Incomplete Contracts And Industrial Organization
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Incomplete Contracts And Industrial Organization
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Author : Gene M. Grossman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999
Incomplete Contracts And Industrial Organization written by Gene M. Grossman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Contracts categories.
Incomplete Contracts And Industrial Organization
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Author : Patrick Legros
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Incomplete Contracts And Industrial Organization written by Patrick Legros and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
The Economics Of Contracts
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Author : Eric Brousseau
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2002-10-17
The Economics Of Contracts written by Eric Brousseau and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-10-17 with Business & Economics categories.
A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
The Impact Of Incomplete Contracts On Economics
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Author : Philippe Aghion
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2015-12-22
The Impact Of Incomplete Contracts On Economics written by Philippe Aghion and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-12-22 with Business & Economics categories.
The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
Firms Contracts And Financial Structure
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Author : Oliver Hart
language : en
Publisher: Clarendon Press
Release Date : 1995-10-05
Firms Contracts And Financial Structure written by Oliver Hart and has been published by Clarendon Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995-10-05 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Essays On Industrial Organization And Economics Of Information
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Author : Salvatore Piccolo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Essays On Industrial Organization And Economics Of Information written by Salvatore Piccolo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
In my dissertation, I study equilibrium and optimal contracting between parties in relationships with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of incomplete contracting are analyzed both in imperfectly and perfectly competitive markets. The first essay analyzes the welfare effects of incomplete contracting in a principal-agent set-up. I study Resale Price Maintenance, a complete contract, and quantity fixing, an incomplete one, in a successive monopolies framework with information asymmetries. Both contracts entail a double marginalization driven by information rents distributed to the retailer. When firms behave non-cooperatively, the principal imposes retail price restrictions, and the impact of complete contracting on consumers' surplus is ambiguous. When, firms maximize ex ante joint profits, policy recommendations are unambiguous: if the preferred contracting mode from an ex ante viewpoint entails retail price restrictions, it also raises consumers' surplus, thereby producing a Pareto improvement relative to incomplete contracts. The second essay examines the welfare effects of contracting incompleteness when agents' preferences and productivity depend on their health status, and occupational choices affect individual health distributions. Efficiency requires agents of the same type to obtain different expected utilities if assigned to different occupations. Workers with riskier jobs get higher (lower) expected utilities if health affects production (consumption) capabilities. Competitive equilibria are first-best if complete contracts are enforceable, but typically not if only incomplete ones are traded. Compensating wage differentials are incompatible with ex-ante efficiency. The third essay provides a rationale for contracting incompleteness in a competing organizations set-up. I show that principals dealing with competing agents may leave contracts silent on some verifiable performance measures when certain aspects of agents' activity are noncontractible. Two effects are at play once one moves from a complete to an incomplete contract. First, reducing the number of screening instruments has a detrimental effect on principals' profits as it makes information revelation more costly. Second, it may create strategic value by forcing competing organizations to behave in a more friendly manner at the competitive stage.
Insomplete Contracts And Economic Organization
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Author : Nicolai J. Foss
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
Insomplete Contracts And Economic Organization written by Nicolai J. Foss and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with categories.
Contract Governance And Transaction Cost Economics
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Author : Oliver E Williamson
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2017-03-24
Contract Governance And Transaction Cost Economics written by Oliver E Williamson and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-03-24 with Business & Economics categories.
This book brings together a collection of seven papers on Transaction Cost Economics by Nobel Laureate Professor Oliver E Williamson. The applications of Transaction Cost Economics are extensive, ranging from the field of industrial organization and applied fields of economics such as labor, public finance, comparative economic systems and economic development, to the business fields of strategy, organizational behavior, marketing, finance, operations management, and accounting. In short, as Williamson states, "any problem that originates as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem can be examined to advantage in transaction cost economizing terms." What is referred to as New Institutional Economics is developed in the West in two mainly complementary ways: Property Rights Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics. Of the two, Property Rights Theory developed more rapidly. Transaction Cost Economics has nonetheless taken shape of late. In China, research on New Institutional Economics began in the 1990s and has grown rapidly since. China has similarly given much more attention to Property Rights Theory. Gengxuan Chen, the editor of this volume, recommends that China will benefit by bringing Transaction Cost Economics to bear. Simultaneously, for scholars who study the market economy, Transaction Cost Economics provides a very attractive way to explain the practice of the Chinese market economy.
International Outsourcing And Incomplete Contracts
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Author : Barbara J. Spencer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
International Outsourcing And Incomplete Contracts written by Barbara J. Spencer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Offshore assembly industry categories.
International outsourcing to lower cost countries such as China and India can best be understood through the enrichment of trade models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the vertical organization of production. The combination of trade with the choice of organizational form represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research. This survey paper provides a perspective on this new literature so as to gain insights into the forces driving international outsourcing. The paper focuses on relationship-specific investment, incomplete contracts, and also search and matching, as fundamental concepts that explain outsourcing decisions.
The Dynamics Of Industrial Collaboration
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Author : Anne Plunket
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2001-01-01
The Dynamics Of Industrial Collaboration written by Anne Plunket and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001-01-01 with Business & Economics categories.
The Dynamics of Industrial Collaboration revisits and reformulates issues previously raised by inter-firm collaboration. The latest research in collaboration, processes and evaluation of cooperation, and industrial and research networks, is presented by way of both empirical and theoretical studies. The authors use several theoretical perspectives to explain inter-firm and inter-institutional collaboration: the theory of transaction costs and contracts, evolutionary theory, and the resource-based view. The book illustrates that none of these approaches are dominant.