[PDF] Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information - eBooks Review

Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information


Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information
DOWNLOAD

Download Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page





Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information


Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information
DOWNLOAD
Author : Bruno Strulovici
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

Renegotiation Proof Contracts With Moral Hazard And Persistent Private Information written by Bruno Strulovici and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.


How does renegotiation affect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persistent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiationproofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has exponential utility and cost of effort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single "sensitivity" parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with reported cash flows. The optimal contract among those always causes immiserization. Reducing the agent's cost of effort can harm the principal by increasing the tension between moral hazard and reporting problems. Truthfulness of the constructed contracts is obtained by allowing jumps in cash flow reports and turning the agent's reporting problem into an impulse control problem. This approach shows that self-correcting reports are optimal of the equilibrium path. The paper also discusses the case of partially pooling contracts and of permanent outside options for the agent, illustrating the interaction between cash-flow persistence, renegotiation, moral hazard, and information revelation. -- Repeated Agency ; Asymmetric Information ; Persistent Information ; Contract Theory ; Principal Agent ; Limited Commitment ; Renegotiation ; Recursive Contracts



Computational Complexity


Computational Complexity
DOWNLOAD
Author : Robert A. Meyers
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2011-10-19

Computational Complexity written by Robert A. Meyers and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-10-19 with Computers categories.


Complex systems are systems that comprise many interacting parts with the ability to generate a new quality of collective behavior through self-organization, e.g. the spontaneous formation of temporal, spatial or functional structures. These systems are often characterized by extreme sensitivity to initial conditions as well as emergent behavior that are not readily predictable or even completely deterministic. The recognition that the collective behavior of the whole system cannot be simply inferred from an understanding of the behavior of the individual components has led to the development of numerous sophisticated new computational and modeling tools with applications to a wide range of scientific, engineering, and societal phenomena. Computational Complexity: Theory, Techniques and Applications presents a detailed and integrated view of the theoretical basis, computational methods, and state-of-the-art approaches to investigating and modeling of inherently difficult problems whose solution requires extensive resources approaching the practical limits of present-day computer systems. This comprehensive and authoritative reference examines key components of computational complexity, including cellular automata, graph theory, data mining, granular computing, soft computing, wavelets, and more.



Inefficient Private Renegotiation Of Sovereign Debt


Inefficient Private Renegotiation Of Sovereign Debt
DOWNLOAD
Author : Kenneth Kletzer
language : en
Publisher: World Bank Publications
Release Date : 1990

Inefficient Private Renegotiation Of Sovereign Debt written by Kenneth Kletzer and has been published by World Bank Publications this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with Debt relief categories.


Private renegotiation of debt repayments and new loans is inefficient because of the creditors' seniority privileges and lack of commitment and the inadequate information creditors have about debtors' policy choices.



The Theory Of Corporate Finance


The Theory Of Corporate Finance
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jean Tirole
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2010-08-26

The Theory Of Corporate Finance written by Jean Tirole and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-08-26 with Business & Economics categories.


"Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.



The Theory Of Incentives


The Theory Of Incentives
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2009-12-27

The Theory Of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-12-27 with Business & Economics categories.


Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.



Contract Theory


Contract Theory
DOWNLOAD
Author : Patrick Bolton
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2004-12-10

Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-12-10 with Business & Economics categories.


A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.



The Economics Of Contracts Second Edition


The Economics Of Contracts Second Edition
DOWNLOAD
Author : Bernard Salanie
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2017-02-17

The Economics Of Contracts Second Edition written by Bernard Salanie and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-02-17 with Business & Economics categories.


A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University



Mastering The Risky Business Of Public Private Partnerships In Infrastructure


Mastering The Risky Business Of Public Private Partnerships In Infrastructure
DOWNLOAD
Author : Manal Fouad
language : en
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Release Date : 2021-05-10

Mastering The Risky Business Of Public Private Partnerships In Infrastructure written by Manal Fouad and has been published by International Monetary Fund this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-05-10 with Business & Economics categories.


Investment in infrastructure can be a driving force of the economic recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of shrinking fiscal space. Public-private partnerships (PPP) bring a promise of efficiency when carefully designed and managed, to avoid creating unnecessary fiscal risks. But fiscal illusions prevent an understanding the sources of fiscal risks, which arise in all infrastructure projects, and that in PPPs present specific characteristics that need to be addressed. PPP contracts are also affected by implicit fiscal risks when they are poorly designed, particularly when a government signs a PPP contract for a project with no financial sustainability. This paper reviews the advantages and inconveniences of PPPs, discusses the fiscal illusions affecting them, identifies a diversity of fiscal risks, and presents the essentials of PPP fiscal risk management.



Research Handbook On Corporate Bankruptcy Law


Research Handbook On Corporate Bankruptcy Law
DOWNLOAD
Author : Barry E. Adler
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2020-06-26

Research Handbook On Corporate Bankruptcy Law written by Barry E. Adler and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-06-26 with Law categories.


In this Research Handbook, today’s leading experts on the law and economics of corporate bankruptcy address fundamental issues such as the efficiency of bankruptcy, the role and treatment of creditors – particularly secured creditors – in the bankruptcy process, the allocation of going-concern surplus among claimants, the desirability of liquidation in the absence of such surplus, the role of contract in bankruptcy resolution, the role of derivatives in the bankruptcy process, the costs of the bankruptcy system, and the special case of financial institutions, among other topics.



Journal Of Economic Literature


Journal Of Economic Literature
DOWNLOAD
Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997

Journal Of Economic Literature written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Economics categories.