Reputation With Long Run Players And Imperfect Observation
DOWNLOAD
Download Reputation With Long Run Players And Imperfect Observation PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Reputation With Long Run Players And Imperfect Observation book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Reputation With Long Run Players And Imperfect Observation
DOWNLOAD
Author : Alp E. Atakan
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2009
Reputation With Long Run Players And Imperfect Observation written by Alp E. Atakan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games between two long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous move stage game where actions of player 2 are imperfectly observed. The set of commitment types for player 1 is taken as any (countable) set of finite automata. In this context, for a restricted class of stage games, we provide a one sided reputation result. If player 1 is a particular commitment type with positive probability and player 2's actions are imperfectly observed, then player 1 receives his highest pay-off, compatible with individual rationality, in any Bayes-Nash equilibria, as agents become patient. -- Repeated Games ; Reputation ; Equal Discount Factor ; Long-run Players ; Imperfect Observation ; Complicated Types ; Finite Automaton
A Long Run Collaboration On Long Run Games
DOWNLOAD
Author : Drew Fudenberg
language : en
Publisher: World Scientific
Release Date : 2009
A Long Run Collaboration On Long Run Games written by Drew Fudenberg and has been published by World Scientific this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with Mathematics categories.
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Repeated Games And Reputations
DOWNLOAD
Author : George J. Mailath
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2006-09-28
Repeated Games And Reputations written by George J. Mailath and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Recent Advances In Game Theory And Applications
DOWNLOAD
Author : Leon A. Petrosyan
language : en
Publisher: Birkhäuser
Release Date : 2016-09-30
Recent Advances In Game Theory And Applications written by Leon A. Petrosyan and has been published by Birkhäuser this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016-09-30 with Mathematics categories.
This contributed volume contains fourteen papers based on selected presentations from the European Conference on Game Theory SING11-GTM 2015, held at Saint Petersburg State University in July 2015, and the Networking Games and Management workshop, held at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozvavodsk, Russia, also in July 2015. These papers cover a wide range of topics in game theory, including recent advances in areas with high potential for future work, as well as new developments on classical results. Some of these include A new approach to journal ranking using methods from social choice theory; A differential game of a duopoly in which two firms are competing for market share in an industry with network externalities; The impact of information propagation in the model of tax audits; A voting model in which the results of previous votes can affect the process of coalition formation in a decision-making body; The Selten-Szidarovsky technique for the analysis of Nash equilibria of games with an aggregative structure; Generalized nucleoli and generalized bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation; Bayesian networks and games of deterrence; and A new look at the study of solutions for games in partition function form. The maturity and vitality of modern-day game theory are reflected in the new ideas, novel applications, and contributions of young researchers represented in this collection. It will be of interest to anyone doing theoretical research in game theory or working on one its numerous applications.
Imperfect Monitoring And Impermanent Reputations Second Version
DOWNLOAD
Author : Martin Cripps
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Imperfect Monitoring And Impermanent Reputations Second Version written by Martin Cripps and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.
Stochastic Teams Games And Control Under Information Constraints
DOWNLOAD
Author : Serdar Yüksel
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date :
Stochastic Teams Games And Control Under Information Constraints written by Serdar Yüksel and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with categories.
A Course In Microeconomic Theory
DOWNLOAD
Author : David M. Kreps
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2020-06-23
A Course In Microeconomic Theory written by David M. Kreps and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020-06-23 with Business & Economics categories.
David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
Handbook Of Game Theory
DOWNLOAD
Author : Petyon Young
language : en
Publisher: Elsevier
Release Date : 2014-10-01
Handbook Of Game Theory written by Petyon Young and has been published by Elsevier this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-10-01 with Mathematics categories.
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
The Social Contract Of The Firm
DOWNLOAD
Author : Lorenzo Sacconi
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2012-12-06
The Social Contract Of The Firm written by Lorenzo Sacconi and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012-12-06 with Business & Economics categories.
In order to survive as a social institution a firm needs a constitutional social contract, even though implicit, among its stakeholders. This social contract must exist if an institution is to be justified. The book focuses on two main issues: To find out the terms of the hypothetical agreement among the firm's stakeholders in an ex ante perspective and to understand the endogenous mechanism generating appropriate incentives that induce to comply with the social contract itself, as seen in the ex post perspective.
Repeated Games And Reputations
DOWNLOAD
Author : George J. Mailath
language : en
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Release Date : 2006-09-28
Repeated Games And Reputations written by George J. Mailath and has been published by Oxford University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006-09-28 with Business & Economics categories.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.