Essays On Networks And Market Design
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Essays On Networks And Market Design
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Author : Alexander Teytelboym
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Essays On Networks And Market Design written by Alexander Teytelboym and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with Auctions categories.
Essays In Algorithmic Market Design Under Social Constraints
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Author : Hoda Heidari
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Essays In Algorithmic Market Design Under Social Constraints written by Hoda Heidari and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
Rapid technological advances over the past few decades--in particular, the rise of the internet--has significantly reshaped and expanded the meaning of our everyday social activities, including our interactions with our social circle, the media, and our political and economic activities. This dissertation aims to tackle some of the unique societal challenges underlying the design of automated online platforms that interact with people and organizations--namely, those imposed by legal, ethical, and strategic considerations. I narrow down attention to fairness considerations, learning with repeated trials, and competition for market share. In each case, I investigate the broad issue in a particular context (i.e. online market), and present the solution my research offers to the problem in that application. Addressing interdisciplinary problems, such as the ones in this dissertation, requires drawing ideas and techniques from various disciplines, including theoretical computer science, microeconomics, and applied statistics. The research presented here utilizes a combination of theoretical and data analysis tools to shed light on some of the key challenges in designing algorithms for today's online markets, including crowdsourcing and labor markets, online advertising, and social networks among others.
Essays On Networks And Markets
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Author : Itay Perah Fainmesser
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays On Networks And Markets written by Itay Perah Fainmesser and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
This thesis consists of three essays on the theory of networks and its applications to markets. The first essay develops a new model for studying repeated games in buyer-seller networks, and explores the connection between network structure and cooperation. The second essay introduces new techniques to analyze the effect of Word-Of-Mouth (WOM) on cooperation in networked markets. The third essay studies how network structure affects the timing of hiring in networked markets. Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers choose whether to cooperate or deviate and 'cheat' their buyers, and buyers decide whether to re-purchase from different sellers. In the first chapter I model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and suggest a framework for studying repeated games in such networks. I derive conditions that determine whether a network is a Steady State Cooperation Network (SSCN)--a network that is consistent with trade and trust between every buyer and seller that are connected. In particular, three network features increase the incentives for cooperation: sparseness, moderate competition, and segregation.
Essays In Market Design And Information Economics
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Author : Akhilendra Vohra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays In Market Design And Information Economics written by Akhilendra Vohra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory, with a particular focus on market design and information economics. The papers develop and study applied theoretical models in order to: 1) Identify the unintended welfare effects of interventions in various markets and improve their design. 2) Understand how strategic actors take advantage of information revelation processes. The first chapter looks at the effect of wage caps on collective bargaining in the world of professional sports. Professional sports in the United States generate over 35 billion dollars yearly in revenue, which is divided between players and owners via collective bargaining. Given the stakes, some leagues instituted maximum contracts, limiting individual compensation to a percentage of team salary caps. Combining a model of a sports league with one of bargaining, I demonstrate that while these contracts limit salaries of star players, they can increase the welfare of all players. Maximum contracts reduce earning inequality and harmonize players' interests, improving collective bargaining power. The model highlights the welfare gains to be had if a heterogeneous group agrees to concessions that increase the alignment of their individual interests. My second chapter studies strategic targeting over networks. Persuaders, such as advertisers and political parties, expend vast resources targeting agents who amplify the persuaders' messages through their social network. Who should they target? To answer this, I develop a model of targeting on a network where agent beliefs evolve via a DeGroot process permitting persistence of initial beliefs. As a result, each agent is identified by their centrality and initial belief. Persuaders that want to steer the average belief of the agents in a particular direction take into account both features. Absent competition, a persuader trades-off an agent's centrality with the dissimilarity of her belief from that of the agent. With competition, a persuader considers the distribution of agents' interactions with its competitors. When competition is intense, the incentive to deter one's rival dominates. Equilibria where persuaders target those with similar beliefs arise, increasing polarization. This is in contrast to the canonical model where persuaders care only about the fraction of impressions they generate. In that case, targeting is based entirely on agent centrality. The final chapter of my dissertation examines the phenomenon of market unraveling. Labor markets are said to unravel if the matches between workers and firms occur inefficiently early, based on limited information. I argue that a significant determinant of unraveling is the transparency of the secondary market, where firms can poach workers employed by other firms. I propose a model of interviewing and hiring that allows firms to hire on the secondary market as well as at the entry-level. Unraveling arises as a strategic decision by low-tier firms to prevent poaching. While early matching reduces the probability of hiring a high type worker, it prevents rivals from learning about the worker, making poaching difficult. As a result, unraveling can occur even in labor markets without a shortage of talent. When secondary markets are very transparent, unraveling disappears. However, the resulting matching is still inefficient due to the incentives of low-tier firms to communicate that they have not hired top-quality workers. Coordinating the timing of hiring does not mitigate the inefficiencies because firms continue to act strategically to prevent poaching.
Essays In Market And Mechanism Design
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Author : Fanqi Shi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays In Market And Mechanism Design written by Fanqi Shi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
This dissertation demonstrates three works to understand how specific markets work and how we can devise the rules to improve market outcome. Chapter 1 studies a two-period matching model where one side of the market (e.g. workers) have an option to invest and delay matching in the first period. Chapter 2 explores the optimal ordering of heterogeneous items in sequential auctions with unit-demand buyers. Chapter 3 analyzes the optimal ``screening'' mechanism of products with network externalities.
Essays On Market Design
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Author : Abhijit Sengupta (Ph. D.)
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Essays On Market Design written by Abhijit Sengupta (Ph. D.) and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Letting of contracts categories.
Essays On Market Design And Experimental Economics
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Author : Eric Samuel Mayefsky
language : en
Publisher: Stanford University
Release Date : 2011
Essays On Market Design And Experimental Economics written by Eric Samuel Mayefsky and has been published by Stanford University this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.
Essays On Information Economics Information Markets Social Learning And Information Design
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Author : Yingju Ma
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On Information Economics Information Markets Social Learning And Information Design written by Yingju Ma and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
This dissertation studies three topics in information economics. In Chapter One, "Monopoly and Competition in the Markets for Information", I analyze the generation and provision of information products, and the implications of competition in these markets. In the model, buyers face a decision problem with uncertainty about the states of the world. A buyer can purchase experiments to augment his private information, therefore the value of an experiment depends on his private information. To generate these experiments, sellers have to make an investment, which determines the most informative experiment a seller can provide. Sellers then post menus of experiments and prices. I first characterize the optimal menu given any investment level and derive the optimal investment. When two sellers compete with investment, I find an equilibrium in which two sellers split the market: one seller only serves to high belief buyers and the other serves to low beliefs buyers. Each seller specializes in generating a more informative signal about one state. Monopoly seller always provides more informative experiments, and to more buyers, than the case of duopoly competition. In Chapter Two, "Preferential Attachment as an Information Cascade in Emerging Networks", I study the preferential attachment observed in real-world social networks as a social learning problem. Networks grown via preferential attachment exhibit the "rich-get-richer" phenomena; nodes with higher connectivity degree are more likely to acquire more connections. This chapter develops a Bayesian social learning model in which agents arriving sequentially to a network judge the qualities of predecessor agents based on their own private signals, and on public signals inferred from the observed network structure. It shows that preferential attachment emerges endogenously as a sequentially equilibrium of the social learning process, where agents may engage in a rational herd behavior. The condensed preferential attachment, in which one agent gets all the future links, emerges with probability one when the private signals are bounded. In Chapter Three, "Information Design in Contests", I consider the information disclosure problem in contests. The designer of a contest has an informational advantage over agents' ability. There is a strong agent (res. weak agent) who will has a higher probability of being a high ability (res. low ability) player. In the optimal information disclosure policy, the designer discriminates two types of agents. When the weak agent has a disadvantage in abilities, the designer will partially disclose the state to him privately. Compared with the no-disclosure benchmark, the optimal policy increases the total effort level. On the other hand, committing to a public message disclosure can not improve the equilibrium of the no-disclosure benchmark.
Essays On Market Design
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays On Market Design written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.
This Ph. D. thesis is composed of four independent research papers in the field of Market Design. It begins with a general introduction for all four papers and ends with a brief conclusion. In this thesis, I study the impact of heterogeneous market participants on allocation outcomes in different market mechanisms; in addition, how to design alternative mechanisms that can more effectively allocate scarce resources with diverse economic and social goals. Chapter 1 studies the impact of affirmative action policies in the context of school choice. It addresses the following two questions: what are the causes of possible perverse consequence of affirmative action policies, and when the designer can effectively implement affirmative actions without unsatisfactory outcomes. Using the minority reserve policy in the student optimal stable mechanism as an example, I show that two acyclicity conditions, type-specific acyclicity and strongly type-specific acyclicity, are crucial for effective affirmative action policies. However, these two cycle conditions are almost impossible to be satisfied in any finite market in practice. Given the limitation of the point-wise effectiveness in finite markets, I further illustrate that the minority reserve policy is approximately effective in the sense that the probability of a random market containing type-specific cycles converges to zero when the copies of schools grow to infinite. Chapter 2 addresses the question of how ex ante asymmetry affects bidders' equilibrium strategies in two popular multi-unit auction rules: uniform-price auction (UPA) and discriminatory-price auction (DPA). I characterize the set of asymmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibria in a simple multi-unit auction game in which two units of a homogeneous object are auctioned among a set of bidders. I argue that bidders' strategic behavior essentially comes from their diverse market positions (i.e., the winning probability and the probability of deciding the market-clea
Essays On Network Games With Incomplete Information With Applications In Finance
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Author : Christian Matthew Leister
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Network Games With Incomplete Information With Applications In Finance written by Christian Matthew Leister and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertations includes three (3) chapters, each adding to the growing network games literature that incorporates incomplete information. Financial over-the-counter markets give motivating applications. (1) "Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation" studies the efficiency of trade in networks. A network of intermediaries facilitates exchange between buyers and a seller. Intermediary traders face a private trading cost, a network characterizes the set of feasible transactions, and an auction mechanism sets prices. Stable networks, which are robust to agents' collusive actions, exist when cost uncertainty is acute and multiple, independent trading relationships are valuable. A free-entry process governs the formation of equilibrium networks. Such networks feature too few intermediaries relative to the optimal market organization and they exhibit an asymmetric structure amplifying the shocks experienced by key intermediaries. (2) "Interdealer Trade: Risk, Liquidity, and the role of Market Inventory" further studies traders facing private shocks, placed in a dynamic setting. Trades between ex ante symmetric, inventory carrying intermediaries ("dealers") are motivated by divergent liquidity needs of the counter parties. Market prices and asset flows are pinned by dealers' indifference between providing intermediation services and retaining liquidity to be utilized in subsequent interdealer markets. More active interdealer markets simultaneously increase the value to intermediation and the option-value to providing these services. Under infrequent shocks, interdealer trade boosts the availability of liquidity in the broader market. This boost decays with market inventory, which serves as a constraint on interdealer activity. Through this market mechanism, prices vary inversely with both search frictions between dealers and on their total current holdings. (3) "Information Acquisition and Response in Peer-effects Networks" endogenizes the quality of information that market participants carry in a general peer effects model. When pairwise peer effects are symmetric, asymmetries in acquired information are inefficiently low relative to the utilitarian benchmark. And with information privately acquired, all players face strictly positive gains to overstating their informativeness as to strategically influence the beliefs and behaviors of neighbors. If strategic substitutes in actions are present and significant, low centrality players move against their signals in anticipation of their neighbors' actions. A blueprint for optimal policy design is developed. Applications to market efficiency in financial crises and two-sided markets are discussed.