Sequential Auctions With Supply Uncertainty

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Sequential Auctions With Supply Uncertainty

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Author : Paul Pezanis-Christou
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996

Sequential Auctions With Supply Uncertainty written by Paul Pezanis-Christou and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with Auctions categories.

Sequential Auctions With Supply Or Demand Uncertainty

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Author : Roberto Burguet
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994

Sequential Auctions With Supply Or Demand Uncertainty written by Roberto Burguet and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with Auctions categories.

Bidding At Sequential First Price Auctions With Out Supply Uncertainty A Laboratory Analysis

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Author : Tibor Neugebauer
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Bidding At Sequential First Price Auctions With Out Supply Uncertainty A Laboratory Analysis written by Tibor Neugebauer and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Simultaneous Vs Sequential Sales Intensity Of Competition And Uncertainty

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Author : Juan Feng
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008

Simultaneous Vs Sequential Sales Intensity Of Competition And Uncertainty written by Juan Feng and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.

Under what circumstances will a seller be better of selling his inventory sequentially, rather than selling them all in a single auction? If buyers come sequentially, there is an obvious reason to sell items sequentially. However, we show that even (1) when all buyers are present at the beginning of the auction, (2) when both the seller and buyers are impatient, a sequential sale can still be more profitable for the seller as it stimulates competition among forward-looking bidders. This result depends on: (1) the "intensity of competition", which is characterized by the number of items available relative to the number of buyers; and (2) the discount factor of the auctioneer and bidders; and (3) the uncertainty among bidders about how many items available for sale. The result is then extended to a T-period setting. When bidders are strategic players who can predict the optimal strategy of the seller, we find that the dynamic equilibrium structure of this game is quite different from that in a typical optimal stopping problem.

Sequential Auctions With Ambiguity

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Author : Gagan Pratap Ghosh
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2019

Sequential Auctions With Ambiguity written by Gagan Pratap Ghosh and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019 with categories.

This paper studies sequential auctions in the presence of Knightian uncertainty about the distribution of values. We propose equilibrium notions based on the multiple selves approach to deal with the possible time inconsistency that arises with dynamic bidding for max-min bidders. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that it is robust to different specifications of preferences. We demonstrate that equilibrium prices are a supermartingale under dynamic consistency, providing an explanation for the well-documented puzzle ``declining price anomaly'' in sequential auctions. The model delivers rich testable implications: on the practical side, declining prices imply that bidders' worst-case belief first-order stochastically dominates the true distribution of values; on the theoretical side, dynamic inconsistency, which can arise when bidders have multiple priors, generates history dependence in bidding strategies.

Equilbrium Price Paths In Sequential Auctions With Stochastic Supply

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Author : Thomas D. Jeitschko
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999

Equilbrium Price Paths In Sequential Auctions With Stochastic Supply written by Thomas D. Jeitschko and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with categories.

In many sequential auctions the total number of units to be auctioned is not known at the outset of the auction. However, information regarding the number of units may become available in the course of the auction. The paper examines how such information impacts the formation of prices during the sequence of sales.

Bidding Behavior In Sequential Auctions For Wholesale Electricity

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Author : Kevin Norman Goulding
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Bidding Behavior In Sequential Auctions For Wholesale Electricity written by Kevin Norman Goulding and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Electric utilities categories.

This paper investigates the process by which bidders in the NYISO (New York Independent System Operator) market update their bids between the Day-ahead and Hour-ahead markets. Observed bids for the ten largest bidders over the years 2002- 2010 are used to investigate the extent to which observed bids into both the Day-ahead (DA) and Hour-ahead (HA) markets are consistent with joint profit maximization in the two markets. Theory about single period bidding behavior developed in the California spot electricity market (Wolak, 2003) and Texas electricity balancing market (Hortacsu and Puller, 2008) is extended to the two-period case specific to the NYISO market. While uncertainty comes from both the behavior of competing firms and additive uncertainty in demand, bidder behavior is broadly consistent with expected profit maximization against a stochastic piece of demand that is additively separable.

Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs

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Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993

Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Auctions categories.

Bidding Behavior Evolution In Sequential Auctions

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Author : Paulo Goes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021

Bidding Behavior Evolution In Sequential Auctions written by Paulo Goes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.

Retailers are increasingly exploiting sequential online auctions as an effective and low cost distribution channel for disposing large quantities of inventory. In such auction environments, bidders have the opportunity of participating in many auctions to learn and choose the bidding strategy that best fits their preferences. Previous studies have mostly focused on identifying bidding strategies in single, isolated online auctions. Using a large data set collected from sequential online auctions, we first characterize bidding strategies in this interesting online environment and then develop an empirical model to explain bidders' adoption of different strategies. We also examine how bidders change their strategies over time. Our findings challenge the general belief that bidders employ their strategies regardless of experience or their specific demand. We find that bidders' demand, participation experience, and auction design parameters affect their choice of bidding strategies. Bidders with unit demand are likely to choose early bidding strategies, while those with multiple unit demand adopt late bidding strategies. Auction design parameters that affect bidders' perception of demand and supply trends affect bidders' choice of bidding strategies. As bidders gain experience within a sequence of auctions, they start choosing late bidding strategies. Our findings help auctioneers to design auction sequences that maximize their objectives. Full paper available at https://doi.org/10.2307/41703496.

Multi Unit Auctions With Uncertain Supply And Single Unit Demand

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Author : Edward J. Anderson
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2023

Multi Unit Auctions With Uncertain Supply And Single Unit Demand written by Edward J. Anderson and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2023 with categories.

We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.