Robust Bidding In First Price Auctions
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Robust Bidding In First Price Auctions
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Author : Bernhard Kasberger
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Robust Bidding In First Price Auctions written by Bernhard Kasberger and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
We show how to bid in first-price auctions when a bidder knows her own value but not how others will bid. To do this we introduce a novel and general method for how to make choices in strategic settings without assuming common knowledge or equilibrium behavior. Accordingly, first eliminate environments that are believed not to occur and then find a robust rule that performs well in the remaining environments. We test our bid recommendations using data from laboratory experiments and from the field. We find that our bids outperform those made by the real bidders.
First Price Auctions With General Information Structures
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Author : Dirk Bergemann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
First Price Auctions With General Information Structures written by Dirk Bergemann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with Auction theory categories.
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they will win or lose and indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values.We report further analytic and computational characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from winning bid data and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms.
Robust Bidding And Revenue In Descending Price Auctions
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Author : Sarah Auster
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Robust Bidding And Revenue In Descending Price Auctions written by Sarah Auster and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
First Price And Second Price Auctions With Externalities
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Author : Chulyoung Kim
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023
First Price And Second Price Auctions With Externalities written by Chulyoung Kim and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with categories.
We consider a scenario where a single indivisible object is auctioned off to three bidders and among the three bidders there is one bidder whose winning imposes a positive or negative externality on the other two bidders. We theoretically and experimentally compare two standard sealed-bid auction formats, first-price and second-price auctions, under complete information. Using a refinement of undominated Nash equilibria, we analyze equilibrium bids and outcomes in the two auction formats. Our experimental results show that overbidding relative to equilibrium bids is prevalent, especially in second-price auctions, and this leads to higher revenue and lower efficiency in second- price auctions than in first-price auctions, especially under negative externalities. Our results are consistent with previous experimental findings that bidders tend to overbid more in second-price auctions than in first-price auctions, and they suggest that such a tendency is robust to the introduction of externalities.
Understanding Auctions
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Author : Asunción Mochón
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2014-09-15
Understanding Auctions written by Asunción Mochón and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-09-15 with Business & Economics categories.
In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Auction Design With Robust Guarantees
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Author : Peerapong Dhangwatnotai
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Auction Design With Robust Guarantees written by Peerapong Dhangwatnotai and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
In this dissertation, we design and analyze auctions that are more practical than those in the traditional auction theory in several settings. The first setting is the search advertising market, in which the multi-keyword sponsored search mechanism is the dominant platform. In this setting, a search engine sells impressions generated from various search terms to advertisers. The main challenge is the sheer diversity of the items for sale -- the number of distinct items that an advertiser wants is so large that he cannot possibly communicate all of them to the search engine. To alleviate this communication problem, the search engine introduces a bidding language called broad match. It allows an advertiser to submit a single bid for multiple items at once. Popular models such as the GSP auction do not capture this aspect of sponsored search. We propose a model, named the broad match mechanism, for the sponsored search platform with broad match keywords. The analysis of the broad match mechanism produces many insights into the performance of the sponsored search platform. First, we identify two properties of the broad match mechanism, namely expressiveness and homogeneity, that characterize the performance of the mechanism. Second, we show that, unlike the GSP auction, the broad match mechanism does not necessarily have a pure equilibrium. Third, we analyze two variants of the broad match mechanism, the pay-per-impression variant and the pay-per-click variant. Under a common model of advertiser valuation, we show that the pay-per-click variant is more economically efficient than the pay-per-impression variant. This result justifies the prevalent use of the pay-per-click scheme in search advertising. In addition, the broad match mechanism can be viewed as an auction of which the bidding language is crucial to its performance. In the second part, we design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes and we assume that the valuations of bidders with the same attribute are independent draws from a common distribution. Previous works in revenue-maximizing auctions assume that the auctioneer knows the distributions from which the bidder valuations are drawn \cite{M81}. In this dissertation, we assume that the distributions are a priori unknown to the auctioneer. We show that a simple auction which does not require any knowledge of the distributions can obtain revenue comparable to what could be obtained if the auctioneer had the distributional knowledge in advance. Our most general auction has expected revenue at least a constant fraction of that of the optimal distributional-dependent auction in two settings. The first setting concerns arbitrary downward-closed single-parameter environments and valuation distributions that satisfy a standard hazard rate condition, called monotone hazard rate. In this setting, the expected revenue of our auction is improved to a constant fraction of the expected optimal welfare. In the second setting, we allow a more general class of valuation distributions, called regular distributions, but require a more restrictive environment called the matroid environment. In our results, we assume that no bidder has a unique attribute value, which is obviously necessary with unknown and attribute-dependent valuation distributions. Our auction sets a reserve price for a bidder using the valuation of another bidder who has the same attribute. Conceptually, our analysis shows that even a single sample from a distribution -- another bidder's valuation -- is sufficient information to obtain near-optimal expected revenue, even in quite general settings. In the third part, we design and analyze auctions that approximately maximize residual surplus in single-parameter settings. Residual surplus is defined to be the surplus less the sum of the bidders' payments. The guarantee of our auction is of the same type as the auctions in the second part, i.e., its expected residual surplus is a fraction of that of the optimal distributional-dependent auction. Instead of the no-unique-attribute assumption made in the second setting, in this setting we assume that the distributions of bidder valuations can be ordered, that is, the distribution of the first bidder stochastically dominates that of the second bidder and the distribution of the second bidder stochastically dominates that of the third and so on. In every downward-closed stochastic-dominance environment where the distributions of bidder valuations satisfy the monotone hazard rate condition, our auction produces residual surplus that is a $\Omega(\tfrac{1}{\log n})$ fraction of the optimal residual surplus, without taking any bid (although it makes use of the ordering), where $n$ is the number of bidders.
Robust Inference In First Price Auctions
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Author : Serafin Grundl
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019
Robust Inference In First Price Auctions written by Serafin Grundl and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.
Auction Theory
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Author : Pak-Sing Choi
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2021-05-24
Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-05-24 with Business & Economics categories.
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
An Externality Robust Auction Theory And Experimental Evidence
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Author : Björn Bartling
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
An Externality Robust Auction Theory And Experimental Evidence written by Björn Bartling and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
Putting Auction Theory To Work
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Author : Paul Robert Milgrom
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 2004-01-12
Putting Auction Theory To Work written by Paul Robert Milgrom and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004-01-12 with Business & Economics categories.
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