Optimal Procurement Mechanism With Observable Quality
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Optimal Procurement Mechanism With Observable Quality
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Author : Juan José Ganuza
language : es
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Optimal Procurement Mechanism With Observable Quality written by Juan José Ganuza and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Optimal Procurement Mechanism With Observable Quality
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Author : Juan José Ganuza Fernández
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Optimal Procurement Mechanism With Observable Quality written by Juan José Ganuza Fernández and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Optimal Procurement With Quality Concerns
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Author : Giuseppe Lopomo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Optimal Procurement With Quality Concerns written by Giuseppe Lopomo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also lowquality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA which, under some conditions, is the best incentive-compatible mechanism for maximizing either the seller's or the social surplus in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor (or minimum) price, and a reserve (or maximum) price. Conveniently, the LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild regularity conditions, is unique. We perform a counterfactual experiment on Italian government procurement auctions: we compute the gain that the government could have made, had it used the optimal mechanism (which happens to be a LoLA), relative to a first-price auction, which is the format the government actually used. Finally, we provide software applications for computing the optimal procurement mechanism.
Bayesian Optimal Knapsack Procurement
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Author : Ludwig Ensthaler
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Bayesian Optimal Knapsack Procurement written by Ludwig Ensthaler and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by observable quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. Money does not enter the buyer's objective function, but only his constraints. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. We report the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the buyer's problem. We find that simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers are interim optimal.
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms For Divisible Goods With Capacitated Suppliers
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Optimal Procurement Mechanisms For Divisible Goods With Capacitated Suppliers written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
The literature on procurement auctions typically assumes that the suppliers are uncapacitated (see, e.g. Dasgupta and Spulber, 1990; Che, 1993). Consequently, these auction mechanisms award the contract to a single supplier. We study mechanism design in a model where suppliers have limited production capacity, and both the marginal costs and the production capacities are private information. We provide a closed form solution for the revenue maximizing direct mechanism when the distribution of the cost and production capacities satisfies a modified regularity condition (Myerson, 1981). We also present a sealed low bid implementation of the optimal direct mechanism for the special case of identical suppliers, i.e. symmetric environment. The results in this paper extend to other principle-agent mechanism design problems where the agents have a privately known upper bound on allocation. Examples of such problems include monopoly pricing with adverse selection and forward auctions.
Measuring Service Quality By Linear Indicators
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Author : Daniel Peña Sánchez de Rivera
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Measuring Service Quality By Linear Indicators written by Daniel Peña Sánchez de Rivera and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Quality of products categories.
Supplier Competition And Cost Reduction With Endogenous Information Asymmetry
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Author : Cuihong Li
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Supplier Competition And Cost Reduction With Endogenous Information Asymmetry written by Cuihong Li and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
We consider a buyer sourcing from multiple competing suppliers who exert cost reduction efforts before procurement contracts are awarded. The supply chain is subject to the classic hold-up problem--as the lack of a contract commitment hinders suppliers' incentives to make investment upfront--complicated with supplier competition. With deterministic cost-reduction outcomes, suppliers will not exert any effort if this effort is observable, and a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist if the effort is unobservable. We analyze the mixed strategy equilibrium with unobservable supplier effort, in which suppliers randomize their efforts and the buyer designs an optimal procurement mechanism. We show that the optimal procurement mechanism can be implemented by a conventional single-price reverse auction with a random reserve price. The mixed strategy of supplier effort generates endogenous information asymmetry on supplier costs that provides suppliers with information rent, which sustains their efforts. The endogenous information asymmetry improves effort efficiency (by inducing positive supplier effort) yet introduces trade inefficiency (by causing the possible failure of trade between the parties). While increasing supplier competition (measured by the number of suppliers) hurts the effort efficiency, it improves the trade efficiency. As a result, the buyer is always better off introducing supplier competition by including more than one supplier in the supply base. However, the desired supply base size (number of suppliers) depends on the product revenue: for high-margin goods, the optimal size is achieved with two suppliers, whereas for low-margin goods, a larger supply base is better for the buyer. We show that the result based on deterministic cost reduction can be established as a limit of the case when uncertainty in cost reduction exists and shrinks to null. Our study helps to understand the impact of supplier competition when supply chain parties deliberately make their actions unpredictable to avoid being held up. The findings provide managerial guidance on procurement auction and supply base designs.
Procurement With Specialized Firms
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Author : Jan Boone
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Procurement With Specialized Firms written by Jan Boone and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with Economic specialization categories.
The Choice Of The Government Optimal Procurement Mechanism
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Author : Stefania Di Serafino
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
The Choice Of The Government Optimal Procurement Mechanism written by Stefania Di Serafino and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matter
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Author : John Asker
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Optimal Procurement When Both Price And Quality Matter written by John Asker and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Industrial procurement categories.