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Three Essays On The Market For Corporate Control


Three Essays On The Market For Corporate Control
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Three Essays On The Market For Corporate Control


Three Essays On The Market For Corporate Control
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Author : Jennifer Ariadne Hawkins Van Heeckeren
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1993

Three Essays On The Market For Corporate Control written by Jennifer Ariadne Hawkins Van Heeckeren and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1993 with Consolidation and merger of corporations categories.




Three Essays On Corporate Governance And Control


Three Essays On Corporate Governance And Control
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Author : Susan Christine Sassalos
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1994

Three Essays On Corporate Governance And Control written by Susan Christine Sassalos and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1994 with categories.




Three Essays On Corporate Governance


Three Essays On Corporate Governance
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Author : Aazam Virani
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2014

Three Essays On Corporate Governance written by Aazam Virani and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014 with categories.




The Market Value Of Corporate Control


The Market Value Of Corporate Control
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Author : Marco Poltera
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2015

The Market Value Of Corporate Control written by Marco Poltera and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2015 with categories.




Three Essays On External Sources Of Corporate Governance


Three Essays On External Sources Of Corporate Governance
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Author : Lee Kevin K.
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2012

Three Essays On External Sources Of Corporate Governance written by Lee Kevin K. and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2012 with Corporate governance categories.


Corporate governance is the system by which corporations are controlled. External sources of governance include regulatory and market mechanisms as well as the interplay of goals between managers, the board, and shareholders. Other external sources can include informal institutions which can shape goals as well as suggested by institutional theory, effectively constrain human behavior. In my first essay, I argue that foreign direct investors can act as agents of change in corporate governance. Investigating changes in ownership and control of Swedish firms, I find that active foreign investors' participation move firms away from a Swedish stakeholder orientation toward an Anglo-American shareholder wealth maximization focus. In my second essay, I explore the relationship of informal and formal institutions on microfinance institutions (MFI). Investigating the outreach and performance of MFIs in developing nations, I find that strong formal institutions foster better efficiency and outreach while strong informal institutions' impact is limited to better outreach. In my third essay, I investigate the apparent lack of market discipline in the bank subordinated debt market leading up to the 2008 finance crisis. I find that subordinated debt holders were caught off guard by the suddenness and magnitude of the crisis. I argue that bank opacity created a vulnerable environment in the banking industry that contributed to this collapse.



Three Essays In Corporate Finance


Three Essays In Corporate Finance
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Author : Suman Banerjee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1999

Three Essays In Corporate Finance written by Suman Banerjee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1999 with Corporations categories.




Essays On The Market For Corporate Control


Essays On The Market For Corporate Control
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Author : Marc Umber
language : de
Publisher:
Release Date : 2010

Essays On The Market For Corporate Control written by Marc Umber and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2010 with categories.




Shifting Balances Of Power And New Forms Of Corporate Control


Shifting Balances Of Power And New Forms Of Corporate Control
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Author : Anselm Jakob Schneider
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013

Shifting Balances Of Power And New Forms Of Corporate Control written by Anselm Jakob Schneider and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.




The Market For Corporate Control The Theory And The Empirical Evidence


The Market For Corporate Control The Theory And The Empirical Evidence
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Author : Marius Beckermann
language : en
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
Release Date : 2014-12-30

The Market For Corporate Control The Theory And The Empirical Evidence written by Marius Beckermann and has been published by GRIN Verlag this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2014-12-30 with Business & Economics categories.


Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: 1,3, Otto Beisheim School of Management Vallendar (Chair for Corporate Finance), course: Seminar on Recent Developments in Corporate Governance, language: English, abstract: The market for corporate control, often referred to as the takeover market, is subject to scientific research since many years. This paper starts with Manne‘s (1965) initial essay on the topic, introduce the theory of the market for corporate control. Therefore, it will begin with a definition of the terms “corporate control” and “the market for corporate control”. Following this, it will explain the possibilities of taking over the control of a corporation. Subsequently, it will argue why the market for corporate control is of great importance. Afterwards, a synopsis on the current empirical evidence of its efficiency follows. Finally, the author takes a look on the welfare effects of the market for corporate control, before concluding on its applicability and having a look on solutions to correct the imperfections of the model.



Two Essays On Corporate Activities And The Market For Corporate Control


Two Essays On Corporate Activities And The Market For Corporate Control
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Author : Zheng Liu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2017-01-26

Two Essays On Corporate Activities And The Market For Corporate Control written by Zheng Liu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2017-01-26 with categories.


This dissertation, "Two Essays on Corporate Activities and the Market for Corporate Control" by Zheng, Liu, 刘峥, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This dissertation addresses concerns regarding corporate activities in relation to agency costs and studies the effect of the market for corporate control. In the first essay, we use the mid-1990s Delaware takeover regime shift as an exogenous shock to examine how the removal of takeover threats affects managerial decisions on corporate financing and investment and how it affects firm value. Based on a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach, we find that managers reduce debt financing and increase capital investment when they are protected against hostile takeovers, which is consistent with managerial agency models of capital structure and the free cash flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986). We demonstrate that engaging in these entrenched behaviors consequently destroys firm value. Moreover, our evidence indicates that the effect of the takeover regime shift is more pronounced in firms with fewer institutional holdings or lower managerial ownership, supporting the argument of Jensen (1993) that effective internal control systems can alleviate the negative outcomes of a weakened market for corporate control. The substitution effect of internal controls is more substantial than that of the external product market competition. Finally, we determine that empire building, rather than quiet life, is the main consequence of a weakened market for corporate control. In the second essay, we directly examine the causal relationship between managerial entrenchment and diversification. We demonstrate that more entrenched managers adopt higher levels of diversification than do less entrenched managers. We verify the result by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression and treating entrenchment as endogenous. In addition, based on an exogenous change in takeover legislation in Delaware in the mid-1990s, we adopt the differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach and demonstrate that managers increase diversification activities when they are protected against hostile takeovers. Given that diversification destroys value, these results are consistent with the agency costs explanation of diversification. We then explore the motivations that drive managers to diversify. We document that entrenched managers diversify to gain private benefits and to reduce firm risk. Finally, we demonstrate that CEO equity-based incentives increase when takeover-protected firms diversify, suggesting that firms proactively respond to counterbalance the increased costs associated with discretional diversification, which is consistent with theories of optimal contract. DOI: 10.5353/th_b5153698 Subjects: Capital investments Corporate governance Corporations - Finance