Pay At Risk
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Making Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off
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Author : Thomas L. Barton
language : en
Publisher: FT Press
Release Date : 2002
Making Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off written by Thomas L. Barton and has been published by FT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with Business & Economics categories.
Making Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off shows how top companies are transforming risk management into an integrated, continuous, broadly focused discipline that identifies and assesses risks more effectively, responds more precisely, and discovers not just "downsides" but breakthrough opportunities as well. Through five wide-ranging case studies - Chase Manhattan, Microsoft, DuPont, Unocal, and United Grain Growers - you'll learn powerful new risk management techniques that span the entire enterprise, and deliver unprecedented business value.
Pay At Risk
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001
Pay At Risk written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Compensation management categories.
Pay At Risk
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Author : John A. Turner
language : en
Publisher: W.E. Upjohn Institute
Release Date : 2001
Pay At Risk written by John A. Turner and has been published by W.E. Upjohn Institute this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Business & Economics categories.
Comprises seven papers which analyse risk bearing by workers in the USA and Canada. Examines changes in wages and job risk, employment arrangements, health care coverage, social security and occupational pension schemes and accident compensation mainly from the 1970s to the 1990s. Discusses policy options.
Performance Pay And Risk Aversion
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Author : Christian Grund
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Performance Pay And Risk Aversion written by Christian Grund and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Paying For Risk Bankers Compensation And Competition
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Author : Simone M. Sepe
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Paying For Risk Bankers Compensation And Competition written by Simone M. Sepe and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way. They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to supervise risk-taking employees. The responses focus on executive pay, believing that executives will bring non-executives into line-using incentives to manage risk-taking-once their own pay is regulated. What they overlook is the effect on non-executive pay of the competition for talent. Even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank's best interests, they will still be trapped into providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the negative externality that arises from that competition. Greater risk-taking can increase short-term profits and, in turn, the amount a non-executive receives, potentially at the expense of long-term bank value. Non-executives, therefore, have an incentive to incur significant risk upfront so long as they can depart for a new employer before any losses materialize. The result is an upward spiral in compensation-reducing an executive's ability to set non-executive pay and the ability of any one bank to adjust compensation to reflect risk-taking and long-term outcomes. New regulation must address the tension between compensation and competition. Regulators should take account of the effect of competition on market-wide levels of pay, including by non-banks who compete for talent. The ability of non-executives to jump from a bank employer to another financial firm should also be limited. In addition, banks should be required to include a long-term equity component in non-executive pay, with subsequent employers being restricted from compensating a new employee for any losses she incurs related to her prior work.
The Relationship Between Risk Incentive Pay And Organizational Performance
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Author : Matthew C. Bloom
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
The Relationship Between Risk Incentive Pay And Organizational Performance written by Matthew C. Bloom and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Incentive awards categories.
The Relationship Between Risk Performance Based Pay And Organizational Performance
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Author : Matthew C. Bloom
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1995
The Relationship Between Risk Performance Based Pay And Organizational Performance written by Matthew C. Bloom and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1995 with Incentive awards categories.
People Performance Pay
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Author : Thomas P. Flannery
language : en
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
Release Date : 2002-01-15
People Performance Pay written by Thomas P. Flannery and has been published by Simon and Schuster this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-01-15 with Business & Economics categories.
People, Performance, and Pay identifies today's four most common organizational work cultures - functional, process, time-based, and network - and explains how to align innovative pay policies with each. With examples from LEGO, Hallmark, Holiday Inn, and other leading organizations, the authors explain how to assess an organization's current culture and determine what its future culture should be. They then demonstrate pay's role in such change initiatives, and how compensation must be integrated with other human resource processes, such as selection, training, and performance management. They also discuss the full range of pay strategies available today and how they can be best used to move the organization forward; for example, they recommend decreasing an organization's emphasis on base pay as it shifts from a functional culture to a process, time-based, or network culture. They also offer guidance on establishing team rewards, especially important in process and team-based cultures, and make a compelling case for putting more pay at risk through variable pay strategies. Here also is strategic advice on competency-based pay, performance-based rewards such as gain-sharing, executive pay, and benefits programs. As responsibility for compensation strategies and compensation decisions shifts away from the realm of the Human Resource Department, line managers and senior executives will find People, Performance, and Pay an invaluable reference for effectively using salary, incentives, and benefits to motivate and reward employees, improve quality, and increase productivity.
Pay As Risk Regulation
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Author : Andrew Lund
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Pay As Risk Regulation written by Andrew Lund and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
How do we prevent financial institutions from taking excessive risk when the public fisc serves as their ultimate creditor? This is one of the central questions left over after the recent financial crisis and, for the past five years, there has been no shortage of proposed answers. Two of the more popular candidates for ex ante regulation - proprietary trading restrictions and enhanced capital requirements - are on their way to being enacted in one form or another, albeit with some controversy over their cost and ultimate efficacy. Meanwhile, a third, more indirect approach has been touted under which bank managers' compensation packages would be adjusted to include bank debt thought to alter their risk preferences. This approach has even been adopted at certain non-U.S. financial institutions. This Article offers a critical appraisal of regulating bank risk-taking through executive pay design. "Regulation by pay" is less likely to ameliorate risk-taking because bank managers with career concerns will continue to face significant incentives to take on high levels of firm risk. Moreover, regulating by pay is an inapt solution where marginal monitoring costs for the government are relatively low as is the case given the existing bank monitor regime. Instead, the case for regulating bank risk through pay redesign is best grounded in a pessimistic view of regulator agency costs. It is hard, however, to see how compromised regulators, given broad discretion, would be much better at implementing a pay regulation regime. Even worse, the very fact of risk regulation by pay, no matter how modestly proposed, makes it more likely that traditional direct monitoring will further atrophy, potentially leaving the government-as-creditor worse off.
Willingness To Pay For Risk Reduction And Risk Aversion Without The Expected Utility Assumption
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Author : Eric Langlais
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Willingness To Pay For Risk Reduction And Risk Aversion Without The Expected Utility Assumption written by Eric Langlais and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
Introducing minimal assumptions on the individual preferences, I show that the Willingness To Pay for both a FSD and SSD reduction of risk may always be described as the sum of a mean effect, a pure risk effect and a wealth effect. As a result, the WTP of a risk-averse decision maker may be smaller than the willingness to pay of a risk-neutral one, for a large class of individual preferences' representation and a large class of risks.