Multidimensional Screening
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Multidimensional Screening
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Author : Suren Basov
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2005-11-19
Multidimensional Screening written by Suren Basov and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-11-19 with Business & Economics categories.
In many industries the tariffs are not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased, i. e, they are nonlinear. Examples of nonlinear tariffs include railroad and electricity schedules and rental rates for durable goods and space. The major justification for the nonlinear pricing is the existence of private information on the side of consumers. In the early papers on the subject, private information was captured either by assuming a finite number of types (e. g. Adams and Yellen, 1976) or by a unidimensional continuum of types (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Economics of the unidimen sional problems is by now well understood. The unidimensional models, however, do not cover all the situations of practical interest. Indeed, often the nonlinear tariffs specify the payment as a function of a variety of characteristics. For example, railroad tariffs spec ify charges based on weight, volume, and distance of each shipment. Dif ferent customers may value each of these characteristics differently, hence the customer's type will not in general be captured by a unidimensional characteristic and a problem of multidimensional screening arises. In such models the consumer's private information (her type) is captured by an m—dimensional vector, while the good produced by the monopolist has n quality dimensions.
Multidimensional Screening Affiliation And Full Separation
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Author : Charles Blackorby
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Multidimensional Screening Affiliation And Full Separation written by Charles Blackorby and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Multidimensional Screening
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Author : Suren Basov
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2005-01-11
Multidimensional Screening written by Suren Basov and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-01-11 with Business & Economics categories.
In many industries the tariffs are not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased, i. e, they are nonlinear. Examples of nonlinear tariffs include railroad and electricity schedules and rental rates for durable goods and space. The major justification for the nonlinear pricing is the existence of private information on the side of consumers. In the early papers on the subject, private information was captured either by assuming a finite number of types (e. g. Adams and Yellen, 1976) or by a unidimensional continuum of types (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Economics of the unidimen sional problems is by now well understood. The unidimensional models, however, do not cover all the situations of practical interest. Indeed, often the nonlinear tariffs specify the payment as a function of a variety of characteristics. For example, railroad tariffs spec ify charges based on weight, volume, and distance of each shipment. Dif ferent customers may value each of these characteristics differently, hence the customer's type will not in general be captured by a unidimensional characteristic and a problem of multidimensional screening arises. In such models the consumer's private information (her type) is captured by an m—dimensional vector, while the good produced by the monopolist has n quality dimensions.
A Revealed Preference Approach To Multidimensional Screening
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Author : Maxwell Rosenthal
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
A Revealed Preference Approach To Multidimensional Screening written by Maxwell Rosenthal and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
This paper develops a data-driven approach to multidimensional screening. The principal observes a population of decision makers each choose from a finite number of exogenously-specified sets of allocations, and her beliefs about the agent's preferences are informed by this data. In our model, there are a multiplicity of preference distributions that are consistent with the principal's observations. Rather than assign privilege to any one distribution, she evaluates mechanisms by computing their worst-case payoff against the set of distributions that are compatible with the choice data. We show that there are circumstances in which the principal can do better than using a mechanism that recreates one of the choice environments in her data set, even if she has no information about the agent's preferences beyond what is implied by the data. More broadly, we allow for arbitrary domains of preferences, and identify conditions under which update mechanisms that use only allocations that are vertically differentiated from the allocations in the principal's data set are optimal.
The Economics Of Multidimensional Screening
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Author : Lars Stole
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
The Economics Of Multidimensional Screening written by Lars Stole and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
This chapter, which corresponds to an invited lecture at the Seventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, surveys recent theoretical developments in the use of multidimensional screening models in such applications as contract theory and pricing strategies.
Multidimensional Screening Observability And Contract Renegotiation
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Author : Mathias François Dewatripont
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1992
Multidimensional Screening Observability And Contract Renegotiation written by Mathias François Dewatripont and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with categories.
Multidimensional Screening
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Author : Deborah Louise Whetzel
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1991
Multidimensional Screening written by Deborah Louise Whetzel and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1991 with categories.
A Partial Characterization Of The Solution Of The Multidimensional Screening Problem With Nonlinear Preferences
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Author : Roberto C. Raimondo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
A Partial Characterization Of The Solution Of The Multidimensional Screening Problem With Nonlinear Preferences written by Roberto C. Raimondo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with Tariff categories.
Identifying A Model Of Screening With Multidimensional Consumer Heterogeneity
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Author : Gaurab Aryal
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Identifying A Model Of Screening With Multidimensional Consumer Heterogeneity written by Gaurab Aryal and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
In this paper we study the identification of a screening model with multidimensional unobserved consumer heterogeneity, using transaction level data and consumers' socio-economic characteristics. In multidimensional screening a seller of a multi-attribute product “screens” by offering a menu of product attributes and prices to consumers who have private information about their multidimensional taste for each attribute. This menu maximizes expected profit subject to the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints. We show that, if utility is linear in product attributes, the demand and supply optimality conditions can be “inverted” to identify the joint density of “high-types” -those with high willingness to pay- and the cost function. To identify the joint density of the “medium-types” -those who are bunched- we can use independent variation in consumer characteristics. If, however, the utility function is nonlinear in product attributes, we show that data from only one market is insufficient for identification. But if we have data from two different markets (or the same market over two periods) that are separated by a binary cost shifter that does not affect the preferences, then we can also identify the vector of non-linear utility functions.
Multitasking Multidimensional Screening And Moral Hazard With Risk Neutral Agents
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Author : Svetlana Danilkina
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Multitasking Multidimensional Screening And Moral Hazard With Risk Neutral Agents written by Svetlana Danilkina and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
In this paper we consider a model where a risk-neutral principal devises a contract for a risk neutral agent who can exert effort along different dimensions. On the top of that the agent possesses multidimensional private information about her cost of effort. We show that as long as effort is exerted along different dimensions that exceed in number the available performance measures, hidden action prevents implementing the second best solution, obtained under pure adverse selection situation, even if both parties are risk neutral and private information of the agent is not correlated with the production technology. Therefore, hidden action leads to additional welfare loss. The result implies that it can be more efficient to compensate employees on the basis of a variety of performance measures rather than base their compensation on a "bottom-line" measure (e.g. their contribution to the company's profits).