Stochastic Analysis Of Bidding In Sequential Auctions And Related Problems
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Stochastic Analysis Of Bidding In Sequential Auctions And Related Problems
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Author : Srinivasa Kartikeya Puranam
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Stochastic Analysis Of Bidding In Sequential Auctions And Related Problems written by Srinivasa Kartikeya Puranam and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Markov processes categories.
In this thesis we study bidding in sequential auctions and taboo optimiza- tion criteria for Markov Decision Processes. In the second chapter we study the problem of sequentially bidding in N auctions of identical items. It is assumed that at each auction there is a sufficiently high price that if paid the item is won. The objective is to acquire a fixed number of these items at a minimum expected cost. In the third chapter we consider the problem of a firm ("the bidder") that in each period, of an infinite time horizon, buys items in auctions and sells the acquired items in a secondary market. We investigate optimal bidding strategies for the bidder that take into account the cost of acquiring the items, the random sale price and demand of the sec- ondary market as well as pertinent salvage value or inventory holding costs. In the final chapter we consider Markovian systems where costs or rewards are unknown either in some states or in all states. For such cases we define taboo optimization criteria for a propitiously defined set of taboo states.
Modeling Online Auctions
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Author : Wolfgang Jank
language : en
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date : 2010-12-01
Modeling Online Auctions written by Wolfgang Jank and has been published by John Wiley & Sons this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010-12-01 with Mathematics categories.
Explore cutting-edge statistical methodologies for collecting, analyzing, and modeling online auction data Online auctions are an increasingly important marketplace, as the new mechanisms and formats underlying these auctions have enabled the capturing and recording of large amounts of bidding data that are used to make important business decisions. As a result, new statistical ideas and innovation are needed to understand bidders, sellers, and prices. Combining methodologies from the fields of statistics, data mining, information systems, and economics, Modeling Online Auctions introduces a new approach to identifying obstacles and asking new questions using online auction data. The authors draw upon their extensive experience to introduce the latest methods for extracting new knowledge from online auction data. Rather than approach the topic from the traditional game-theoretic perspective, the book treats the online auction mechanism as a data generator, outlining methods to collect, explore, model, and forecast data. Topics covered include: Data collection methods for online auctions and related issues that arise in drawing data samples from a Web site Models for bidder and bid arrivals, treating the different approaches for exploring bidder-seller networks Data exploration, such as integration of time series and cross-sectional information; curve clustering; semi-continuous data structures; and data hierarchies The use of functional regression as well as functional differential equation models, spatial models, and stochastic models for capturing relationships in auction data Specialized methods and models for forecasting auction prices and their applications in automated bidding decision rule systems Throughout the book, R and MATLAB software are used for illustrating the discussed techniques. In addition, a related Web site features many of the book's datasets and R and MATLAB code that allow readers to replicate the analyses and learn new methods to apply to their own research. Modeling Online Auctions is a valuable book for graduate-level courses on data mining and applied regression analysis. It is also a one-of-a-kind reference for researchers in the fields of statistics, information systems, business, and marketing who work with electronic data and are looking for new approaches for understanding online auctions and processes. Visit this book's companion website by clicking here
Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs
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Author : Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993
Sequential Auctions With Continuation Costs written by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Auctions categories.
Bidding Behavior In Sequential Auctions For Wholesale Electricity
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Author : Kevin Norman Goulding
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
Bidding Behavior In Sequential Auctions For Wholesale Electricity written by Kevin Norman Goulding and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Electric utilities categories.
This paper investigates the process by which bidders in the NYISO (New York Independent System Operator) market update their bids between the Day-ahead and Hour-ahead markets. Observed bids for the ten largest bidders over the years 2002- 2010 are used to investigate the extent to which observed bids into both the Day-ahead (DA) and Hour-ahead (HA) markets are consistent with joint profit maximization in the two markets. Theory about single period bidding behavior developed in the California spot electricity market (Wolak, 2003) and Texas electricity balancing market (Hortacsu and Puller, 2008) is extended to the two-period case specific to the NYISO market. While uncertainty comes from both the behavior of competing firms and additive uncertainty in demand, bidder behavior is broadly consistent with expected profit maximization against a stochastic piece of demand that is additively separable.
Bidding Behavior Evolution In Sequential Auctions
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Author : Paulo Goes
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Bidding Behavior Evolution In Sequential Auctions written by Paulo Goes and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with categories.
Retailers are increasingly exploiting sequential online auctions as an effective and low cost distribution channel for disposing large quantities of inventory. In such auction environments, bidders have the opportunity of participating in many auctions to learn and choose the bidding strategy that best fits their preferences. Previous studies have mostly focused on identifying bidding strategies in single, isolated online auctions. Using a large data set collected from sequential online auctions, we first characterize bidding strategies in this interesting online environment and then develop an empirical model to explain bidders' adoption of different strategies. We also examine how bidders change their strategies over time. Our findings challenge the general belief that bidders employ their strategies regardless of experience or their specific demand. We find that bidders' demand, participation experience, and auction design parameters affect their choice of bidding strategies. Bidders with unit demand are likely to choose early bidding strategies, while those with multiple unit demand adopt late bidding strategies. Auction design parameters that affect bidders' perception of demand and supply trends affect bidders' choice of bidding strategies. As bidders gain experience within a sequence of auctions, they start choosing late bidding strategies. Our findings help auctioneers to design auction sequences that maximize their objectives. Full paper available at https://doi.org/10.2307/41703496.
Auction Theory
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Author : Vijay Krishna
language : en
Publisher: Academic Press
Release Date : 2002-03-13
Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and has been published by Academic Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002-03-13 with Business & Economics categories.
"Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory." --R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas "This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions-including results that are very recent-but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work." --Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey "The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions." --Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland "This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject." --Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization and his clear proofs for each proposition make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multiunit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.
Sequential Bidding In Asymmetric First Price Auctions
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Author : Gal Cohensius
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
Sequential Bidding In Asymmetric First Price Auctions written by Gal Cohensius and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
We study asymmetric first price auctions in which bidders place their bids sequentially, one after the other and only once. We show that with a strong bidder and a weak bidder (in terms of first order stochastic dominance of their valuations distribution function), when the asymmetry between the bidders is large enough the expected revenue in the sequential bidding first price auction (when the strong bidder bids first) is higher than in the simultaneous bidding first price auction as well as in the second price auction. The expected payoff of the weak bidder is also higher in the sequential first price auction. Therefore a seller interested in increasing revenue facing asymmetric bidders may find it beneficial to order them and let them bid sequentially instead of simultaneously. In terms of efficiency, both the simultaneous first price auction and the sequential first price auction cannot guarantee full efficiency (as opposed to a second price auction which guarantees full efficiency). The sequential bidding auction when the stronger bidder bids first achieves lower efficiency than the simultaneous auction. However, when the order is reversed and bidders are asymmetric enough the sequential first price auction achieves higher efficiency than the simultaneous one.
An Experimental Study On Sequential Auctions With Privately Known Capacities
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Author : Luca Corazzini
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017
An Experimental Study On Sequential Auctions With Privately Known Capacities written by Luca Corazzini and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017 with categories.
We experimentally study bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions where bidders' capacity constraints are private information. Treatment differs in the ex-ante probability distribution of sellers' capacities and in the (exogenous) probability that the second auction is actually implemented. Our results show that: (i) bidding behavior in the second auction conforms with sequential rationality; (ii) while first auction's bids negatively depend on capacity, bidders seem unable to recognize this link when, at the end of the first auction, they state their beliefs on the opponent's capacity. To rationalize this inconsistency between bids and beliefs, we conjecture that bidding in the first auction is also affected by a hidden, behavioral type - related to the strategic sophistication of bidders - that obfuscates the link between capacity and bids. Building on this intuition, we show that a simple level-k model may help explain the inconsistency.
Essays In Auctions And Procurement
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Author : George M. Deltas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1996
Essays In Auctions And Procurement written by George M. Deltas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1996 with categories.
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse
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Author : John H. Kagel
language : en
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Release Date : 2021-04-13
Common Value Auctions And The Winner S Curse written by John H. Kagel and has been published by Princeton University Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-04-13 with Business & Economics categories.
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.