The Corporate Governance Effects Of Audit Committees
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The Corporate Governance Effects Of Audit Committees
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Author : Mahbub Zaman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
The Corporate Governance Effects Of Audit Committees written by Mahbub Zaman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with categories.
Arguments associated with the promotion of audit committees in many countries are premised on their potential for alleviating weaknesses in corporate governance. This paper provides a synthesis and evaluation of empirical research on the governance effects associated with audit committees. Given recent policy recommendations in several countries aimed at strengthening these committees, it is important to establish what research evidence demonstrates about their existing governance contribution. A framework for analyzing the impact of audit committees is described, identifying potential perceived effects which may have led to their adoption and documented effects on aspects of the audit function, on financial reporting quality and on corporate performance. It is argued that there is only limited and mixed evidence of effects to support claims and perceptions about the value of audit committees for these elements of governance. It is also shown that most of the existing research has focused on factors associated with audit committee existence, characteristics and measures of activity and there is very little evidence on the processes associated with the operation of audit committees and the manner in which they influence organizational behaviour. It is clear that there is no automatic relationship between the adoption of audit committee structures or characteristics and the achievement of particular governance effects, and caution may be needed over expectations that greater codification around factors such as audit committee members' independence and expertise as the means of quot;correctingquot; past weaknesses in the arrangements for audit committees. The most fundamental question concerning what difference audit committees make in practice continues to be an important area for research development. For future research we suggest (i) greater consideration of the organizational and institutional contexts in which audit committees operate; (ii) explicit theorization of the processes associated with audit committee operation; (iii) complementing extant research methods with field studies; and (iv) investigation of unintended (behavioural) as well as expected consequences of audit committees.
The Effects Of Corporate Governance Experience And Financial Reporting And Audit Knowledge On Audit Committee Members Judgments
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Author : Todd DeZoort
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
The Effects Of Corporate Governance Experience And Financial Reporting And Audit Knowledge On Audit Committee Members Judgments written by Todd DeZoort and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
Interest in audit committees as part of overall corporate governance has increased dramatically in recent years, with a specific emphasis on member independence, experience, and knowledge. This paper reports the results of a study investigating whether audit committee members' corporate governance experience and financial reporting and audit knowledge affect their judgments in auditor-corporate management conflict situations. A sample of 68 audit committee members completed an accounting policy dispute case and several knowledge and ability tests. The results indicate that, as expected, greater independent director experience and greater audit knowledge was associated with higher audit committee member support for an auditor who advocated a "substance over form" approach in the dispute with client management. Conversely, concurrent experience as a board director and a senior member of management was associated with increased support for management. Collectively, these findings have a number of implications for practice and research. The results provide justification for calls that audit committees be composed completely of independent directors. The results also support auditor concerns that varying knowledge levels lead to systematic differences in audit committee member judgments in disputes between auditors and management.
The Audit Committee Performing Corporate Governance
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Author : Laura F. Spira
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2007-05-08
The Audit Committee Performing Corporate Governance written by Laura F. Spira and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-05-08 with Business & Economics categories.
Why do we need to understand audit committees? The Cadbury Committee recommended that UK companies should adopt them in response to financial scandals that have stemmed from dubious financial reporting practices. In other countries, similar commissions have made similar recommendations and audit committees are now a common institution. However, many practitioners doubt whether an audit committee really does much to ensure the integrity of a firm's financial statements because, as outsiders, members don't know enough to dig deeply beneath the numbers. The Audit Committee: Performing Corporate Governance argues that such criticism overlooks the ceremonial function of these committees. The audit committee is an arena where members can form and strengthen shifting and fragmentary networks with each other and with the external auditors. Within these networks, both consensus and independence are demonstrated, generating comfort, which legitimises the company and maintains its access to external sources of capital. The audit committee is a key part of the corporate governance structure within an organisation. Many in the UK have been patched together to meet regulatory requirements and their operation is poorly understood because few people other than their members have access to their deliberations. In this account of the world of audit committees the practitioner will find the ethnographical perspectives on ceremonial performance, consensus, independence, and comfort both familiar and different. It's like looking at a photograph of something commonplace from an unusual angle or through a strange-shaped lens.
Audit Committees
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Author : Australian Institute of Company Directors
language : en
Publisher: AICD
Release Date : 2008
Audit Committees written by Australian Institute of Company Directors and has been published by AICD this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Business & Economics categories.
"Role and responsibilities of Audit Subcommittees of Boards. Provides a practical introduction to the role of and responsibilities of the audit committee. Explains the context in which an audit committee typically operates and outlines good practice. Reflects developments in audit committee practice, legislation and gudance from regulatory bodiesand leading global board practices since 2001."--Provided by publisher.
The Effects Of Independent Audit Committee Member Characteristics And Auditor Independence On Financial Restatements
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Author : Vineeta Divesh Sharma
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2006
The Effects Of Independent Audit Committee Member Characteristics And Auditor Independence On Financial Restatements written by Vineeta Divesh Sharma and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Corporations categories.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) continues to reform the corporate governance mechanisms in order to improve the quality of financial reporting and thus, enhance the confidence of investors in the stock market and in the accounting profession. Despite the efforts of the SEC, financial reporting scandals continue with record numbers of financial restatements documented by the General Accounting Office. A financial restatement is a correction of a previously misstated financial statement. There is a small volume of literature examining the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on financial restatements. The results of these studies however, are mixed and possibly explained by their narrow focus and omitted variables that could influence the effectiveness of audit committees. Consequently, this study examines the effects of independent audit committee member characteristics and auditor independence on financial restatements. Specifically, this study investigates the relationship between the likelihood of financial restatements and: (1) the expertise of the independent audit committee members, (2) the expertise and diligence of the independent audit committee members, (3) the reputation of the independent audit committee members, (4) the interaction effect of expertise, diligence and reputation, (5) the tenure of the independent audit committee members, and (6) the cash compensation paid to independent audit committee members. Prior studies have not investigated some of these variables or the interaction effects of independent audit committee member characteristics on financial restatements. This study also investigates the association between auditor independence and financial restatements. The SEC alleges that an increasing number of audit failures are due to the lack of auditor independence. One of the major sources of the lack of auditor independence is the auditor's economic dependency on the client. The provision of non-audit services increases the financial reliance of the auditor on the client. As a result, the auditor may become reluctant to raise issues with the preparation of the financial statements at the risk of foregoing the lucrative non-audit services fees. The SEC believes that longer audit firm tenure can also impair auditor independence and Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests periodic audit firm rotation. Therefore, auditor independence was measured as: (1) fees paid to the auditor, and (2) audit firm tenure. Finally, this study extends the prior literature by studying the interaction effects of independent audit committee member characteristics and auditor independence on financial restatements. This interaction effect is important because the external auditor and the audit committee are regarded vital governance mechanisms that interact and exchange dialogue in the performance of their respective oversight of the financial reporting process. Prior research has not investigated this important interaction effect. The sample of the study comprises 69 U.S. publicly listed companies that announced their restatement from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2002. These companies were matched with 69 non-restatement companies based on industry and size. The data for the study is derived from SEC filings such as Form 10-K and DEF 14A, and Compustat. The univariate results show that compared to restatement firms, non-restatement firms generally have effective audit committee characteristics. The audit committees of non-restatement firms have members who are experts, diligent, reputable and appropriately compensated. They also pay lower non-audit services and total fees, and have audit firms with longer tenure. The multivariate results show that after controlling for other governance structures and firm specific non-governance variables, the likelihood of financial restatements is related to independent audit committee member characteristics and auditor independence. Specifically, the likelihood of financial restatements decreases when independent audit committee members are: (1) experts, (2) experts and diligent, (3) reputable, (4) experts, diligent and reputable, and (5) appropriately compensated. The audit committee member tenure variable is insignificant. In relation to the auditor independence variables, the multivariate results show that the likelihood of financial restatements increases when the non-audit services and total fees generated by the client are higher. On the other hand, the likelihood of financial restatements decreases when audit firm tenure is longer. The empirical results of this study suggest that independent audit committees are more effective overseers of the corporate financial reporting and auditing processes when: they comprise majority experts, they meet regularly, their members are reputable, and audit committee members are appropriately compensated. On the other hand, external auditors are not deemed to be effective overseers of the corporate financial reporting process when the non-audit services and total fees generated by the client are higher but are effective when audit firm tenure is long. The results support the SEC's concerns regarding the provision of non-audit services impairing auditor independence. The results also support the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which under Section 201 prohibits external auditors from providing certain non-audit services to its audit client. Overall, these results support the regulatory efforts to increase the quality of financial reporting by enhancing the corporate governance process related to audit committees and auditor independence. However, the results do not support calls to limit the tenure of the auditor. The results of the multivariate interaction effects suggest that, after controlling for other governance structures and firm specific non-governance variables, when the non-audit services and total fees generated by the client are higher, the likelihood of financial restatements increases under conditions when the audit committee is not effective (a non expert audit committee, an audit committee that does not meet regularly, an audit committee whose members are not reputable or an audit committee that is not appropriately compensated). The implication of this result is that it provides evidence of conditions under which restatements take place. Knowledge of such conditions could aid regulators further improve the financial reporting process and corporate governance. This knowledge will support regulators in revising policies that ensure audit committee members are not only independent but also comprise other critical qualities. These improvements to the audit committee coupled with the existing regulations on the provision of non-audit services suggest a company's governance will be more effective. Overall, the results extend current knowledge in the sparse but growing literature related to financial restatements and corporate governance, and extend our understanding of the effectiveness and interaction of governance mechanisms in reducing financial restatements.
Audit Committees
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Author : Gerald S. Backman
language : en
Publisher: Aspen Publishers
Release Date : 2000
Audit Committees written by Gerald S. Backman and has been published by Aspen Publishers this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Audit comittees categories.
Audit Committees: Regulation and Practice is the only complete, one-volume guide to complying with every aspect of the new SEC regulations and stock exchange listing requirements. You'll find comprehensive analysis of the new rules from a corporate perspective...insightful guidance on bringing your audit committee and its oversight procedures into compliance...extensive discussions on best practices and effective committee strategies and structures...detailed sample charters, calendars and other time-saving tools...and insightful articles about the potential future impact of the rules.
Audit Committee Effectiveness
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Author : Catherine L. Bromilow
language : en
Publisher: Iia Research Foundation
Release Date : 2005
Audit Committee Effectiveness written by Catherine L. Bromilow and has been published by Iia Research Foundation this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Business & Economics categories.
Audit Committees
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Author : Frank M. Burke
language : en
Publisher: CCH
Release Date : 2008-08
Audit Committees written by Frank M. Burke and has been published by CCH this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008-08 with Business & Economics categories.
Audit Committee Briefing
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Author : Curtis C. Verschoor
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2000
Audit Committee Briefing written by Curtis C. Verschoor and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2000 with Audit committees categories.
The Effect Of Corporate Governance On Auditor Client Realignments
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Author : Cory A. Cassell
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
The Effect Of Corporate Governance On Auditor Client Realignments written by Cory A. Cassell and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market which resulted in the transfer of a large number of clients from Big N to non-Big N audit firms. We extend prior research examining the determinants of auditor-client realignments by investigating the effect of corporate governance on downward (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N auditors) switching activity. We develop a corporate governance index comprised of governance characteristics that we expect auditors to find more desirable in their clients (specifically, board and audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise). The results suggest that Big N auditors consider client corporate governance mechanisms when making client portfolio decisions. Specifically, downward auditor-client realignments are more likely for clients that score lower on our corporate governance index. However, the influence of audit committee-related corporate governance components on downward auditor-client realignments decreased post-SOX. The reduced effect of audit committee-related corporate governance components is consistent with what would be expected if the audit committee-related rules imposed by SOX reduced the variation in audit committee quality across clients.