Three Essays On Dynamic Games In Industrial Organization
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Three Essays On Dynamic Games In Industrial Organization
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Author : Jin-Soo Yoo
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1990
Three Essays On Dynamic Games In Industrial Organization written by Jin-Soo Yoo and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1990 with categories.
Essays On Industrial Organization
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Author : Thomas G. Wollmann
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays On Industrial Organization written by Thomas G. Wollmann and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation comprises three essays on industrial organization. The first essay studies how product-level entry and exit decisions impact business and public policy analysis. It provides an empirical model that incorporates these decisions and then estimates it in the context of the commercial vehicle segment of the US automotive industry. Finally, it demonstrates the importance of accounting for product-level changes using the $85 billion decision to rescue two US automakers in 2009. The second essay studies how two period strategies perform relative to Markov perfect strategies in discrete dynamic games. In particular, it considers a simple entry/exit game and shows that agents sacrifice very little in terms of expected discounted payoffs when they employ these simpler strategies. It also shows this result is robust to varying the underlying market characteristics. The third essay estimates the causal impact of research expenditures on scientific output. Unexpected college football outcomes provide exogenous variation to university funds, and in turn, research expenditures in the subsequent year. Using this variation, it estimates the dollar elasticity of scholarly articles, new patent applications, and the citations that accrue to each.
Three Essays In Industrial Organization Theory
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Author : Hyung Bae
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1985
Three Essays In Industrial Organization Theory written by Hyung Bae and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1985 with categories.
Three Essays In Industrial Organization
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Author : Limin Fang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018
Three Essays In Industrial Organization written by Limin Fang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
My thesis includes three chapters that examine the dynamics of competition in the retail industry. Chapter One of the thesis demonstrates that online review platforms help consumers learn faster about product quality and improve consumer welfare as a result. To examine this, I use a novel dataset containing the universe of full-service restaurants in Texas, consumer search interest on major online review platforms and their online review information. I illustrate that online review platforms' effects on learning show up in restaurant revenues and survival probabilities. Specifically, doubling consumers' exposure to Yelp, the dominant platform, increases the revenue of a high-quality new independent restaurant by 8-20% and decreases that of a low-quality restaurant by about the same amount. Doubling Yelp exposure also raises the survival rate of a new high-quality independent restaurant by 7-19 basis points and reduces that of a low-quality restaurant by a similar level. Other platforms, especially Google, have similar effects but in smaller magnitude. In contrast, online platforms do not affect the revenues or survival rates of chains and old independent restaurants. Counterfactual analysis based on a structural demand model with consumer learning shows that online review platforms speed up the learning process by 0.5 to 2.5 years, increase consumer welfare by 5.4% and the total industry revenue by 5.9% during the period of 2005-2015. Chapters Two and Three deal with the entry and exit dynamics of the retail industry, in particular, how chain retailers can pre-empt the entry of competitors by densely packing a geographic area with their outlets. Chapter Two develops a measure for preemptive motives in dynamic oligopoly games with entry and exit, and applies the measure in both theoretical and empirical studies. Chapter Three uses this measure in the fast casual dining industry in Texas to investigate if there is a trade-off between preemptive entry and survival of firms. The results show that under some conditions, preemption in fact helps the incumbent firm survive, while in other cases, preemption harms survival.
Essays In Industrial Organization And Econometrics
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Author : Fanyin Zheng
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015
Essays In Industrial Organization And Econometrics written by Fanyin Zheng and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.
This dissertation consists of three essays, two on estimating dynamic entry games and one on the inference for misspecified models with fixed regressors.
Dynamic Games In Empirical Industrial Organization
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Author : Victor Aguirregabiria
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Dynamic Games In Empirical Industrial Organization written by Victor Aguirregabiria and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with Equilibrium (Economics) categories.
This survey is organized around three main topics: models, econometrics, and empirical applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces the concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence and multiplicity, and describes the representation of this equilibrium in terms of conditional choice probabilities. We also discuss extensions of the basic framework, including models in continuous time, the concepts of oblivious equilibrium and experience-based equilibrium, and dynamic games where firms have non-equilibrium beliefs. In section 3, we first provide an overview of the types of data used in this literature, before turning to a discussion of identification issues and results, and estimation methods. We review different methods to deal with multiple equilibria and large state spaces. We also describe recent developments for estimating games in continuous time and incorporating serially correlated unobservables, and discuss the use of machine learning methods to solving and estimating dynamic games. Section 4 discusses empirical applications of dynamic games in IO. We start describing the first empirical applications in this literature during the early 2000s. Then, we review recent applications dealing with innovation, antitrust and mergers, dynamic pricing, regulation, product repositioning, advertising, uncertainty and investment, airline network competition, dynamic matching, and natural resources. We conclude with our view of the progress made in this literature and the remaining challenges.
Essays On Industrial Organization And Game Theory
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Author : Justin Kai-Jen Ho
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Essays On Industrial Organization And Game Theory written by Justin Kai-Jen Ho and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Our simulations indicate that their choices of which contracts to offer are profit-maximizing. However, many retailers prefer to utilize linear pricing contracts even when our model indicates that this may not be profit-maximizing. The third chapter incorporates positive feedback reciprocity in a repeated moral hazard game In this environment, buyers observe feedback left for them before reporting feedback to the mechanism. Buyer feedback reports depend jointly on feedback received and the actual outcome of the transaction. Reciprocal preferences influence buyers and lead to inaccurate feedback reports that deviate from actual outcomes. Contrary to intuition, inaccurate feedback does not always harm equilibrium payoffs. If the feedback remains sufficiently informative, positive reciprocity increases the efficiency of the mechanism by reducing the amount of punishment that occurs in equilibrium.
Handbook Of Game Theory And Industrial Organization Volume I
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Author : Luis C. Corchón
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 2018
Handbook Of Game Theory And Industrial Organization Volume I written by Luis C. Corchón and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Game Theory And Economic Behaviour
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Author : Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany)
language : en
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Release Date : 1999-03-24
Game Theory And Economic Behaviour written by Reinhard Selten (Economist, Germany) and has been published by Edward Elgar Publishing this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999-03-24 with categories.
'These two volumes constitute an impressive collection of selected path-breaking works of Professor Selten. . . . Edward Elgar Publications deserve merit for bringing out most frequently-cited and prominent articles of Professor Selten in a conveniently available package.' - K. Ravikumar, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research In 1994, the Nobel Prize was awarded to Reinhard Selten, John Nash and John Harsanyi, for pioneering analysis in game theory. Selten was the first to refine the Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative games for analysing dynamic strategic interaction and to apply these concepts to analyses of oligopoly.
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization
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Author : Jihwan Do
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2021
Essays On Theoretical Industrial Organization written by Jihwan Do and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2021 with Industrial organization (Economic theory) categories.
"This dissertation is a collection of four papers theoretically studying industrial organization. In Chapter 1, I provide a theoretical explanation of "cheating and compensation on-path of play" using a canonical model of price-fixing collusion. The novel mechanism relies on firms playing mixed strategies allowing for coordination on monopoly price and price-cutting to happen with positive probability, together with a compensation scheme that punishes price-cutters. The mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of equilibria, and such price-cutting and compensation are necessary parts for any symmetric collusive equilibrium. In Chapter 2, I study an infinite-horizon oligopoly model in a network good market with segmented demands. In each period, three firms make compatibility decisions before engaging in price competition. The firm that made a sale in the last period provides a better quality of the product in terms of installed base customers, which can be shared with its competitors through compatibility. I show that compatibility can be used as an exclusionary device even though it intensifies short-run price competition when the firms are sufficiently patient. Under certain conditions, this is the only stable prediction with respect to a dynamic analogue of strong stability in network formation games (Dutta, 1997). In Chapter 3, which is jointly written with Jeanine Mikls̤-Thal, we propose a dynamic approach to modeling opportunism in bilateral vertical contracting between an upstream monopolist and competing downstream firms. Unlike previous literature on opportunism which has focused on games in which the upstream firm makes simultaneous secret offers to the downstream firms, we model opportunism as a consequence of asynchronous recontracting in an infinite-horizon continuous-time model. We find that the extent of opportunism depends on the absolute and relative reaction speeds of the different bilateral upstream-downstream firm pairs and on the firms' discount rate. Patience, fast reaction speeds, and asymmetries in reaction speeds across upstream-downstream pairs are shown to alleviate the opportunism problem. In Chapter 4, which is jointly written with Yu Awaya, we study a moral hazard problem when an employer evaluates employees' performances only through peers - subjective peer evaluation - and cannot discriminate employees' wages ex-post. More precisely, each employee privately chooses effort level, which generates private signals received by his peers. The employer solicits peer evaluations, which are not verifiable. The wage must be equal across workers. We show that the employer can still provide incentives to put effort if signals are correlated, and higher efforts lead to higher correlation."--Pages viii-ix.