Tacit Collusion With Price Matching Punishments
DOWNLOAD
Download Tacit Collusion With Price Matching Punishments PDF/ePub or read online books in Mobi eBooks. Click Download or Read Online button to get Tacit Collusion With Price Matching Punishments book now. This website allows unlimited access to, at the time of writing, more than 1.5 million titles, including hundreds of thousands of titles in various foreign languages. If the content not found or just blank you must refresh this page
Tacit Collusion With Price Matching Punishments
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yuanzhu Lu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Tacit Collusion With Price Matching Punishments written by Yuanzhu Lu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.
We re-examine tacit collusion under a simple punishment rule in which firms match any lower price by their rivals, but otherwise leave their prices unchanged. We provide conditions under which this simple rule sustains collusion and is credible. Provided competition is imperfect, collusion can always be sustained, but never to the point of monopoly. Interestingly, the standard ambiguous relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion is unambiguous under this new setting. The relationship to existing theories of price matching guarantees, kinked demand curves, and continuous reaction-function equilibria are explained.
Tacit Collusion With Quantity Matching Punishments In A Homogeneous Market
DOWNLOAD
Author : Yuanzhu Lu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Tacit Collusion With Quantity Matching Punishments In A Homogeneous Market written by Yuanzhu Lu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Tacit collusion with quantity-matching punishments in a homogeneous market is investigated. The findings are the following: (i) tacit collusion can arise with quantity-matching punishments in a homogeneous market, (ii) the monopoly quantity cannot be supported by quantity-matching punishment strategy, and (iii) compared with Nash-reversion punishments, collusion is no easier to sustain, but not necessarily harder. The results are compared with those in Lu and Wright (International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 28 (2010), pp. 298-306) with price-matching punishments. A linear demand example is provided to illustrate the theory.
Tacit Collusion By Conglomerates Operating Under Imperfect Monitoring
DOWNLOAD
Author : Peter Addison Woodward
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1989
Tacit Collusion By Conglomerates Operating Under Imperfect Monitoring written by Peter Addison Woodward and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1989 with categories.
Handbook Of Game Theory And Industrial Organization Volume Ii
DOWNLOAD
Author : Luis C. Corchón
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2018
Handbook Of Game Theory And Industrial Organization Volume Ii written by Luis C. Corchón and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization and empirical models of R&D.
Channel Strategies And Marketing Mix In A Connected World
DOWNLOAD
Author : Saibal Ray
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2019-12-14
Channel Strategies And Marketing Mix In A Connected World written by Saibal Ray and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-12-14 with Business & Economics categories.
This book aims to revisit the “traditional” interaction between channel strategies and the marketing mix in a connected world. In particular, it focuses on the following four dimensions in this context: Consumers, Products, Value Proposition and Sustainability. Keeping in mind the growing digitalization of business processes in the retail world and the move towards omni-channel retailing, the book introduces the state-of-the-art academic and practitioner studies along these dimensions that could enhance the understanding of the potential impact that new technologies and strategies can have on practice in the near future. When launching a new product/service to market, firms usually consider various components of the marketing mix to influence consumers’ purchase behaviors, such as product design, convenience, value proposition, promotions, sustainability initiatives, etc. This mix varies depending on the specific channel and consumer niche that the firm is targeting. But this book shows how channel strategy also influences the effectiveness in utilizing the marketing mix to attract potential customers.
Global Price Fixing
DOWNLOAD
Author : John M. Connor
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2007-05-24
Global Price Fixing written by John M. Connor and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-05-24 with Business & Economics categories.
This book describes and analyzes the formation, operation, and impacts of modern global cartels. It provides a broad picture of the economics, competition law and history of international price fixing. Intensive case studies of collusion in the markets for lysine, citric acid, and vitamins offer a deep, detailed understanding of the phenomenon. The author assesses whether antitrust enforcement by the European Union, the United States, and other countries can deter cartels.
Algorithmic Pricing Collusion The Limits Of Antitrust Enforcement
DOWNLOAD
Author : Sumit Bhadauria
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Algorithmic Pricing Collusion The Limits Of Antitrust Enforcement written by Sumit Bhadauria and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
The combination of big data, large storage capacity and computational power has strengthened the emergence of algorithms in making myriads of business decision. It allows business to gain a competitive advantage by making automatic and optimize decision making. In particular, the use of pricing algorithms allows business to match the demand and supply equilibrium by monitoring & setting dynamic pricing. It benefits consumer alike to see and act on fast changing prices. However, on the downside, the widespread use of algorithm in an industry has the effect of altering the structural characteristic of market such as price transparency, high speed trading which increases the likelihood of collusion. The ability of pricing algorithm to solve the cartel incentive problem by quickly detecting and punishing the deviant further strengthen the enforcement of price fixing agreement. In addition, the use of more advance forms of algorithm such as self-learning algorithm allows business to achieve a tacitly collusive outcome in limited market characteristic even without communication between humans. This raises the fundamental challenge for anti-cartel enforcement as the current law in most jurisdictions is ill-equipped to deal with algorithmic facilitated tacit collusion. The legality of tacit collusion is questionable primarily because the pricing algorithm has the ability to alter the market characteristics where the tacitly collusive outcome is difficult to achieve; thus widening the scope of the so-called 'oligopoly problem'. This paper studies the usages of pricing algorithms by business in online markets. In particular, the paper identify the conditions under which the algorithm prices causes the harm to consumers. It seeks to analyze how algorithms might facilitate or even causes the collusive outcome without human interventions. Further, it looks at the legal challenges faced by the competition authorities around the globe to deal with the algorithmic let collusion and examine the various approaches suggested to counter act it.
The Economics Of Collusion
DOWNLOAD
Author : Robert C. Marshall
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 2014-01-10
The Economics Of Collusion written by Robert C. Marshall and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-01-10 with Business & Economics categories.
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts—fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases—offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entrée to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.
The Theory Of Industrial Organization
DOWNLOAD
Author : Jean Tirole
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date : 1988-08-26
The Theory Of Industrial Organization written by Jean Tirole and has been published by MIT Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1988-08-26 with Business & Economics categories.
The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition.
Market Power In Eu Antitrust Law
DOWNLOAD
Author : Luis Ortiz Blanco
language : en
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
Release Date : 2011-12-02
Market Power In Eu Antitrust Law written by Luis Ortiz Blanco and has been published by Bloomsbury Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011-12-02 with Law categories.
The notion of market power is central to antitrust law. Under EU law, antitrust rules refer to appreciable restrictions of competition (Article 101(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ex Article 81(1) EC Treaty), the elimination of competition for a substantial part of the market (Article 101 (3) TFEU, ex Article (81(3) EC), dominant positions (Article 10 (2) TFEU, ex Article 82 EC), and substantial impediment to effective competition, in particular by creating or reinforcing a dominant position (Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation). At first sight, only the concept of dominant position relates to market power, but it is the aim of this book to demonstrate that the other concepts are directly linked to the notion of market power. This is done by reference to the case law of the EU Courts and the precedents of the European Commission. The author goes on to argue that for very good reasons (clarity and enforceability, among others) the rules should be interpreted in this way. Beginning with market definition, the book reviews the different rules and the different degrees of market power they incorporate. Thus it analyses the notion of 'appreciable restriction of competition' to find a moderate market power obtained by agreement among competitors to be the benchmark for the application of Article 101 TFEU, ex Article 81 EC. It moves on to the concept of dominance under Article 102 TFEU (ex Article 82 EC), which is equivalent to substantial (or sgnificant) market power, and then focuses on the old and new tests for EU merger control. Finally, it addresses the idea of elimination of competition in respect of a substantial part of the market (Article 101 (3) TFEU, ex Article 81 (3) (b) EC), in which the last two types of market power (Article 102 TFEU, ex Article 82 EC and EU Merger Regulation) converge. To exemplify this, an in-depth study of the notion of collective dominance is conducted. The book concludes that a paradigm of market power exists under the EU antitrust rules that both fits with past practice and provides for a useful framework of analysis for the general application of the rules by administrative and even more importantly judicial authorities in the Member States, under conditions of legal certainty.