Optimal Bidder Participation In Public Procurement Auctions
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Optimal Bidder Participation In Public Procurement Auctions
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Author : Ilke Onur
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
Optimal Bidder Participation In Public Procurement Auctions written by Ilke Onur and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
We present an easy-to-implement method to identify the optimal number of bidders in public procurement auctions. We examine a unique data set that covers all government procurement auctions comprising more than half a million observations. We show that there is an optimal number of bidders at which the minimum procurement price can be achieved. These results have several policy implications. Policy makers can use the easy-to-implement method to identify the optimal number of bidders and employ them as focal points to analyze whether competitive efficiency is achieved in public procurement auctions.
Best Practices For Online Procurement Auctions
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Author : Parente, Diane H.
language : en
Publisher: IGI Global
Release Date : 2007-12-31
Best Practices For Online Procurement Auctions written by Parente, Diane H. and has been published by IGI Global this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-12-31 with Education categories.
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Bid Costs And The In Efficiency Of Public Procurement Auctions
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Author : Niels Blomgren-Hansen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Bid Costs And The In Efficiency Of Public Procurement Auctions written by Niels Blomgren-Hansen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
The paper analyzes the excess entry hypothesis for sealed-bid first-price public procurement auctions. The hypothesis is proved analytically for any feasible combination of bid preparation cost and bid evaluation cost when the bidders face a rectangular cost density function and confirmed in numerical simulations based on a family of flexible cost density functions. The excess entry hypothesis implies that the procurer may reduce both his own cost and the social cost by imposing a positive fee on the bids. Sequential search is a superior strategy to a public procurement auction whether or not the procurer imposes an optimal fee on the bids.
Handbook Of Procurement
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Author : Nicola Dimitri
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2006-09-28
Handbook Of Procurement written by Nicola Dimitri and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
How can organizations ensure that they can get best value for money in their procurement decisions? How can they stimulate innovations from their dedicated suppliers? With contributions from leading academics and professionals, this 2006 handbook offers expert guidance on the fundamental aspects of successful procurement design and management in firms, public administrations, and international institutions. The issues addressed include the management of dynamic procurement; the handling of procurement risk; the architecture of purchasing systems; the structure of incentives in procurement contracts; methods to increase suppliers' participation in procurement contests and e-procurement platforms; how to minimize the risk of collusion and of corruption; pricing and reputation mechanisms in e-procurement platforms; and how procurement can enhance innovation. Inspired by frontier research, it provides practical recommendations to managers, engineers and lawyers engaged in private and public procurement design.
Putting Auction Theory To Work
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Author : Paul Milgrom
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004-01-12
Putting Auction Theory To Work written by Paul Milgrom and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-01-12 with Business & Economics categories.
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions
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Author : Maria Monica Wihardja
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Corruption In Public Procurement Auctions written by Maria Monica Wihardja and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
We provide a positive analysis of the equilibrium bidding and bribing strategies with and without corruption in a first-price, sealed-bid, procurement auction with two-dimensional-type bidders. With corruption, we assume that the quality of the bidders are unobservable and non-contractible ex-post. We show examples of equilibrium bids and bribes of N two-dimensional-type bidders in an incomplete information game where the type space is discrete and strategy space is infinite. The equilibrium bid and bribe decrease in the number of bidders. Moreover, we show that in this auction with corruption, quality is randomly chosen, constraining efficiency. In fact, no mechanism can be efficient in this auction. The empirical study suggests that increasing the number of bidders increases the percentage cost efficiency at a decreasing rate and it starts to decrease the percentage cost efficiency after it reaches a certain number of bidders.
Comparing Public Procurement Auctions
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Author : Francesco Decarolis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Comparing Public Procurement Auctions written by Francesco Decarolis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
This article contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions (ABAs), in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the ABA is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for the subsample of first price auctions and used to quantify the efficiency loss under counterfactual ABAs.
Handbook Of Spectrum Auction Design
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Author : Martin Bichler
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2017-10-26
Handbook Of Spectrum Auction Design written by Martin Bichler and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-10-26 with Business & Economics categories.
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Optimal Cost Overruns
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Author : Fabian Herweg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Optimal Cost Overruns written by Fabian Herweg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Auctions categories.
Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award procedure when the procurer cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for more complex designs, it is optimal to fix a simple design ex ante and to renegotiate to a more complex and costlier design ex post. Specifying a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price.
On Discrimination In Procurement Auctions
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Author : Philippe Jehiel
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
On Discrimination In Procurement Auctions written by Philippe Jehiel and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with Auctions categories.
With exogenous participation, strong bidders should be discriminated against weak bidders to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When participation is endogenous and the set of potential entrants is large, optimal discrimination if any takes a very different form. Without incumbents, there should be no discrimination even if entrants come from groups with different characteristics. With incumbents, those should be discriminated against entrants no matter how strong/weak they are even if some share of their surplus is internalized by the designer. The optimal reserve policy in standard auctions is also analyzed to shed light on situations in which discrimination is not permitted.