Three Essays On Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance In The Banking Industry
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Three Essays On Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance In The Banking Industry
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Author : Allister Keane
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Three Essays On Ownership Structure And Corporate Governance In The Banking Industry written by Allister Keane and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
Thèse. HEC. 2020.
Three Essays In Corporate Finance
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Author : Jérôme Philippe Alain Taillard
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Three Essays In Corporate Finance written by Jérôme Philippe Alain Taillard and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with Corporations categories.
Abstract: In my dissertation, I first contribute to the capital structure literature by estimating the potential impact of financial distress on a firm's real business operations. Secondly, I contribute to the ownership structure literature, and more broadly to the field of corporate governance, by revisiting the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. In my first essay, I analyze a comprehensive sample of defendant firms that found themselves exposed to an unexpected wave of asbestos litigation in the wake of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Since these legal liabilities are unrelated to current operations, firms that are in financial distress due to their legal woes provide a natural experiment to study the impact of financial distress on a firm's operational performance. When analyzing firms suffering from this exogenous shock to their finances, I find little evidence of negative spillover effects ("indirect" costs) of financial distress. That is, the competitive position of the distressed firms is not adversely impacted by their weakened financial situation. Furthermore, I find empirical support for a significant disciplinary effect of financial distress as these firms actively restructure and refocus on core operations. In my second and third essays, I focus on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance using a large panel dataset of U.S. firms over the period 1988-2004. In the second essay, I reconcile some of the extant literature by showing that the relationship is sensitive to the firm size characteristics of the sample being used. In particular, I recover the classic hump-shaped relationship when focusing only on the largest firms (e.g. Fortune 500 firms), while the relationship turns negative when the sample is comprised of smaller firms. The negative relationship among smaller firms is consistent with entrenchment arguments given that managerial ownership is on average much higher for small firms. Second, I find that for lower levels of managerial ownership, the negative relationship is driven by older firms that have on average less liquid stocks. This finding is consistent with firms that do not perform well enough to create a liquid market for their stock, and hence have to keep high levels of insider ownership in order to avoid a negative price impact that would result from a reduction of their stake. Lastly, these results could also be suggestive of endogeneity concerns. I investigate this issue further in my third essay. Principal-agent models predict that managerial ownership and firm performance are endogenously determined by exogenous changes in a firm's contracting environment. Changes in the contracting environment are, however, only partially observed, and the standard statistical techniques used to address endogeneity may be ineffective in this corporate setting. In my third essay, together with my coauthor Phil Davies, we develop a novel econometric approach to control for the influence of time-varying unobserved variables related to a firm's contracting environment. Using the same large panel dataset of U.S. firms over the period 1988-2004, we find no evidence of a systematic relation between managerial ownership and performance.
Corporate Governance In Banking
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Author : Justine Chinoperekweyi, Ph.D.
language : en
Publisher: Notion Press
Release Date : 2009
Corporate Governance In Banking written by Justine Chinoperekweyi, Ph.D. and has been published by Notion Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2009 with categories.
This thesis is the product of my PhD studies at the Department of International Economics and Management at Copenhagen Business School and consists of four essays - one literature review and three empirical studies - on different aspects of the corporate governance of banks. The four essays are self-contained and can be read independently.
Three Essays In Banking
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Author : Tuyet Nhung Vu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2020
Three Essays In Banking written by Tuyet Nhung Vu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2020 with categories.
Three Essays On Institutional Investors And Corporate Governance
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Author : Rasha Ashraf
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2007
Three Essays On Institutional Investors And Corporate Governance written by Rasha Ashraf and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007 with Antitakeover strategies categories.
The first essay analyzes mutual funds' proxy voting records on shareholder proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders' wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of managements' policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors' trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. According to "managerial entrenchment hypothesis," higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. "Efficient contracting hypothesis" argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay structure.
Corporate Governance And Firm Performance The Role Of Transparency And Disclosure In The Banking Sector Of Pakistan
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Author : Muhammad Arslan
language : de
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015-07-16
Corporate Governance And Firm Performance The Role Of Transparency And Disclosure In The Banking Sector Of Pakistan written by Muhammad Arslan and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015-07-16 with categories.
Scientific Essay from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Miscellaneous, language: English, abstract: The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the relationship between transparency and disclosure and firm performance. Highlighting the importance of corporate governance in banking sector, the paper has focused in depth over its role, level and its impact on performance in banking industry of Pakistan. The paper access this purpose by constructing transparency and disclosure index for the past five year 2007-2011, using proxies for three sub-categories which are board and management structure disclosure, ownership structure disclosure and financial transparency disclosure. The paper also investigated structural changes of T&D Index and its effect on bank financial performance over the sample of 30 banks operating in Pakistan. Empirical analysis results by using ordinary least square regression model, reveals that financial performance is positively related to the transparency and disclosure and their sub levels except ownership structure disclosure which has negative relation with both ROA and ROE. Furthermore the average T&D level in Pakistani banking sector is above average. The current research paper aims for important policy implementation to reduce information asymmetry and improve corporate governance and firm performance in banking sector of Pakistan.
Essays On Corporate Governance Of Financial And Non Financial Firms
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Author : Ling Zhang
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Essays On Corporate Governance Of Financial And Non Financial Firms written by Ling Zhang and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Corporate governance of financial and non-financial firms is critical in modern corporations with diffuse stock ownership, which deals with the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Corporate governance has a profound impact on various corporate policy, and firm value in the end. This study examines the importance of corporate governance and its influences on various corporate policy and firm value and risks for both financial and non-financial firms. Chapter 1 investigates the association between the firm's liquidity level and liquidity mix on the one hand and CEO entrenchment on the other. CEO entrenchment may distort the firms' liquidity policy because managers and shareholders may have conflicting preferences between cash and lines of credit. Using lines of credit data from 1996 to 2008, we find five main results. First, entrenched CEOs hold more liquidity as measured by the sum of cash and lines of credit. Second, entrenched managers have a preference for cash over lines of credit because while cash gives them flexibility, lines of credit are accompanied with bank restrictions and monitoring. Third, entrenched CEOs also use more lines of credit because of the extra liquidity it provides, despite the associated bank monitoring. Fourth, entrenched CEOs in smaller and opaque firms tend to hold more liquidity. Five, entrenched CEO's preference for cash versus lines of credit is stronger for large and transparent firms, compared to small and opaque firms. These findings imply that firms should better align the interests of the entrenched managers with those of the shareholders in order to limit the excessive liquidity holding of firms when CEOs are entrenched and to thereby increase firms' profitability. Chapter 2 examines the relationship between bank holding company (BHC) performance, risk and "busy" board of directors, an overlooked dimension of corporate governance in the banking literature. Busy directors are defined as directors with three or more directorships. The sample covers the 2001-2010 period. We employ a simultaneous equation framework and estimate the models employing the three stage least square (3SLS) technique in order to account for endogeneity. Several interesting results are obtained. First, BHC performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA), Tobin's Q and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over total assets is positively associated with busy directors. Second, BHC total risk (standard deviation of stock returns), market risk (market beta), idiosyncratic risk (standard errors of the CAPM model) credit risk (percentage of non-performing assets over total assets) and default risk (HigherZ-Score) are inversely related to it. Third, busy directors are not more likely to become problem directors, in the sense of failing the meeting-attendance-criterion (75% attendance). Fourth, the benefits of having busy directors in terms of performance improvement strengthened but the benefits of risk reduction declined during the recent financial crisis These findings partially alleviate concerns that when directors become too busy with multiple directorships, they shirk their responsibilities. Major implications for investors, regulators, and firm managers are drawn. Chapter 3 investigates the effect of CEO entrenchment on the loan syndication structure. Over the past decade, syndicated loans have played an increasingly important role in corporate financing. Unlike a traditional bank loan with only a single creditor, a syndicated loan involves a group of lenders: a lead arranger and a number of participant lenders. The syndication process, therefore, generates an additional dimension of agency problem between the lead arranger and the participant lenders, besides the traditional agency cost of debt between the borrowing firm and the lender (Diamond, 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). Several results are obtained about syndicated loans made to firms with more entrenched CEOs. First, in these loans the number of participant lenders and their share in the loan are smaller; the lead arranger retains a larger loan share. Second, these loans are more closely held resulting in a higher Herfindahl index of loan concentration. Third, foreign lenders are less involved in these loans. Specifically, the number of foreign lenders and the percentage of loans held by foreign lenders are both smaller. Our findings shed light on the two types of agency problems associated with the syndicated loans, and have great implication for the firms' shareholders, creditors and regulators.
Three Essays In Finance
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Author : Jaemin Baik
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2016
Three Essays In Finance written by Jaemin Baik and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2016 with Electronic dissertations categories.
Corporate Governance In European Banks
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Author : Hanna Westman
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010
Corporate Governance In European Banks written by Hanna Westman and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.
Essays On Changes In Corporate Governance
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Author : Sukesh Patro
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005
Essays On Changes In Corporate Governance written by Sukesh Patro and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with categories.