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Essays On Social Networks In Developing Countries


Essays On Social Networks In Developing Countries
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Essays On Social Networks In Developing Countries


Essays On Social Networks In Developing Countries
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Author : Hyunhoi Koo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022

Essays On Social Networks In Developing Countries written by Hyunhoi Koo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.




Essays In Social Networks And Development Economics


Essays In Social Networks And Development Economics
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

Essays In Social Networks And Development Economics written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.


This dissertation is a collection of three essays on social networks and development economics. The first chapter examines the effect of peer networks on self-control problems. I construct a theoretical model to describe the way in which peer networks influence consumption behaviors through social norms, which guide individuals to conform to their friends' behavior. Using comprehensive data from a monthly survey conducted in 16 villages in Thailand from 1999 through 2004, I empirically examine peer effects on temptation consumption patterns, and test the mechanism underlying this relationship. Detailed social network information in the dataset allows the identification of impacts using a friend of a friend (excluded network) as the instrument. The empirical results provide evidence that peer decisions significantly impact individuals' temptation consumption such as alcohol and gambling, as well as savings. These peer effects are driven primarily by social norms, rather than by risk sharing. In the second chapter, co-authored with professor Laura Schechter, we first conduct an extensive review of the disparate literature studying the stability of preferences measured in experiments. Then, we test the stability of individuals' choices in panel data from rural Paraguay, including both experimental and survey measures of risk, time, and social preferences collected over almost a decade. Answers to survey questions are quite stable, while experimental measures are less so. If choices made in experiments are not stable, it may be because these choices are influenced by shocks, or because they include high levels of noise. We find no evidence that real-world shocks influence play in games. We suggest that in a developing country context, researchers may want to design simpler experiments or make more use of survey questions to measure preferences. The third chapter explores the impact of weather shocks on farmers' income diversification strategies. I combine historical weather data with household data in India to explore whether farmers employ different responses toward weather shocks in regions with different levels of historical variation. I find that weather shocks can negatively affect agricultural income, but this effect decreases in a riskier place where people have, over time, diversified their income into off-farm employment. I also find evidence that caste-networks can potentially determine people's income diversification strategies. Households who are within a different caste from the majority of their village peers will be more likely to seek for off-farm jobs, while households who are in a similar caste to the majority of the people within the village will seek agricultural wage jobs from others in the village.



Essays On Social Networks In Development Economics


Essays On Social Networks In Development Economics
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Author : Arun Gautham Chandrasekhar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Essays On Social Networks In Development Economics written by Arun Gautham Chandrasekhar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.


(cont.) substitutes for commitment. On net, savings allows individuals to smooth risk that cannot be shared interpersonally, with the largest benefits for those who are weakly connected in the network. The final chapter (co-authored with my classmates Horacio Larreguy and Juan Pablo Xandri) attempts to determine which models of social learning on networks best describe empirical behavior. Theory has focused on two leading models of social learning on networks: Bayesian and DeGroot rules of thumb learning. These models can yield greatly divergent behavior; individuals employing rules of thumb often double-count information and may not exhibit convergent behavior in the long run. By conducting a unique lab experiment in rural Karnataka, India, set up to exactly differentiate between these two models, we test which model best describes social learning processes on networks. We study experiments in which seven individuals are placed into a network, each with full knowledge of its structure. The participants attempt to learn the underlying (binary) state of the world. Individuals receive independent, identically distributed signals about the state in the first period only; thereafter, individuals make guesses about the underlying state of the world and these guesses are transmitted to their neighbors at the beginning of the following round. We consider various environments including incomplete information Bayesian models and provide evidence that individuals are best described by DeGroot models wherein they either take simple majority of opinions in their neighborhood.



Social Networks An Essay


Social Networks An Essay
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Author : Patrick Pearse
language : en
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Release Date : 2014-03-17

Social Networks An Essay written by Patrick Pearse and has been published by GRIN Verlag this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-03-17 with Computers categories.


Dana M Boyd describes the online social networks as “web-based services that allow people to build a public or public-private profile within a bounded system, to establish a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and to examine the list of links created by other users in the system.” In social networks the goal is understanding, establishing and maintaining contacts, or working on a specific cause. The typical and widely-known social networks are Facebook, Linkedin, Myspace, etc. Another definition of the term “social network” says that “The social network is a social structure of nodes (representing mostly individuals or organizations) linked by specific types of nodes such as ideas, opinions, financial benefits, friendship, tradition, hyperlinks and more. In its simplest form, the social network is a map of all the relative links between nodes that are being studied. These concepts are usually represented by a social network diagram, where nodes are the points and ties are the lines.”



Essays On Social Networks


Essays On Social Networks
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Author : Chen, Xi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Essays On Social Networks written by Chen, Xi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.


This dissertation is composed of a literature review, Chapter 1, an in-depth analysis of data used in the dissertation, Chapter 2, and three main essays, Chapters 3-5, on relative concerns, social interactions and unintended consequences. To uncover the nature of social interactions, Chapter 3 studies how rural residents form social networks, and what explains the recent gift spending escalation. Chapter 4 focuses on a typical market that carries significant social stigma - paid blood plasma donation in China. I explore the role of peer interactions in the networks. Building upon it, Chapter 5 evaluates how in utero exposures to frequent and costly social events for the impoverished families impacts early child nutrients intake and health status. Chapter 1 This chapter reviews the recent literature on inequality and income distribution in rural China utilizing panel datasets. On the basis of the review, this chapter identifies new research areas with existing panel datasets and my new household panel dataset, i.e., the IFPRI-CAAS, which could shape future research. Chapter 2 The tradition of keeping written gift record in many Asian countries offers researchers an old-fashioned but underutilized means of data collection for development and social network study. This chapter documents a long-term spontaneous household gift record I collected from the field. I discuss the data collection and network structure, highlighting its unique features for studies at household and dyadic link level. Chapter 3 The growth rate of gift and festival spending in some developing countries has been much higher than that of consumption and income. I test three competing explanations of the phenomenon-peer effect, status concern, and risk pooling-based on the IFPRI-CAAS and the gift network data. I find that gift-giving behavior is largely influenced by peers in reference groups. Status concern is another key motive for keeping up with the Joneses in extending gifts. In contrast, risk pooling does not seem to be a key driver of the observed gift-giving patterns. I also show that large windfall income triggers the escalation of competitive gift-giving behavior. Chapter 4 Despite the resultant disutility, people are still engaged in behavior carrying social stigma. Empirical studies on stigma behavior are rare, largely due to the formidable challenges of collecting data on stigmatized goods and services. Combining the IFPRI-CAAS and the gift network data, I examine frequent blood sales, widely regarded as a stigmatized behavior and the driving force of public health crises. Using a novel spatial identification strategy, I find social interactions with heterogeneous intensities affect plasma sales decisions. Peer effects are directional and work through preference interactions that reduce stigma. Families with unmarried son are more likely to sell plasma to offset costs of getting married in a tight marriage market, such as a bigger house, a higher bride price and a more lavish wedding banquet. Chapter 5 Participating in and presenting gifts at funerals, weddings, and other ceremonies held by fellow villagers have been regarded as social norms. However, it is more burdensome for the poor to take part in these social occasions than the rich. Because the poor often lack the necessary resources, they are forced to cut back on basic consumption, such as food, in order to afford a gift to attend the social festivals. Using the IFPRI-CAAS and the gift dataset, this chapter shows that children born to mothers in poor families who are exposed to a greater number of ceremonies during their pregnancies are more likely to display a lasting detrimental health impact.



Essays On Signaling And Social Networks


Essays On Signaling And Social Networks
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Author : Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
language : en
Publisher: Stanford University
Release Date : 2011

Essays On Signaling And Social Networks written by Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer and has been published by Stanford University this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.


Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.



Essays On Social Network And The Role Of Information


Essays On Social Network And The Role Of Information
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Author : Juni Singh
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020

Essays On Social Network And The Role Of Information written by Juni Singh and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.


This thesis combines experiments and theoretical models with data analysis to answer ques-tions on the role of social network and aggregated information. Chapter 1 studies a multi-state binary choice experiment in which in each state, one alternative has well understood consequences whereas the other alternative has unknown consequences. Subjects repeatedly receive feedback from past choices about the consequences of unfamiliar alternatives but this feedback is aggregated over states. Varying the payoffs attached to the various al-ternatives in various states allows us to test whether unfamiliar ones are discounted and whether subjects' use of feedback is better explained by similarity-based reinforcement learning models (in the spirit of the valuation equilibrium, Jehiel and Samet 2007) or by some variant of Bayesian learning model. Our experimental data suggest that there is no discount attached to the unfamiliar alter-natives and that similarity-based reinforcement learning models have a better explanatory power than their Bayesian counterparts. Chapter 2 studies a natural follow up to the question to understand how these findings would change in the face of the feedback being individual specific in the spirit of learning by doing. The follow up experiment allows subject to experiment and generate individual level feedback unlike the endogenous group feedback in the original one. Our experimental data suggest that there is not much difference in learning and the choice in the proportion of Bayesian learners. Chapter 3 studies the demand for monitoring and its effectiveness across different group compositions. In developing countries where formal institutions are often weak or non-existent, the community is responsible to enforce local agreements. Peer monitoring represents a natural mechanism for the enforcement of social norms and local agreements in such a setting. In this paper we collect original network data in 19 villages in rural Nepal and conduct an experiment to study who is elected as a monitor in a public good game.Individuals play in groups of three, both with their close friends and with people socially distant in the network. They receive the opportunity to anonymously choose their preferred"institution". We combine a theoretical model and a unique lab-in-the-field experiment to show that closely knit groups are significantly more likely to not choose any monitor, while sparse groups tend to prefer a monitor who is highly central in their network. Low central monitors are seldom chosen. Endogenous election of the high central monitor ensures higher cooperation compared to an exogenous assignment, but only in sparse groups.



Essays On Labor Markets In Developing Countries


Essays On Labor Markets In Developing Countries
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Author : Norihiko Matsuda
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018

Essays On Labor Markets In Developing Countries written by Norihiko Matsuda and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.


My dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines social networks in labor markets. While existing theories such as models of screening and peer effects imply that social networks improve job match quality, these theories do not well explain the stylized fact, which we call negative selection---workers and employers with lower socio-economic status use social networks more frequently. By proposing an equilibrium search model, we show that social networks create mismatched jobs in the context where negative selection occurs. Our model sheds light on a neglected aspect of social networks: they help to match, but not necessarily with good-match partners. In the presence of search frictions, workers and firms can be tempted by bad-match encounters through social networks. This temptation is stronger for less productive, poorer workers and firms because costly formal channels are less rewarding for them. Using linked employer-employee data in Bangladesh, we find that matching through social networks rather than formal channels results in mismatches. This chapter demonstrates that while social networks compensate for search frictions in formal labor markets by matching more workers and jobs, their match quality is low. The second chapter evaluates the effects of social security benefits on labor supply. The benefits can reduce labor supply through two channels: current benefits and expectations over future benefits. I develop a framework to jointly estimate both channels and apply it to the South African pension program, which lowered the male eligible age in 2008 to 2010. I find the anticipatory effect of future benefits to be considerable: it accounts for nearly 60 percent of the labor force contraction caused by the lowering of the eligible age. Moreover, the framework identifies binding liquidity constraints faced by nearly-age-eligible people. The third chapter examines spillover effects of the South African Old-Age Pension Program on employment choices of recipients' children. By exploiting quasi-experimental variations in eligibility, the empirical results show that prime-age children leave the labor force if their fathers receive pension benefits. I find suggestive evidence that they leave the labor force to receive education and training. I also find suggestive evidence that the benefits allow prime-age individuals to look for jobs for longer duration. These findings imply that the program does not discourage work but help prime-age individuals move to more productive jobs.



Essays On Development Social Networks And Information


Essays On Development Social Networks And Information
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Author : Davide Pietrobon
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019

Essays On Development Social Networks And Information written by Davide Pietrobon and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.




Essays On Social Media Social Influence And Social Comparison


Essays On Social Media Social Influence And Social Comparison
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Author : Qian Tang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Essays On Social Media Social Influence And Social Comparison written by Qian Tang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.


Social networking and social media technologies have greatly changed the way information is created and transmitted. Social media has made content contribution an efficient approach for individual brand building. With abundant user generated content and social networks, content consumers are constantly subject to social influence. Such social influence can be further utilized to encourage pro-social behavior. Chapter 1 examines the incentives for content contribution in social media. We propose that exposure and reputation are the major incentives for contributors. Besides, as more and more social media websites offer advertising-revenue sharing with some of their contributors, shared revenue provides an extra incentive for contributors who have joined revenue-sharing programs. We develop a dynamic structural model to identify a contributor's underlying utility function from observed contribution behavior. We recognize the dynamic nature of the content-contribution decision--that contributors are forward-looking, anticipating how their decisions impact future rewards. Using data collected from YouTube, we show that content contribution is driven by a contributor's desire for exposure, revenue sharing, and reputation and that the contributor makes decisions dynamically. Chapter 2 examines how social influence impact individuals' content consumption decisions in social network. Specifically, we consider social learning and network effects as two important mechanisms of social influence, in the context of YouTube. Rather than combining both social learning and network effects under the umbrella of social contagion or peer influence, we develop a theoretical model and empirically identify social learning and network effects separately. Using a unique data set from YouTube, we find that both mechanisms have statistically and economically significant effects on video views, and which mechanism dominates depends on the specific video type. Chapter 3 studies incentive mechanism to improve users' pro-social behavior based on social comparison. In particular, we aim to motivate organizations to improve Internet security. We propose an approach to increase the incentives for addressing security problems through reputation concern and social comparison. Specifically, we process existing security vulnerability data, derive explicit relative security performance information, and disclose the information as feedback to organizations and the public. To test our approach, we conducted a field quasi-experiment for outgoing spam for 1,718 autonomous systems in eight countries. We found that the treatment group subject to information disclosure reduced outgoing spam approximately by 16%. Our results suggest that social information and social comparison can be effectively leveraged to encourage desirable behavior.