market structure can impact a firm's risk of facing predation by rivals, and hence, its financial policy decisions. Using a simple model, I demonstrate that a firm faces a greater predation threat when it meets the same competitor in many markets, as this competitor is able to internalize more of the benefit, degrading the firm's ability to compete in the future through aggressive actions today. I then test the predictions of the model using 2003-2011 panel data on store location across retail store chains in the US. I find that firms tend to expand more aggressively in markets shared with a competitor experiencing a substantial increase in leverage, or a decline in a credit rating, when they face that competitor in more of the other markets. The expansion relationship was found to be stronger in data from the 2008-2009 financial crisis, a period when difficulty in rolling over or obtaining new debt made it especially hard for weak firms to absorb losses. I also show that a firm facing the same competitors in many markets choose lower levels of leverage and that it decreases that leverage when a merger in the industry increases the amount of competitive overlap it has with other firms. These results suggest that firms are aware of the predation risk due to a competitive overlap and select financial policies to minimize this risk. In the second essay, I study the impact of internally generated funds on product market competition. More specifically, I investigate the idea that firms compete aggressively when their competitors face cash flow shortfalls. Testing this idea is challenging because competitor's cash flow changes are potentially endogenous with respect to firm's behavior. I address this problem in three ways. First, I investigate firm's reaction in a given market when its competitors face cash flow shortfalls outside of that market; this analysis is conducted using store location data on retail store chains. Second, I focus on the 2008-2009 financial crisis period in which retail store chains were hit by a negative demand shock which was hardly expected ex ante. Finally, I use a shock to local economic conditions which varies across markets and the different distributions of store locations across firms as instruments for the changes in competitors' cash flows. I find that a firm expands more in a given market in which it competes with rivals which face a more negative cash flow shortfall in the other markets. This relation is stronger when the competitors were highly leveraged before the crisis. Finally, I illustrate evidence that a firm responds more aggressively to competitor's cash flow shortfalls if it competes with that competitor in many of the same markets; this result is consistent with the prediction of the model in Chapter 1. These essays contribute to the literature by adding new evidence on the predatory behavior of corporations in product market competition.
Three Essays On Market Structure Competition Prices Health Spending And Quality In The Us Healthcare System
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Author : James R Godwin
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Three Essays On Market Structure Competition Prices Health Spending And Quality In The Us Healthcare System written by James R Godwin and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
The United States spends a larger percentage of GDP on healthcare than any other OECD nation, and yet it performs poorly on measures of access, process quality and outcomes relative to other wealthy nations. One hypothesis that may explain the relatively poor performance of the United States' healthcare system per dollar spent is that markets for hospitals, physician services, and insurance are highly consolidated and lack competition. This dissertation contributes to the body of literature seeking to measure healthcare market structure and assess the relationship between this market structure and unit prices, overall spending, and healthcare quality. The first paper in this dissertation, "The Association between Hospital-Physician Vertical Integration and Outpatient Physician Prices Paid by Commercial Insurers: New Evidence," demonstrates market-level associations between vertical integration among hospitals and physicians and higher prices for outpatient care. The second essay, "How Hospital-Owned Physician Organizations are Associated with Healthcare Prices, Expenditures, and Quality," analyzes vertical integration and prices, quality, and total patient spending, building on the findings of the first essay using physician and hospital level claims data. This study finds that vertical integration is associated with higher levels of annual spending for patients attributed to vertically integrated providers, but interpretation of association between vertical integration and outpatient prices is confounded by pre-intervention trends. Analysis of CMS hospital outcome measures does not show associations between vertical integration at a hospital level and quality. Finally, the third essay, "Automated Delineation of Hospital Market Boundaries in California," explores geographic market definition in healthcare, an important topic in research and antitrust action, while assessing the application of community detection methods in this field. This study finds that community detection methods group hospitals with higher accuracy than other geographic markets as measured by patient flows and may offer promise for merger screening, research on market concentration, and research on geographic variation in healthcare. The final chapter reviews overarching limitations of the dissertation, outlines directions for future research, and comments on potential policy approaches to promote competition and address the symptoms that may result from highly consolidated healthcare markets
Essays On Competition Cooperation And Market Structures
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Author : Jonathan Richard Lhost
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Essays On Competition Cooperation And Market Structures written by Jonathan Richard Lhost and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
My dissertation examines competition, cooperation, and efficiency in three market settings in which a population of economic agents interact, either directly with each other in pairwise matches, directly with firms, or with firms via a platform. In one chapter I consider a population of customers who have different valuations for a good sold by competing merchants, as well as varying preferences over the merchant from which to purchase the good and the payment form with which to make the purchase, and examine what the effects might be if a merchant placed an additional surcharge on transactions completed with a payment form that is more costly for the merchant. The cost for the merchant can vary dramatically depending on the payment form used. For example, a credit card transaction is generally more expensive for the merchant than a debit card transaction, even if the transaction is completed using the same technology and is processed over the same network (e.g., a MasterCard signature debit transaction and a MasterCard credit card transaction). Historically, with limited exceptions, merchants have been prohibited, both by law and by the contract permitting the acceptance of that network's cards, from charging customers different prices for transactions completed using different payment cards, despite the different costs these transactions impose on them. Recent concessions made by several major payment networks in response to legal challenges raises the possibility that this paradigm might change in the future. This chapter examines what the effects might be if merchants were permitted to charge customers different prices based on the payment form and whether these effects depend on differences between the merchants, such as differences in the marginal cost of providing the good. In another chapter, I consider a population of individuals made up of more-patient and less-patient types who interact directly with each other in a repeated prisoner's dilemma embedded in a search model. A player is matched anonymously with another player to play a prisoner's dilemma game repeatedly until the match is ended, either exogenously or endogenously by one of the players, at which point each player may receive another random match. I first determine when it is feasible to achieve the best outcome in which all players cooperate. When it is not possible to achieve full cooperation, I examine how welfare can be improved over the outcome in which no players cooperate. When conditions are such that less-patient players choose not to cooperate, I first examine how separation by action within a single market can increase welfare for all players over the uncooperative equilibrium, with more-patient players choosing to cooperate in hopes of forming a cooperative relationship, despite the risk of being matched with a less-patient player who chooses not to cooperate. I then examine how full separation of the more- and less-patient players, made possible by introduction of a second market, can increase the welfare of the more-patient players without harming the less-patient players. In a third chapter, customers choose to purchase a good from one of several competing firms in a setting in which network congestion and firms' investment in capacity plays an important role in firm costs and product quality, e.g., the wireless industry. Wireless carriers (e.g., Verizon) compete not only on the price of their service but also on its quality. The quality of a carrier's service is determined in part by the quantity of customers it serves and by investment in capacity with which to serve them. While the primary effect of a carrier increasing its capacity is an increase in that carrier's service quality, there are also externality effects on other wireless carriers. For example, if carrier A increases its capacity, thereby increasing its service quality, and causes some customers to leave a competing carrier B, the service quality experienced by customers who remain with carrier B will increase as a result of the decreased congestion in carrier B's network. This chapter examines the interplay between these effects alongside traditional price competition in this oligopoly setting.
