Four Essays In Corporate Finance
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Four Essays In Corporate Finance
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Author : Sukwhan Ahn
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Four Essays In Corporate Finance written by Sukwhan Ahn and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Corporate debt categories.
Essays In Corporate Finance
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Author : Tilan Tang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Essays In Corporate Finance written by Tilan Tang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.
Four Essays In Strategic Corporate Finance
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Author : Torsten Twardawski
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Four Essays In Strategic Corporate Finance written by Torsten Twardawski and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with Corporations categories.
Three Essays Of Corporate Finance
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Author : Lunzhou Che
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Three Essays Of Corporate Finance written by Lunzhou Che and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with Business categories.
Four Essays On Corporate Finance Issues In Emerging Stock Markets
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Author : Rose Ngugi
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Four Essays On Corporate Finance Issues In Emerging Stock Markets written by Rose Ngugi and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
Essays In Corporate Finance
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Author : Rong Wang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Essays In Corporate Finance written by Rong Wang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Essays In Corporate Finance Theory
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Author : Mr. Andrey Malenko
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Essays In Corporate Finance Theory written by Mr. Andrey Malenko and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
This thesis consists of three essays that examine various problems in corporate finance. The central theme of all essays is information asymmetry between agents. The first essay features information asymmetry between the headquarters and the division manager about investment projects of the division and studies the best way to provide the manager with incentives to invest efficiently. The second essay studies implications of asymmetric information between the decision-maker and the outsiders on exercise decisions of real options in several settings. The third essay features asymmetric information between sellers of assets and potential buyers and studies what selling procedures arise in equilibrium in a market with multiple sellers and potential buyers. More specifically, in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I study optimal design of a capital allocation system in a firm in which the division manager with empire-building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects, and the headquarters is able to audit each project at a cost. I show that under certain conditions the optimal system takes the form of a budgeting mechanism with threshold division of authority. Specifically, the headquarters: (i) allocates a spending account to the manager at the initial date and accumulates it over time; (ii) sets a threshold on the size of individual projects, such that all projects below the threshold are delegated to the manager and financed out of her spending account, while all projects above the threshold are audited and financed fully by the headquarters. I extend the model in several directions, including multiple audit technologies, multiple project categories, and the possibility of renegotiation. In Chapter 2, which is the product of joint work with Steven R. Grenadier, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the utility of the decision-maker. In a general setting that accommodates a variety of applications we show that signaling incentives distort the timing of exercise, and the direction of distortion depends on whether the decision-maker's utility increases or decreases in the outsiders' belief about the payoff from exercise. In the former case, signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up option exercise, while in the latter case option exercise is delayed. We demonstrate the implications of the general model through four corporate finance applications: investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash flow diversion, and product market competition. In Chapter 3, which is the product of joint work with\ Alexander S.\ Gorbenko, forthcoming in the American\ Economic Review, we study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The key difference from the prior literature on competition among auctioneers is that we allow bidders to make bids in the form of contingent claims on future payoffs of the assets. The sellers compete for bidders by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.
A Compilation Of Essays In Corporate Finance
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Author : Melinda L. Newman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
A Compilation Of Essays In Corporate Finance written by Melinda L. Newman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Capital market categories.
Essays In Corporate Finance
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Author : Ning Gong
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Essays In Corporate Finance written by Ning Gong and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Corporations categories.
Two Essays In Behavioral Corporate Finance
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Author : Cagri Berk Onuk
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Two Essays In Behavioral Corporate Finance written by Cagri Berk Onuk and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
The two essays in my dissertation are broadly related to the behavior and decision-making of firm managers and directors, and how those variables are associated with firm outcomes and firms' relationship with investors. The first essay examines the disagreement within the executive team. The model shows the negative effect of disagreement on firm outcomes via executives' reduced effort and the positive effect via decision enhancement. In a novel manner, I identify disagreement through information-based insider trades in opposing directions. The outcome I analyze is firm investments including capital expenditures, acquisitions, and R&D expenses. I uncover negative effects of disagreement on capital expenditures, which is statistically and economically significant. Decision enhancing effects are measured as reduction in a firm's tendency to overinvest, but the results are weaker. Disagreement also hurts firm valuation especially when firms need quick decisions. Overall, disagreement is found to have more harmful than beneficial effects on firms. The second essay, coauthored with Orhan Erdem, examines the effect of piety on individual investor and corporate decision-making, and on the interactions between the two types of agents. We use Turkey as our experimental setting, where piety is likely to have an important effect on financial outcomes due to the country's unique political and religious background. We have proprietary individual investor trading data for a random sample of 25,000 investors, and importantly, we have a number of strong identifiers for investor piety. One of them is a binary variable that indicates whether investors are trading through an Islamic brokerage house. Similarly, we have a few strong variables capturing firm piety. One such variable identifies whether firm executives are affiliated with a secular or a conservative executive club. Our results indicate that religious investors display conservative trading behavior, in particular, they display less overconfidence and higher local bias. Results on firms indicate that apparently religious firms grow their assets faster and are highly valued but have lower operating profitability. We also find that upon events that stir religious sentiment in the country, conservative investors increase their holdings of apparently religious firms.