Petit Robinson Ou Les Aventures De Robinson Cruso Arrang Es Pour L Amusement De La Jeunesse Par M Henri Lemaire Avec Six Jolies Gravures Cinqui Me Dition Revue Et Corrig E An Adaptation Of Pt 1
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The Rejection Of Consequentialism
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Author : Samuel Scheffler
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 1994-08-11
The Rejection Of Consequentialism written by Samuel Scheffler and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994-08-11 with Philosophy categories.
In contemporary philosophy, substantive moral theories are typically classified as either consequentialist or deontological. Standard consequentialist theories insist, roughly, that agents must always act so as to produce the best available outcomes overall. Standard deontological theories, by contrast, maintain that there are some circumstances where one is permitted but not required to produce the best overall results, and still other circumstances in which one is positively forbidden to do so. Classical utilitarianism is the most familiar consequentialist view, but it is widely regarded as an inadequate account of morality. Although Professor Scheffler agrees with this assessment, he also believes that consequentialism seems initially plausible, and that there is a persistent air of paradox surrounding typical deontological views. In this book, therefore, he undertakes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He argues that it is possible to provide a rationale for the view that agents need not always produce the best possible overall outcomes, and this motivates one departure from consequentialism; but he shows that it is surprisingly difficult to provide a satisfactory rationale for the view that there are times when agents must not produce the best possible overall outcomes. He goes on to argue for a hitherto neglected type of moral conception, according to which agents are always permitted, but not always required, to produce the best outcomes.