Pay Equity In Ceo Compensation And Agency Problems
DOWNLOAD
Download Pay Equity In Ceo Compensation And Agency Problems PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Pay Equity In Ceo Compensation And Agency Problems book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Pay Equity In Ceo Compensation And Agency Problems
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jeongil Seo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Pay Equity In Ceo Compensation And Agency Problems written by Jeongil Seo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
Executive Compensation As An Agency Problem
DOWNLOAD
Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Executive Compensation As An Agency Problem written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with Agency (Law) categories.
This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power' approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.
Other People S Money
DOWNLOAD
Author : Steve Werner
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994
Other People S Money written by Steve Werner and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Compensation management categories.
Pay Without Performance
DOWNLOAD
Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
language : en
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Release Date : 2004
Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and has been published by Harvard University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Business & Economics categories.
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Mergers And Acquisitions And Executive Compensation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Virginia Bodolica
language : en
Publisher: Routledge
Release Date : 2015-06-26
Mergers And Acquisitions And Executive Compensation written by Virginia Bodolica and has been published by Routledge this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-06-26 with Business & Economics categories.
Over the past decades, the total value of executive compensation packages has been rising dramatically, contributing to a wider pay gap between the chief executive officer and the average worker. In the midst of the financial turmoil that brought about a massive wave of corporate failures, the lavish executive compensation package has come under an intense spotlight. Public pressure has mounted to revise the levels and the structure of executive pay in a way that will tie more closely the executive wealth to that of shareholders. Merger and acquisition (M&A) activities represent an opportune setting for gauging whether shareholder value creation or managerial opportunism guides executive compensation. M&As constitute major examples of high-profile events prompted by managers who typically conceive them as a means for achieving higher levels of pay, even though they are frequently associated with disappointing returns to acquiring shareholders. Mergers and Acquisitions and Executive Compensation reviews the existing empirical evidence and provides an integrative framework for the growing body of literature that is situated at the intersection of two highly debated topics: M&A activities and executive compensation. The proposed framework structures the literature along two dimensions, such as M&A phases and firm’s role in a M&A deal, allowing readers to identify three main streams of research and five different conceptualizations of causal relationships between M&A transactions and executive compensation. The book makes a comprehensive review of empirical studies conducted to date, aiming to shed more light on the current and emerging knowledge in this field of investigation, discuss the inconsistencies encountered within each stream of research, and suggest promising directions for further exploration. This book will appeal to researchers and students alike in the fields of organizational behavior and governance as well as accounting and accountability.
Corporate Governance Pay Equity And The Limitations Of Agency Theory
DOWNLOAD
Author : Marc T. Moore
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Corporate Governance Pay Equity And The Limitations Of Agency Theory written by Marc T. Moore and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
It is well known that recent decades have seen an explosion in levels of senior executive remuneration in public companies, both in absolute terms and in relative terms to ordinary worker pay. However, a conspicuous corresponding trend over recent years has been the development of a range of countervailing regulatory tools designed to mitigate this disparity within various national environments. These include regulatory pay ratio caps, bonus bans, and mandatory pay ratio disclosures. Notwithstanding these salient developments, prevailing legal and economic debates on senior executive and worker pay remain rooted in the dominant principal-agent paradigm of corporate governance, which consistently disputes the relevance of equitable or distributive fairness concerns to the essentially functional challenge of determining effective agent incentives. In this article, I take issue with the orthodox principal-agent perspective on pay equity, by demonstrating the centrality of equitable concerns to effective agent-incentive design, both at senior executive and ordinary worker levels.
Too Much Is Not Enough
DOWNLOAD
Author : Robert W. Kolb
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2012-08-02
Too Much Is Not Enough written by Robert W. Kolb and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-08-02 with Business & Economics categories.
The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in the academic literature, we might also expect the success of incentive compensation to be well-documented. Historically, however, this has been very far from the case. In Too Much Is Not Enough, Robert W. Kolb studies the performance of incentives in executive compensation across many dimensions of CEO performance. The book begins with an overview of incentives and unintended consequences. Then it focuses on the theory of incentives as applied to compensation generally, and as applied to executive compensation particularly. Subsequent chapters explore different facets of executive compensation and assess the evidence on how well incentive compensation performs in each arena. The book concludes with a final chapter that provides an overall assessment of the value of incentives in guiding executive behavior. In it, Kolb argues that incentive compensation for executives is so problematic and so prone to error that the social value of giving huge incentive compensation packages is likely to be negative on balance. In focusing on incentives, the book provides a much sought-after resource, for while there are a number of books on executive compensation, none focuses specifically on incentives. Given the recent fervor over executive compensation, this unique but logical perspective will garner much interest. And while the literature being considered and evaluated is technical, the book is written in a non-mathematical way accessible to any college-educated reader.
An Introduction To Executive Compensation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Steven Balsam
language : en
Publisher: Academic Press
Release Date : 2002
An Introduction To Executive Compensation written by Steven Balsam and has been published by Academic Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with Business & Economics categories.
General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.
Role Of Financial Contracts And Managerial Compensation In Resolving Agency Problems
DOWNLOAD
Author : Huiyan Qiu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
Role Of Financial Contracts And Managerial Compensation In Resolving Agency Problems written by Huiyan Qiu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Executive Compensation As An Agency Problem
DOWNLOAD
Author : Lucian A. Bebchuk
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Executive Compensation As An Agency Problem written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.