Monotonicity In Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Affiliation
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Monotonicity In Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Affiliation
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Author : David McAdams
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Monotonicity In Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Affiliation written by David McAdams and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
I study monotonicity of equilibrium strategies in first-price auctions with symmetric bidders, risk-aversion, affiliated types, and interdependent values. I prove that every mixed-strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium under the priority rule for breaking ties. This provides a missing link to establish uniqueness in Milgrom and Weber (1982)'s general symmetric model. Non-monotone equilibria can exist under the coin-flip rule but they are distinguishable: all non-monotone equilibria have positive probability of ties whereas all monotone equilibria have zero probability of ties. This provides a justification for the standard empirical practice of restricting attention to monotone strategies.
All Mixed Strategy Equilibria Are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria In Asymmetric First Price Auctions
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Author : David McAdams
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
All Mixed Strategy Equilibria Are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria In Asymmetric First Price Auctions written by David McAdams and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
Every mixed strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions in which n bidders have affiliated, one-dimensional, atomless types and interdependent values.
Handbook Of Econometrics
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Author : James J. Heckman
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2007-12-13
Handbook Of Econometrics written by James J. Heckman and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-12-13 with Business & Economics categories.
As conceived by the founders of the Econometric Society, econometrics is a field that uses economic theory and statistical methods to address empirical problems in economics. It is a tool for empirical discovery and policy analysis. The chapters in this volume embody this vision and either implement it directly or provide the tools for doing so. This vision is not shared by those who view econometrics as a branch of statistics rather than as a distinct field of knowledge that designs methods of inference from data based on models of human choice behavior and social interactions. All of the essays in this volume and its companion volume 6B offer guidance to the practitioner on how to apply the methods they discuss to interpret economic data. The authors of the chapters are all leading scholars in the fields they survey and extend. *Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics Series*Updates and expands the exisiting Handbook of Econometrics volumes*An invaluable reference written by some of the world's leading econometricians.
Handbook Of Econometrics
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Author : Zvi Griliches
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 1983
Handbook Of Econometrics written by Zvi Griliches and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1983 with Business & Economics categories.
The Handbook is a definitive reference source and teaching aid for econometricians. It examines models, estimation theory, data analysis and field applications in econometrics.
Handbook Of Game Theory
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Author : Petyon Young
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2014-10-01
Handbook Of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-10-01 with Mathematics categories.
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Uniqueness In Symmetric First Price Auctions With Affiliation
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Author : David McAdams
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
Uniqueness In Symmetric First Price Auctions With Affiliation written by David McAdams and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values.
Three Essays In Empirical Auctions
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Author : Sudip Gupta
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Three Essays In Empirical Auctions written by Sudip Gupta and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Uniform Distributions
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Author : Todd R. Kaplan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Asymmetric First Price Auctions With Uniform Distributions written by Todd R. Kaplan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
While auction research, including asymmetric auctions, has grown significantly in recent years, there is still little analytical solutions of first-price auctions outside the symmetric case. Even in the uniform case, Griesmer et al. (1967) and Plum (1992) find solutions only to the case where the lower bounds of the two distributions are the same. We present the general analytical solutions to asymmetric auctions in the uniform case for two bidders, both with and without a minimum bid. We show that our solution is consistent with the previously known solutions of auctions with uniform distributions. Several interesting examples are presented including a class where the two bid functions are linear. We hope this result improves our understanding of auctions and provides a useful tool for future research in auctions.
First Price Auctions
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Author : Gustavo Rodríguez
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
First Price Auctions written by Gustavo Rodríguez and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Auctions categories.
Sequential Bidding In Asymmetric First Price Auctions
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Author : Gal Cohensius
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Sequential Bidding In Asymmetric First Price Auctions written by Gal Cohensius and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
We study asymmetric first price auctions in which bidders place their bids sequentially, one after the other and only once. We show that with a strong bidder and a weak bidder (in terms of first order stochastic dominance of their valuations distribution function), when the asymmetry between the bidders is large enough the expected revenue in the sequential bidding first price auction (when the strong bidder bids first) is higher than in the simultaneous bidding first price auction as well as in the second price auction. The expected payoff of the weak bidder is also higher in the sequential first price auction. Therefore a seller interested in increasing revenue facing asymmetric bidders may find it beneficial to order them and let them bid sequentially instead of simultaneously. In terms of efficiency, both the simultaneous first price auction and the sequential first price auction cannot guarantee full efficiency (as opposed to a second price auction which guarantees full efficiency). The sequential bidding auction when the stronger bidder bids first achieves lower efficiency than the simultaneous auction. However, when the order is reversed and bidders are asymmetric enough the sequential first price auction achieves higher efficiency than the simultaneous one.