The Impact Of Public Information On Bidding In Highway Procurement Auctions
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The Impact Of Public Information On Bidding In Highway Procurement Auctions
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Author : Dakshina G. De Silva
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
The Impact Of Public Information On Bidding In Highway Procurement Auctions written by Dakshina G. De Silva and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers' cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.
Firm Bidding Behavior In Highway Procurement Auctions
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Author : David R. Barrus
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Firm Bidding Behavior In Highway Procurement Auctions written by David R. Barrus and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
The Effect Of Information On The Bidding And Survival Of Entrants In Procurement Auctions
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Author : Dakshina G. De Silva
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2008
The Effect Of Information On The Bidding And Survival Of Entrants In Procurement Auctions written by Dakshina G. De Silva and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with categories.
In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses affecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction projects. Using newly developed quantile regression approaches, this paper examines the impact of the policy change on aggressive entrants. First, we find that the information release eliminates the bidding differential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries. Second, we argue that the policy change affects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market. We find that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37 percent longer, while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68 percent. The policy has the potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition.
The Impact Of Timing On Bidding Behavior In Procurement Auctions Of Contracts With Private Costs
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Author : Dakshina G. De Silva
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
The Impact Of Timing On Bidding Behavior In Procurement Auctions Of Contracts With Private Costs written by Dakshina G. De Silva and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that, bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats related to synergies and level of bidder participation.
The Economics Of Public Private Partnerships
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Author : Stéphane Saussier
language : en
Publisher: Springer
Release Date : 2018-01-03
The Economics Of Public Private Partnerships written by Stéphane Saussier and has been published by Springer this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018-01-03 with Business & Economics categories.
This book investigates the economic decisions behind the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The first part of the book discusses different forms of public procurement contracts, in particular in France and the UK, and provides an economic analysis of the potential advantages and pitfalls of public-private partnerships. This exploration of PPPs’ efficiency also includes an examination of the financing conditions of public procurements, as well as regulatory requirements. By reviewing empirical studies on PPPs, the second part of the book compares their advantages over purely public solutions and offers practical guidance on their implementation. Practitioners will also learn best practices on how to involve stakeholders in calls for bids.
The Impact Of Timing On Bidding Behavior In Procurement Auctions Of Contracts With Private Costs
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012
The Impact Of Timing On Bidding Behavior In Procurement Auctions Of Contracts With Private Costs written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with categories.
Emerging Issues In Competition Collusion And Regulation Of Network Industries
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Author : Antonio Estache
language : en
Publisher: CEPR
Release Date : 2011
Emerging Issues In Competition Collusion And Regulation Of Network Industries written by Antonio Estache and has been published by CEPR this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with Business & Economics categories.
This book presents a comprehensive review of the vast economic literature covering the governance issues of network industries and suggests paths to improve their efficiences.
Economic Analysis And Infrastructure Investment
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Author : Edward L. Glaeser
language : en
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Release Date : 2021-11-11
Economic Analysis And Infrastructure Investment written by Edward L. Glaeser and has been published by University of Chicago Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021-11-11 with Business & Economics categories.
Policy makers often call for increased spending on infrastructure, which can encompass a broad range of investments, from roads and bridges to digital networks that will expand access to high-speed broadband. Some point to the near-term macroeconomic benefits, such as job creation, associated with infrastructure spending; others point to the long-term effects of such spending on productivity and economic growth. Economic Analysis and Infrastructure Investment explores the links between infrastructure investment and economic outcomes, analyzing key economic issues in the funding and management of infrastructure projects. It includes new research on the short-run stimulus effects of infrastructure spending, develops new estimates of the stock of US infrastructure capital, and explores incentive aspects of public-private partnerships with particular attention to their allocation of risk. The volume provides a reference for researchers seeking to study infrastructure issues and for policymakers tasked with determining the appropriate level and allocation of infrastructure spending.
The Effect Of Lump Sum Contracts On Bidding Behavior And Procurement Costs In Public Highway Construction
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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014
The Effect Of Lump Sum Contracts On Bidding Behavior And Procurement Costs In Public Highway Construction written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.
I study the effect of lump sum contracts on bidding behavior and procurement costs in highway construction. For highway construction projects we usually observe ex-post changes in design due to unforeseen site condition. The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) offers two different contract types regarding compensations for ex-post quantity changes of work item. Under the standard contract, the department provides a list of work items and their quantities. If there is a quantity change, the contractor's unit price bid on that work item is used to make pay adjustment. On the other hand, under the lump sum contract, bidders are allowed to design the project themselves and no pay adjustments are made for ex-post quantity changes. In Chapter 1, I propose a theoretical model to describe bidding behavior under the lump sum. They are willing to inflate bids to self-insure against ex-post changes, while they should make a cost-efficient design to win the contract. Compared to the standard, lump sum contracts may increase or decrease bids, but they reduce the expected payments in many cases. In Chapter 2, I estimate the effect of lump sum contracts on (winning) bids and procurement costs. I assume that the outcome variables are independent of the assignment conditional on observables. And I use regressions and propensity score methods to estimate the effects. Specifically, I use a trimmed sample for regressions in which some seemingly extreme observations are dropped based on the propensity scores. With miscellaneous projects, lump sum does not increase the outcome variables. And I allow the assignment decision to be endogenous and use the treatment effect model to quantify the impact. In particular, I use district and task dummies as instrumental variables. It turns out that the outcome variables do not increase under the lump sum. And I test for unobserved project heterogeneity conditional on all the covariates by exploiting multiple bids within an auction. Using the FDOT data, the correlation coefficient for the trimmed sample is close to zero, which implies no serious unobserved project heterogeneity. Thus, the regression results with the trimmed sample are supported.
Public Procurement In The European Union
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Author : Alexander Rhode
language : en
Publisher: Springer Nature
Release Date : 2019-10-19
Public Procurement In The European Union written by Alexander Rhode and has been published by Springer Nature this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2019-10-19 with Business & Economics categories.
Alexander Rhode investigates performance-oriented measures of Contracting Authorities in public tenders conducted within the EU. He finds that Contracting Authorities can improve their performance and attract more suppliers by publishing (as precise as possible) starting prices in the beginning of a tender. First, he reports that compared with private-sector negotiations, starting prices do not create entry barriers in public procurement. Second, he finds that increased numerical precision of starting prices is linearly correlated with better performance and a higher number of bids. In public procurement, suppliers tend to attribute increased credibility to precise starting prices which reduces their (perceived) entry risks.