The Effects Of Minimum Quality Standards On Product Quality
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The Effects Of Minimum Quality Standards On Product Quality
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
The Effects Of Minimum Quality Standards On Product Quality written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
In a model where two firms products are diÞerentiated both, horizontally and vertically, introduction of a quality standard affects equilibrium quality levels of both firms. The effects, furthermore, depend upon consumers being or not perfectly informed about qualities. Qualities are strategic substitutes and under perfect information only non-innocuous standards, i.e. above the lowest quality in an unregulated equilibrium, change the equilibrium. However, the average quality in the market may go down due to the standard, and total consumers welfare decrease. Under uncertainty, even apparently innocuous standards, below the lowest unregulated equilibrium quality, may alter the equilibrium quality choices.
The Impact Of Minimum Quality Standards On Firm Entry Exit And Product Quality
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Author : V. Joseph Hotz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
The Impact Of Minimum Quality Standards On Firm Entry Exit And Product Quality written by V. Joseph Hotz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Barriers to entry (Industrial organization) categories.
We examine the impact of minimum quality standards on the supply side of the child care market, using a unique panel data set merged from the Census of Services Industries, state regulation data, and administrative accreditation records from the National Association of Education for Young Children. We control for state-specific and time-specific fixed effects in order to mitigate the biases associated with policy endogeneity. We find that the effects of quality standards specifying the labor intensiveness of child care services are strikingly different from those specifying staff qualifications. Higher staff-child ratio requirements deter entry and reduce the number of operating child care establishments. This entry barrier appears to select establishments with better quality into the market and alleviates competition among existing establishments: existing establishments are more likely to receive accreditation and higher profits, and are less likely to exit. By contrast, higher staff-education requirements do not have entry-deterrence effects. They do have the unintended effects of discouraging accreditation, reducing owners' profits, and driving firms out of businesses.
The Effects Of Minimum Quality Standards
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Author : Paolo G. Garella
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
The Effects Of Minimum Quality Standards written by Paolo G. Garella and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Minimum Quality Standards In Global Health Impact And Incentives
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Author : Felix Lerch
language : en
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Release Date : 2019-06-19
Minimum Quality Standards In Global Health Impact And Incentives written by Felix Lerch and has been published by GRIN Verlag this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-06-19 with Business & Economics categories.
Bachelor Thesis from the year 2016 in the subject Business economics - General, grade: 1,0, University of Würzburg (Lehrstuhl für Logistik und Quantitative Methoden), language: English, abstract: In developing countries people do not have adequate access to essential medicines. These countries’ health care systems lack the financial resources for providing appropriate and comprehensive medical support. Moreover, there is a demand for medical innovations which allow fighting neglected diseases. Global health organizations provide assistance during the procurement process of medicines for countries which are subjected to these challenges. In order to ensure that only the right products for the intended purpose at appropriate quality levels reach those in need, these organizations require specific quality standards from their suppliers. With the demand for the implementation of quality assurance measures for pharmaceutical manufactures, the question about the impact of quality standards arises. This thesis provides answers to the question whether and how market participants are affected by these factors. For this purpose, this work makes use of several papers dealing with the effects of introducing a minimum quality standard (MQS). Since organizations aim at ensuring security of supply at affordable prices, further questions evolve regarding new product development and competition between firms: How can organizations incentivize innovation and market entry of pharmaceutical manufacturers? Which tools do they use and can these tools address possible drawbacks of the introduction of a MQS? An answer to the latter question is given by connecting the results of game-theoretical models with the approaches of existing incentive mechanisms in global health. The remaining part of this thesis is structured in the following way: Section 2 presents three organizations and their approaches to ensure the product’s compliance with quality standards. In section 3, several game-theoretical models on MQS are analyzed and compared. The analysis highlights the models’ findings, as well as differences between them and the models’ construction. Section 4 considers several incentive mechanisms for suppliers.
The Economics Of Minimum Quality Standards Imposed By Agricultural Producer Organizations
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Author : Tina Lynn Saitone
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
The Economics Of Minimum Quality Standards Imposed By Agricultural Producer Organizations written by Tina Lynn Saitone and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
Trade Effects Of Minimum Quality Standards With Or Without Deterred Entry
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Author : Stefan Lutz
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2002
Trade Effects Of Minimum Quality Standards With Or Without Deterred Entry written by Stefan Lutz and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.
In a model of vertical product differentiation, duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and compete in quality and price in two segmented markets. Minimum quality standards, set uniformly or according to the principle of Mutual Recognition, can be used to increase welfare. The analysis includes entry deterrence by the choice of a particular standard. With identical costs, both industries remain in the market under either regulatory alternative. Mutual Recognition is the optimal policy choice for either region. With significantly different costs, the Full-Harmonization outcome includes only one firm and leads to a maximal sum of regional welfares.
Minimum Quality Standards And Compulsory Labeling
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Author : Laura Birg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Minimum Quality Standards And Compulsory Labeling written by Laura Birg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This paper studies the effect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical differentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products can be observed by consumers. Both a minimum quality standard on the non-observable quality dimension and a labeling scheme that informs consumers about the non-observable quality dimension have no impact on the observable quality dimension, increase prices, and have no impact on demand. The combination of a minimum standard and a labeling scheme increases prices, reduces or enhances investment in the observable quality dimension, and alters market shares depending on the minimum quality level. Compared to the case of no regulation, social welfare may decrease or increase under the minimum quality standard, the compulsory labeling scheme or the combined scheme, depending on the level of the minimum quality standard and the market size.
Minimum Quality Standards And Non Compliance
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Author : Laura Birg
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Minimum Quality Standards And Non Compliance written by Laura Birg and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This paper studies the effect of non-compliance with a minimum quality standard on prices, quality, and welfare in a vertical differentiation model. Non-compliance with a minimum quality standard by a low-quality firm reduces quality levels of both firms and shifts demand from the low-quality to the high-quality firm. Under non-compliance, an increase in the standard increases the quality of both products and shifts demand from the high-quality product to the low-quality product. Stricter government enforcement decreases the quality level of the low-quality firm and shifts demand from the low-quality firm to the high-quality firm. Non-compliance of the low-quality firm increases profits for both firms, reduces consumer surplus, and increases or decreases welfare depending on the market size, the detection probability, surveillance cost, and the minimum quality level.
Minimum Quality Standards And Consumers Information
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004
Minimum Quality Standards And Consumers Information written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.
The literature so far has analyzed the effects of Minimum Quality Standards in oligopoly, using models of pure vertical differentiation, with only two firms, and perfect information. We analyze products that are differentiated horizontally and vertically, with imperfect consumers information, and more than two firms. We show that a MQS changes the consumers perception of produced qualities. This increases the firms returns from quality enhancing investments, notwithstanding contrary strategic effects. As a consequence, MQS policies may be desirable as both, firms and consumers, can gain. This contrasts with previous results in the literature and provides a justification for the use of MQS to improve social welfare.
Minimum Quality Standards And Novelty Requirements In A One Short Development Race
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Author : Jacek Prokop
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Minimum Quality Standards And Novelty Requirements In A One Short Development Race written by Jacek Prokop and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
We examine the timing and quality of product introduction in an R & D stopping game, where we allow for horizontal and vertical differentiation in the product market. We observe that discontinuous changes in introduction dates can occur as firms' abilities as researchers change. Further, when the research abilities of the firms differ, either the high ability firm or the low ability firm may be the first mover. The underlying research abilities of the firms determine the social optimality of the entry patterns we observe. Minimum quality standards and novelty requirements can play a role in correcting these suboptimal patterns of entry. While minimum quality standards increase welfare for a large range of research abilities, we find that increasing the novelty requirement does not necessarily increase either the profits or, consequently, the research investment incentives of the initial innovator, contrary to much of the cumulative innovation literature. Indeed, as the effect of policy interventions differs significantly across industries where quality improvement is steep and those where it is flat, targeted policies towards specific industries as are often observed in minimum quality standards are generally preferable to more broad-based policies. -- Innovation ; minimum quality standards ; novelty requirements ; stopping game