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Three Essays On Auctions And Bargaining

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Three Essays On Auctions And Bargaining

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Author : Yumiko Baba
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1997

Three Essays On Auctions And Bargaining written by Yumiko Baba and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1997 with categories.

Case Concerning The Delimitation Of The Maritime Boundary In The Gulf Of Maine Area

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Author :
language : en
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Case Concerning The Delimitation Of The Maritime Boundary In The Gulf Of Maine Area written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on with categories.

Three Essays On Auction Theory

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Author : Xiaoshu Xu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011

Three Essays On Auction Theory written by Xiaoshu Xu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.

Abstract: My dissertation consists of three chapters in theoretical auction analysis. The first chapter considers optimal sequential auctions with new bidders arriving in each period. The second chapter examines how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in an auction environment with costly entry. The third chapter investigates how resale affects bidding strategies and auction outcomes in a sequential auction setting where the values of items auctioned in different periods exhibit synergies. The first chapter gives a full characterization of the optimal sequential second-price (or ascending English) auctions with sequentially arriving bidders. There are n bidders in the first period and m new bidders arrive in the second period. Based on the auctioneer's commitment power, we study two cases: full commitment and noncommitment. In both cases, we establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium characterized by a threshold strategy - -a bidder does not bid in the first auction when her valuation is below this threshold and bids according to an increasing function otherwise. In the noncommitment case, the auctioneer chooses an optimal reserve price to maximize the expected revenue from the second period; thus her decision of whether to include previous bidders as potential buyers is endogenously determined by the reserve price in the first auction. This might create multiple equilibria depending on the beliefs of the auctioneer and the bidders. We apply a fairly intuitive rule to establish the uniqueness. We also extend our analysis to allow for opportunities for resale, where the winner in the first auction can opt to resell the item to new bidders. The second chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where an arbitrary number of bidders possess two-dimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale induces motivation for both speculative entry and bargain hunting abstentions. By following the uniform distribution for numerical analysis, our results suggest that while the entry probability and efficiency are always higher when resale is allowed, the auctioneer's expected revenue is lower when resale is allowed for almost all parameter values. We also compare this model to one where bidders may follow "strong" or "weak" distributions in terms of valuations. The third chapter, joint with Dan Levin and Lixin Ye, studies a sequential second-price auction of two objects with two bidders, where the winner of the package obtains a synergy from the second object. If reselling after the two auctions occurs, it proceeds as either monopoly or monopsony take-it-or-leave-it offer. I find that a post-auction resale has a significant impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in resale, there is no equilibrium where at least one bidder reveals her type with positive probability. When buyer makes the offer instead, there exist symmetric increasing equilibrium strategies for both items. While allowing resale always improves efficiency, I demonstrate that the effect of resale is ambiguous on expected revenue as Ill as the probability of exposure. I also extend this model to allow for three bidders and provide the equilibrium analysis.

Three Essays On Procurement Under Bargaining And Asymmetric Information

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Author : Dimitrios Kostamis
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007

Three Essays On Procurement Under Bargaining And Asymmetric Information written by Dimitrios Kostamis and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with categories.

Essays On Auction Bargaining And Contract Theory

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Author : Zhiyong Yao
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007

Essays On Auction Bargaining And Contract Theory written by Zhiyong Yao and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Negotiation in business categories.

Three Essays In Auctions And Contests

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Author : Jun Zhang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

Three Essays In Auctions And Contests written by Jun Zhang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.

This thesis studies issues in auctions and contests. The seller of an object and the organizer of a contest have many instruments to improve the revenue of the auction or the efficiency of the contest. The three essays in this dissertation shed light on these issues. Chapter 2 investigates how a refund policy affects a buyer's strategic behavior by characterizing the equilibria of a second-price auction with a linear refund policy. I find that a generous refund policy induces buyers to bid aggressively. I also examine the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers only have private initial estimates of their valuations and may privately learn of shocks that affect their valuations later. When all buyers are \emph{ex-ante} symmetric, this optimal selling mechanism can be implemented by a first-price or second-price auction with a refund policy. Chapter 3 investigates how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. I establish that there exists no symmetric separating equilibrium under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. I then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. I finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within my framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes. Chapter 4 analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Compared to the benchmark model, in which private valuations are revealed automatically before the final round and thus no signaling of bids takes place, I find that strong contestants bluff and weak contestants sandbag. In a separating equilibrium, bids in the preliminary round fully reveal the contestants' private valuations. However, this signaling effect makes the equilibrium bidding strategy in the preliminary round steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations compared to the benchmark model.