First Price Auctions When The Ranking Of Valuations Is Common Knowledge
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First Price Auctions When The Ranking Of Valuations Is Common Knowledge
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Author : Michael Landsberger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
First Price Auctions When The Ranking Of Valuations Is Common Knowledge written by Michael Landsberger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
We consider an augmented version of the symmetric private value auction model with independent types. The augmentation, intended to illustrate reality, concerns information bidders have about their opponents. To the standard assumption that every bidder knows his type and the distribution of types is common knowledge we add the assumption that the ranking of bidders' valuations is common knowledge. This set-up induces a particular asymmetric auction model that raises serious technical difficulties. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies in the two bidder case. We also show that the model generally has no analytic solution. If the distribution of valuations is uniform, both bidders bid pointwise more aggressively relative to the standard symmetric case. However, this property does not apply to all distributions of valuations. Finally, we also provide a numerical solution of equilibrium bid functions for the uniform distribution case.
First Price Auctions When The Ranking Of Valuations Is Common Knowledge
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Author : Michael Landsberger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
First Price Auctions When The Ranking Of Valuations Is Common Knowledge written by Michael Landsberger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
First Price Auctions When The Ranking Of Valuations Is Common Knowledge
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
First Price Auctions When The Ranking Of Valuations Is Common Knowledge written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Impact Of Valuation Ranking Information On Bidding In First Price Auctions
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Author : A. Alexander Elbittar
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Impact Of Valuation Ranking Information On Bidding In First Price Auctions written by A. Alexander Elbittar and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Landsberger et al. (2001) identified optimal bidder behavior in first-price private-value auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge, and derived comparative-statics predictions regarding the auctioneer's expected revenue and the efficiency of the allocation. The experiment reported here tests the behavioral components of these comparative-statics predictions. The results support the prediction that buyers are inclined to bid more aggressively when they learn they have the low value. Contrary to the theory, buyers are inclined to bid less when they learn they have the high value. Once information is revealed, bidders tend to move toward better responses, exploiting new economic opportunities. Consistent with theory, the overall proportion of efficient allocations is lower than in the first-price auction before information is revealed. But as a result of high-value bidders decreasing their bids, the expected revenue does not increase on a regular basis, contrary to the theory's predictions.
Advances In Economic Design
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Author : Murat R. Sertel
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2013-04-17
Advances In Economic Design written by Murat R. Sertel and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013-04-17 with Business & Economics categories.
Some of the finest and most recent research in economic and political design is presented. Among the authors are several prominent academics as well as many new and promising researchers. They investigate social choice and electoral systems, auctions, matching, bargaining, coalitional stability and efficiency, regulation, the design of rights, mechanisms, games, hierarchies and information. The book is bound to become a standard reference as a collection displaying where we are and where we are going in a broad spectrum of areas in economic design.
Economics Of Art Auctions
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Author : Gianfranco Mossetto
language : en
Publisher: FrancoAngeli
Release Date : 2002
Economics Of Art Auctions written by Gianfranco Mossetto and has been published by FrancoAngeli this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with Art categories.
Handbook Of Game Theory
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Author : Petyon Young
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2014-10-01
Handbook Of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-10-01 with Mathematics categories.
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Advances In Economic Design
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Author : Murat R. Sertel
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2003-04-15
Advances In Economic Design written by Murat R. Sertel and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003-04-15 with Business & Economics categories.
Some of the finest and most recent research in economic and political design is presented. Among the authors are several prominent academics as well as many new and promising researchers. They investigate social choice and electoral systems, auctions, matching, bargaining, coalitional stability and efficiency, regulation, the design of rights, mechanisms, games, hierarchies and information. The book is bound to become a standard reference as a collection displaying where we are and where we are going in a broad spectrum of areas in economic design.
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse
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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-13
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-04-13 with Business & Economics categories.
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Robust Mechanism Design
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Author : Dirk Bergemann
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2012
Robust Mechanism Design written by Dirk Bergemann and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Business & Economics categories.
Robust Mechanism Design: the Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs.