Solutions To The Principal Agent Problem In The Firm
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Solutions To The Principal Agent Problem In The Firm
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Author : Catherine V. Brown
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2001
Solutions To The Principal Agent Problem In The Firm written by Catherine V. Brown and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2001 with Compensation management categories.
Does increasing or restructuring executive compensation improve firm performance? Is there an optimal composition for the firm's supervisory board of directors? How effective are management incentives and regulation of management in alleviating firm agency problems? While previous work examines the relationships of executive compensation and board composition to firm performance in isolation, I explore the effects of the agency alleviating mechanisms in a simultaneous equations framework. I find evidence that the variables are jointly determined. If these findings indicate the approximate nature of the system, then results estimating these relationships in isolation are potentially spurious, and corporate governance recommendations based upon them may be ineffectual.
Handbook Of New Institutional Economics
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Author : Claude Ménard
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2008-06-27
Handbook Of New Institutional Economics written by Claude Ménard and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-06-27 with Business & Economics categories.
New Institutional Economics (NIE) has skyrocketed in scope and influence over the last three decades. This first Handbook of NIE provides a unique and timely overview of recent developments and broad orientations. Contributions analyse the domain and perspectives of NIE; sections on legal institutions, political institutions, transaction cost economics, governance, contracting, institutional change, and more capture NIE's interdisciplinary nature. This Handbook will be of interest to economists, political scientists, legal scholars, management specialists, sociologists, and others wishing to learn more about this important subject and gain insight into progress made by institutionalists from other disciplines. This compendium of analyses by some of the foremost NIE specialists, including Ronald Coase, Douglass North, Elinor Ostrom, and Oliver Williamson, gives students and new researchers an introduction to the topic and offers established scholars a reference book for their research.
Managerial Dilemmas
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Author : Gary J. Miller
language : en
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date : 1992
Managerial Dilemmas written by Gary J. Miller and has been published by Cambridge University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Business & Economics categories.
Managerial Dilemmas extends the use of analytical techniques from organisational economics to the spheres of organisational culture and leadership in politics and business.
Agency Theory And Executive Pay
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Author : Alexander Pepper
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2018-11-19
Agency Theory And Executive Pay written by Alexander Pepper and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-11-19 with Business & Economics categories.
This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.
A Complete Solution To A Class Of Principal Agent Problems With An Application To The Control Of A Self Managed Firm
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Author : Roger Guesnerie
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1985
A Complete Solution To A Class Of Principal Agent Problems With An Application To The Control Of A Self Managed Firm written by Roger Guesnerie and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1985 with categories.
Why The Case Of Enron Falls Into The Principal Agent Framework
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Author : Vicki Preibisch
language : en
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Release Date : 2007-02-04
Why The Case Of Enron Falls Into The Principal Agent Framework written by Vicki Preibisch and has been published by GRIN Verlag this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-02-04 with Business & Economics categories.
Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Economics - Job market economics, grade: 2,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: It is claimed that lucrative executive compensation packages have led to irresponsible risk taking and a decline in shareholder value. This research paper is an economic approach to analyse the relationship between principals and agents, whereby the focus lies on executive remuneration incentives. The paper uses the example of Enron’s corporate failure to build a case for the principal-agent framework and analyses executive payment schemes. Aspects on the origins and possible solutions for the principal-agent relationship are looked into. The paper concludes that Enron’s compensation scheme has led to its failure.
The Theory Of Incentives
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Author : Jean-Jacques Laffont
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2009-12-27
The Theory Of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009-12-27 with Business & Economics categories.
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Foundations Of Insurance Economics
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Author : Georges Dionne
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 1992
Foundations Of Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1992 with Business & Economics categories.
Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.
The Economics Of Contracts Second Edition
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Author : Bernard Salanie
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2017-02-17
The Economics Of Contracts Second Edition written by Bernard Salanie and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-02-17 with Business & Economics categories.
A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models; revised and updated throughout for this edition. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries. This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists. The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics. The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics. Two chapters have been completely rewritten: chapter 7, on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter 8, on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Praise for the previous edition: “The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models. Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up-to-date. Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer.”—Jean Tirole, Institut D'Économie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France “Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory. Salanié has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner.”—Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
How To Compete
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Author : Sandra Black
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997
How To Compete written by Sandra Black and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with Industrial efficiency categories.