Essays On Structural Analysis Of Procurement Auctions
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Essays On Structural Analysis Of Procurement Auctions
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Author : Bin Yu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Essays On Structural Analysis Of Procurement Auctions written by Bin Yu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
This dissertation addresses the empirical analysis of procurements based on the auction theory, which is known as the structural-form analysis of procurement auctions.
Three Essays On Multi Round Procurement Auctions
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Author : Lu Ji
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Three Essays On Multi Round Procurement Auctions written by Lu Ji and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Auctions categories.
My dissertation contributes to auction studies. It analyzes the bidding behavior in multi-round auctions. It is motivated by an interesting multi-round feature observed in the procurement auctions held by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT hereafter), which adopts secret reserve prices. Prior research has indicated that auctions with reserve prices usually lead to no trade. However, prior research has not paid much attention to the possibility that the seller can auction unsold objects from previous rounds and a trade is therefore still likely to occur. My dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical analyses of auctions with multiple rounds. It first develops a game-theoretic bidding model for the multi-round auctions with non-forward looking bidders. It then establishes a structural econometric model in order to conduct a structural analysis of the INDOT data. Lastly it introduces dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking and uses a dynamic control approach to analyze the bidding behavior and policy issues. The main findings are: (1) rational bidders reduce their markup across periods in multi-round auctions; (2) simulations show that using secret reserve price is sometimes better than public reserve price for the procurement auctioneer; (3) counterfactual analyses indicate that on one hand, when bidders are not forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price; on the other hand, when bidders are forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price when the discount factor is low and to use a public reserve price when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Essays In Auctions And Procurement
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Author : George M. Deltas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Essays In Auctions And Procurement written by George M. Deltas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Selection And Search
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Author : Matthew Loren Gentry
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Selection And Search written by Matthew Loren Gentry and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Auctions categories.
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Auction Markets
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Author : Marleen Renske Marra
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Auction Markets written by Marleen Renske Marra and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
This thesis presents new results that make significant contributions to the structural analysis of auction markets. One chapter develops a methodology to study welfare and revenue impacts of fees in auction platforms. The impacts of fees are theoretically ambiguous as the platform faces a ``two-sided market'' with network effects; increased seller entry raises its value to bidders, and vice versa. The chapter develops and solves a structural model with endogenous bidder and seller entry, seller selection, and costly listing inspection. It also exploits an original dataset with 15 months of wine auctions to study these issues. Relevant model primitives are shown to be identified in the auction platform model from observed variation in reserve prices, transaction prices, and the number of bidders. The proposed estimation strategy combines methods from the auction and discrete choice literatures. Model estimates reveal significant network effects, and it is shown with counterfactual policy simulations that fee structures that subsidize bidders make all parties better off. Implications for competition policy are discussed as well. Another chapter focuses on nonparametric identification in English auctions with absentee bidding, in which the number of bidders is unknown. The chapter exploits additional identifying variation from drop-out values of absentee bidders and develops a novel nonparametric identification approach based on the stochastic spacing of order statistics. In combination with a shape restriction the method delivers bounds on both the latent valuation distribution and expected consumer surplus. The value of the proposed method is highlighted by showing that it identifies informative bounds on policy-relevant model primitives in a sample of traditional English auctions collected from the online bidding portal of Sotheby's, which does not contain the number of bidders and their final bids. The thesis ends by providing directions for future research.
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Auctions
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Author : Ying Zheng
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Essays On The Structural Analysis Of Auctions written by Ying Zheng and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with Electronic dissertations categories.
Essays On Procurement Auctions
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Author : Hidenori Takahashi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Procurement Auctions written by Hidenori Takahashi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
Essays In Honor Of Cheng Hsiao
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Author : Dek Terrell
language : en
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
Release Date : 2020-04-15
Essays In Honor Of Cheng Hsiao written by Dek Terrell and has been published by Emerald Group Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-04-15 with Business & Economics categories.
Including contributions spanning a variety of theoretical and applied topics in econometrics, this volume of Advances in Econometrics is published in honour of Cheng Hsiao.
Essays On Procurement Scoring Auction And Quality Manipulation Corruption
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Author : Yangguang Huang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Essays On Procurement Scoring Auction And Quality Manipulation Corruption written by Yangguang Huang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Auction theory categories.
This dissertation studies the procurement problem with focus on the issue of quality. Most target items of procurement are not standardized goods, but are some customized goods with quality measured by non-monetary attributes. Scoring auction is one of the most popular procurement schemes used in practice. In a scoring auction, each supplying firm chooses its bid as a combination of price and quality attributes according to a pre-announced scoring rule. The scoring rule ranks all submitted multi-dimensional bids and award the contract to the firm with highest score. To implement a scoring auction, quality assessment is necessary, but the buyer usually does not possess the relevant industrial expertise. So the buyer has to hire an intermediary agent and the problem of quality manipulation arises when the quality reports of bids are distorted by the agent. In particular, the agent may exaggerate the corrupted firm's quality score in exchange for bribe. Chapter 1 provides an theoretical analysis on the optimal procurement scheme design problem under quality manipulation. Chapter 2 is an empirical study on scoring auctions. Chapter 3 shows how we can statistically test quality manipulation from scoring auction data.
Essays In Industrial Organization Entry In Multi Object Auctions And Freemium Packages In Two Sided Markets
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Author : Renato Zaterka Giroldo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Essays In Industrial Organization Entry In Multi Object Auctions And Freemium Packages In Two Sided Markets written by Renato Zaterka Giroldo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I study the design of multi-object auctions. Using a large data set from the Brazilian public procurement sector, I show evidence that entry is costly and that the mix of products being auctioned off is a first-order effect to understand firm participation. In the first chapter, I find evidence that the data is consistent with a theory of selection. The average entrant has a higher product match with the session, and they are closer to auction locations. Distance affects entry decisions negatively: a 1 unit (100km) increase in the distance to the auction location lowers the odds ratio for entry 0.91 times. At the same time, an additional auction in the set of potential auctions of a firm increases the odds for entry 1.62 times. In terms of variable costs, a 1% increase in the distance to the auction location increases bid by 0.4% to 3.3%. There are also gains of scale in terms of the size of the contracts: a 1% increase in the contract quantity for a given product increases bids by 0.64% to 0.76%. The main force responsible for lowering procurement costs is the presence of additional bidders. I find that an extra bidder can lower costs between 21.2% and 32.4%. These results motivate and feed into the structural model presented in chapter 2. In the second chapter, I continue to analyze this market with the focus on estimating entry costs and answering policy questions. To do so, I build a novel model of endogenous entry in multi-object auction sessions that allows me to disentangle two forces that affect entry decisions: entry costs, and the menu of items of a given session. The model has two stages. In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter an auction session and pay a fixed cost after observing an imperfect signal of their true cost. In the second stage, both the items for which they can bid and their costs are realized, and the auction takes place. I focus the analysis on type symmetric equilibria, where bidders of the same type follow the same entry strategy. In equilibrium, marginal bidders make zero profits. This condition allows me to link the unobserved entry costs to the observed bid behavior of entrants. Having derived the equilibrium of the model, I estimate model fundamentals and turn to policy questions. The estimates provide evidence that entry is more attractive to local firms. I find that their cost distribution stochastically dominates the one from non-local firms. Moreover, conditioned on the number of items a firm can participate in, non-local firms face between 3.9% to 6.5% higher entry costs than local firms. I focus on two counterfactual simulations. In the fully efficient scenario, where firms do not incur any entry costs, I find that procurement costs would be lowered by 22.5% to 40.1%. These are bounds on the maximum cost savings and also quantifies the degree of inefficiency present in this market. The second counterfactual is a partially efficient scenario, where non-local firms face the same entry costs as local firms. This analysis focuses on a selected equilibrium where firms enter the sessions sequentially. Firms are sorted according to a lexicographic order which is determined by the strength of their signal, number of items, and firm type (non-local/local). I find that procurement costs would be lowered by 2.8% to 2.9%. Thus, on this type of equilibrium and by holding on-site auctions, the government indirectly sacrificed some efficiency to the benefit of local firms. In the third chapter, I study the pricing of platforms that offer consumers the choice between a free package, in which consumers are exposed to advertising, and a premium package, in which they pay to not be exposed to advertisements. I characterize its profit-maximizing and Pigouvian pricing, which allows me to analyze the degree to which the platform incorporates consumers' distaste for advertising in its pricing scheme, as well as the trade-offs that emerge between the free and paid packages. The results contribute to the discussion of consumers' overexposure to advertising when platforms behave as a social planner and maximize their value.