Impact Of Corporate Governance Excess Ceo Compensation And Ceo Stock Option Grants On Firm Performance During Recessionary Periods
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Impact Of Corporate Governance Excess Ceo Compensation And Ceo Stock Option Grants On Firm Performance During Recessionary Periods
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Author : Robert P. Antenucci
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Impact Of Corporate Governance Excess Ceo Compensation And Ceo Stock Option Grants On Firm Performance During Recessionary Periods written by Robert P. Antenucci and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with Business enterprises categories.
There is much debate over the efficacy of corporate governance in mitigating agency costs and improving the correlation between firm performance and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay. Research on this topic ranges from theories which maintain that CEO compensation in the U.S. is commensurate with CEO ability, and is therefore justified, to theories which maintain that CEOs are little more than overpaid rent extractors. I investigate the above dichotomy in the executive compensation literature by examining the impact of corporate governance on excess CEO compensation and firm performance during recessions. Business cycle contractions are challenging times for firms, and arguably a period when stronger corporate governance and CEO ability is significant to the success of the firm. I posit that better governed firms with lower levels of excess compensation outperform their peers in subsequent challenging recessionary periods. Stock option grants, a frequently used component of CEO pay packages, are thought to better align CEO and shareholder interests. However, with recent financial scandals there is much concern over this form of equity compensation. I examine the use of employee stock option grants in CEO compensation packages and whether such stock option compensation improves the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. My research achieves several aims: it extends the literature on the impact of corporate governance on firm performance by using a recessionary period metric, it examines the effectiveness of corporate governance in mitigating agency costs, it examines excess CEO compensation and this excess compensation connection with CEO ability or CEO rent extraction during recessionary periods, and it examines the impact of stock option grants in CEO pay packages on firm performance during recessionary periods. I find support for a decrease in abnormal return associated with trading on stronger corporate governance and support for rent extraction in the CEO compensation process during the 2001 recession.
Pay Without Performance
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Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
language : en
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date : 2004
Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and has been published by Harvard University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Business & Economics categories.
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Corporate Governance Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance
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Author : John E. Core
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Corporate Governance Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance written by John E. Core and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Chief executive officers categories.
Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance
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Author : Neslihan Ozkan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Ceo Compensation And Firm Performance written by Neslihan Ozkan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
This paper examines the link between CEO pay and performance employing a unique, hand-collected panel data set of 390 UK non-financial firms from the FTSE All Share Index for the period 1999-2005. We include both cash (salary and bonus) and equity-based (stock options and long-term incentive plans) components of CEO compensation for a panel of large UK companies. Different from previous studies, we use GMM-system estimation method, which controls for the presence of unobserved firm-specific effects and for the endogeneity of explanatory variables. In addition, we control for a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables. The empirical results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between firm performance and the level of CEO cash compensation while the relationship is positive but not significant for total compensation. This finding suggests that corporate governance reports in the UK, such as Greenbury Report (1995) that proposed CEO compensation be more closely linked to performance, have not been totally effective. We also find that proportion of non-executive directors on board does not have a significant impact on CEO cash compensation, while non-executive directors' share ownership has a significant impact suggesting that ownership can provide incentives for non-executive directors to be more active in monitoring for CEO compensation packages. Our results also indicate that institutional ownership has a positive and significant influence on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity of option grants. Finally, we find that longer CEO tenure is associated with lower pay-for-performance sensitivity of option grants suggesting the entrenchment effect of CEO tenure.
Essays On The Effect Of Excess Compensation And Governance Changes On Firm Value
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Author : Mustafa A. Dah
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Essays On The Effect Of Excess Compensation And Governance Changes On Firm Value written by Mustafa A. Dah and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Corporate governance categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm's performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation is not significantly inversely related to the firm's future performance, it has an indirect negative effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators' objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines the relationship between the firm's governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders' wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.
The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The Performance Of U S Small Cap Firms
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Author : Mingjun Tang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
The Impact Of Corporate Governance On The Performance Of U S Small Cap Firms written by Mingjun Tang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
The Bankers New Clothes
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Author : Anat Admati
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2024-01-09
The Bankers New Clothes written by Anat Admati and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2024-01-09 with Business & Economics categories.
A Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, and Bloomberg Businessweek Book of the Year Why our banking system is broken—and what we must do to fix it New bank failures have been a rude awakening for everyone who believed that the banking industry was reformed after the Global Financial Crisis—and that we’d never again have to choose between massive bailouts and financial havoc. The Bankers’ New Clothes uncovers just how little things have changed—and why banks are still so dangerous. Writing in clear language that anyone can understand, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig debunk the false and misleading claims of bankers, regulators, politicians, academics, and others who oppose effective reform, and they explain how the banking system can be made safer and healthier. Thoroughly updated for a world where bank failures have made a dramatic return, this acclaimed and important book now features a new preface and four new chapters that expose the shortcomings of current policies and reveal how the dominance of banking even presents dangers to the rule of law and democracy itself.
Searching For A Corporate Savior
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Author : Rakesh Khurana
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2011-09-19
Searching For A Corporate Savior written by Rakesh Khurana and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-09-19 with Business & Economics categories.
Corporate CEOs are headline news. Stock prices rise and fall at word of their hiring and firing. Business media debate their merits and defects as if individual leaders determined the health of the economy. Yet we know surprisingly little about how CEOs are selected and dismissed or about their true power. This is the first book to take us into the often secretive world of the CEO selection process. Rakesh Khurana's findings are surprising and disturbing. In recent years, he shows, corporations have increasingly sought CEOs who are above all else charismatic, whose fame and force of personality impress analysts and the business media, but whose experience and abilities are not necessarily right for companies' specific needs. The labor market for CEOs, Khurana concludes, is far less rational than we might think. Khurana's findings are based on a study of the hiring and firing of CEOs at over 850 of America's largest companies and on extensive interviews with CEOs, corporate board members, and consultants at executive search firms. Written with exceptional clarity and verve, the book explains the basic mechanics of the selection process and how hiring priorities have changed with the rise of shareholder activism. Khurana argues that the market for CEOs, which we often assume runs on cool calculation and the impersonal forces of supply and demand, is culturally determined and too frequently inefficient. Its emphasis on charisma artificially limits the number of candidates considered, giving them extraordinary leverage to demand high salaries and power. It also raises expectations and increases the chance that a CEO will be fired for failing to meet shareholders' hopes. The result is corporate instability and too little attention to long-term strategy. The book is a major contribution to our understanding of corporate culture and the nature of markets and leadership in general.
Corporate Governance In Asia
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Author : Sang-Woo Nam
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Corporate Governance In Asia written by Sang-Woo Nam and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Corporate governance categories.
Research Handbook On Executive Pay
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Author : John S. Beasley
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2012-01-01
Research Handbook On Executive Pay written by John S. Beasley and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-01-01 with Business & Economics categories.
Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.