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Managerial Incentives Capital Structure And Corporate Governance


Managerial Incentives Capital Structure And Corporate Governance
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Managerial Incentives Capital Structure And Corporate Governance


Managerial Incentives Capital Structure And Corporate Governance
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Author : Xinping Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Managerial Incentives Capital Structure And Corporate Governance written by Xinping Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.




Capital Structure Managerial Incentives And Corporate Governance


Capital Structure Managerial Incentives And Corporate Governance
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Author : Christian M. Pfeil
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999

Capital Structure Managerial Incentives And Corporate Governance written by Christian M. Pfeil and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.




A Study On Capital Structure And Corporate Governance


A Study On Capital Structure And Corporate Governance
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Author : Ryoonhee Kim
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

A Study On Capital Structure And Corporate Governance written by Ryoonhee Kim and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.


Capital structure and corporate governance are the important areas that represent salient part of corporate finance research. By studying various aspects of the two areas, this study attempts to deepen our understanding of the two. First, this study provides both a theoretical model and empirical evidence on the interaction between capital structure and managerial incentive compensation (one of key measures of corporate governance). Researchers acknowledge that the two interact to each other and the interaction should affect their optimal determination, but few studies formally consider the interaction. This study shows that due to the interaction through agency conflicts, key firm characteristics that represent agency costs affect leverage and managerial incentive compensation in opposite directions. After controlling for the opposite interactions, the two are shown to be positively related. Second, this study provides empirical evidence on the interaction between financial structure and product market performance by examining business group affiliated firms. The firms that are affiliated to a business group is not only affected by their own financial position, but also affected by the position of business groups which the firms belong to. The empirical investigation suggests that affiliated firms lose market shares to their rivals in their product market when their business group is financially weak due to high group leverage. Third, this study examines whether special governance structure of business groups is actually beneficial to the groups0́9 member firms. The study exploit unique dataset of firms that were once stand alone, but later acquired by business groups. The empirical methodology we employ can account for the fact that the firms which are acquired by business groups can be very different from other firms which are not acquired. The findings from matching estimator suggest that performance increase of the acquired firms is significantly greater than the performance of matched stand alone firms, implying that business groups are actually helping their affiliated firms to perform better than stand alone firms.



Complementarities In Corporate Governance


Complementarities In Corporate Governance
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Author : Ralph P. Heinrich
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2002-06-04

Complementarities In Corporate Governance written by Ralph P. Heinrich and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-06-04 with Business & Economics categories.


Corporate governance reform is currently on the agenda in the European Union, the United States, Japan and in emerging market economies. This book takes a fresh look at the reform debate by focusing on the trade-offs involved in reconciling the diverging interests of shareholders, creditors and managers. It shows how effective corporate governance systems exploit complementarities between the incentives generated by the capital structure, the ownership structure, investor monitoring, takeover threats, and management compensation to minimize the sum of all agency costs facing the public corporation. The book combines a general theoretical treatment with a detailed study of the institutions of corporate governance in Germany, Japan and the United States and a critical assessment of recent reforms.



Corporate Governance And Capital Structure Dynamics


Corporate Governance And Capital Structure Dynamics
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Author : Li-Kai (Connie) Liao
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

Corporate Governance And Capital Structure Dynamics written by Li-Kai (Connie) Liao and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.


Morellec, Nikolov, and Schürhoff (2012) predict that a self-interested manager prefers a leverage level that is lower than the shareholders' desired level, and effective corporate governance encourages timely capital structure rebalancing. In a U.S. sample during 1996-2008, we confirm that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with a better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO-Chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when the initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.



Optimal Capital Structure


Optimal Capital Structure
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Author : Marc Schauten
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Optimal Capital Structure written by Marc Schauten and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.


Despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm there still is a big gap between theory and practice. Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani amp; Miller, much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders' point of view. Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders' interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure. Furthermore, the issue of corporate control and, related, the issue of corporate governance, receive a lion's part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions. From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) has to deal with more issues than the maximization of the firm's market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We show that capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are widely available.



Handbook Of Empirical Corporate Finance Set


Handbook Of Empirical Corporate Finance Set
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Author : Bjørn Espen Eckbo
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2008-12-23

Handbook Of Empirical Corporate Finance Set written by Bjørn Espen Eckbo and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-12-23 with Business & Economics categories.


This two-volume set summarizes recent research on corporate decision-making. The first volume covers measurement and theoretical subjects as well as sources of capital, including banks, public offerings, and private investors. In the second volume, contributors focus on the ways corporations are structured and the practices through which they can be bought and sold. Thus, its major subjects include dividends, capital structure, financial distress, takeovers, restructurings, and managerial incentives. Takes stock of the main empirical findings to date across an unprecedented spectrum of corporate finance issues Discusses everything from econometric methodology, to raising capital and capital structure choice, and to managerial incentives and corporate investment behavior Contributors are leading empirical researchers that remain active in their respective areas of expertise Writing style makes the chapters accessible to industry practitioners



Complementarities In Corporate Governance


Complementarities In Corporate Governance
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Author : Ralph P. Heinrich
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000

Complementarities In Corporate Governance written by Ralph P. Heinrich and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Corporate governance categories.




Corporate Governance


Corporate Governance
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Author : Kevin Keasey
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 2005-05-05

Corporate Governance written by Kevin Keasey and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-05-05 with Business & Economics categories.


The decade since the publication of the Cadbury Report in1992 has seen growing interest in corporate governance. This growth has recently become an explosion with major corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron in the US, the international diffusion of corporate governance codes and wider interest in researching corporate governance in different institutional contexts and through different subject lenses. In view of these developments, this book will be a rigorous update and development of the editor’s earlier work, Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues. Each chapter, written by an expert in the subject offers a high level review of the topic, embracing material from financial accounting, strategy and economic perspectives.



The Role Of Managerial Incentive And Corporate Governance In Asset Restructuring


The Role Of Managerial Incentive And Corporate Governance In Asset Restructuring
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Author : Chinmoy Ghosh
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016

The Role Of Managerial Incentive And Corporate Governance In Asset Restructuring written by Chinmoy Ghosh and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with categories.


We investigate the effect of corporate governance on equity carve-out decisions during the period of 1990 to 2014. Consistent with the notion that managerial incentives drive corporate decisions, we find that firms where the CEO and management have larger stock ownership are more likely to carve-out their subsidiaries. Larger firms with prior poor performance are also more likely to carve-out their divisions. Among equity carve-out parents, larger firms with higher profitability, higher managerial ownership and CEO incentive-based compensation tend to retain higher portions of their subsidiaries. We finally demonstrate that for wealth-enhancing strategic decisions such as equity carve-outs CEO tenure and classified board are negatively related to value, while outsider dominated boards are perceived positively by the investors. Our results offer new insights on the role of managerial incentive and corporate governance in asset restructuring.